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AD NUMBER	
AD391481	
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AUTHORITY	
31 Aug 1978, DoDD 5200.10; AGO d/a ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

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Lessons Learned, HEADQUARTERS,

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

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OPERATIONAL REPORT
for period ending
31 JULY 1966.

(RCS CSFOR - 65)

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1st Infantry Division
Operational Report-Lessons Learned
1 May - 31 July 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

15 August 1966

I Significant Organization and Unit Activities

1. Introduction:

During the period covered by the previous Operational Report-Lessons Learned (1 Jan - 30 Apr 66), the 1st Infantry Division began to conduct major operations outside the assigned tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) to extend U.S. and GVN influence into previously uncontested areas. The period covered by this report was marked by even deeper penetrations into areas considered as VC dominated territory. Operations were characterized by rapid reaction to intelligence information and deployment of the bulk of division forces over vast areas of the III Corps Tactical Zone. There has been a significant increase in the integration of ARVN combat forces into 1st Infantry Division operations. The division initiated its first major pacification operation and results to date have been very encouraging. Operations were also conducted within base camp TAORs to locate and destroy remaining VC forces and installations. Three main Force Viet Cong regiments were engaged in five major battles and in each the enemy forces were decisively defeated. The elite 272d VC Regiment was engaged in battle on two separate occasions, one of which occurred on the 49th Anniversary of the formation of the Big Red One, 3 July 1917.

Sergeant Major William Wooldrige departed the 1st Infantry Division on 9 July to assume his duties as the newly created Sergeant Major of the Army.

The numerous and varied projects initiated under the Civic Action program have continued to have a high priority. During this period, the scope of the program was enlarged to encompass assistance to ARVN forces through construction, training, and medical care for dependents.

2. Organization:

The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy five major base camps at DI AN, PHU LOI, LAI KHE, PHUOC VINH and BEAR CAT. In a ceremony on 4 July 1966, the 2d Brigade base camp at BEAR CAT was officially renamed CAMP COX in honor of Sergeant Martin Cox, Company B, 1st Engineer Battalion. Sergeant Cox was killed in action during Operation ABLEONE.

The 35th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) arrived in-country 16 June and was attached to the 1st Infantry Division by U.S. Army Vietnam General Order 4079 (Incl 4). The entire platoon was further attached to the 2d Brigade for centralized control until training that was incomplete upon deployment from CONUS and refresher training could be completed.

In accordance with guidance from the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, a provisional light assault artillery battery (4.2 inch mortar) was formed in July (Incl 5). Assets of three infantry battalion heavy mortar platoons were transferred to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery. One battalion from each brigade base camp provided the assets, thereby retaining the integrity of the transferred platoons and facilitating the formation of the battery. This plan also enabled each base camp commander to adjust the remaining heavy mortar platoons defending the camp with little or no difficulty. Mortar platoons of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry (PHUOC VINH), 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (LAI KHE), and 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry (CAMP COX) were transferred

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and provided the nucleus to train and organize the battery. The battery, commanded by a major, is assigned to the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery (155mm/8") and has a total strength of 144 personnel. The light assault artillery battery makes available to the division fire power that can be rapidly deployed by UH-1D helicopters when medium helicopters are not available to move a 105mm battery.

In February 1966 modification tables of organization and equipment were submitted for units of the division. Changes from the current organization are necessitated by the counterinsurgency environment; location of division units at five base camps, separated, in some cases by insecure LOC's; and TOE deficiencies which degrade units' ability to perform their missions. Since submission of the original MTOE's, additional modifications have been required by the development of new tactics and issue of new equipment. These additional changes include the establishment of a long range reconnaissance patrol platoon organic to the air cavalry troop; re-authorization of the armored vehicle launched bridge platoon whose deletion was directed prior to deployment from CONUS; and modification of the general support artillery battalion, engineer battalion, and maintenance battalion required by the impending issue of self-propelled 155mm howitzers and additional engineer equipment. Submission of revised MTOE's to incorporate the above changes will be completed in early August 1966.

Requested modifications have been kept to a minimum consistent with the division's mission. Those requested are necessary to meet the operator and maintenance requirements of new equipment and to effectively operate in the Vietnam environment. Pending approval of division MTOE's, the requested modifications have been accomplished in part through the reassignment of excess personnel to requested personnel spaces and temporary authorization of excess equipment, when available. Although this provides a temporary and partial solution to accomplishment of the required changes, it does not provide the complete and permanent modifications required.

Preparation of division MTOE's did not include consideration of reorganization of infantry battalions. The six company organization recommended as a result of the ARCOV Study will significantly enhance the fighting capabilities of the division.

The mechanized flame throwers have been transferred to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Very good results of combat support have been received during contact with the Viet Cong.

Division organization is shown at Inclosure 2.

3. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Order of Battle: Enemy units, reinforcements, location and units in contact with 1st Infantry Division.

(1) Enemy units in III Corps Tactical Zone include two division headquarters, eleven infantry regiments, one artillery regiment and 46 battalions, 36 of which are subordinate to regiments. Five others are heavy weapons battalions subordinate to the artillery regiment. There are also 40 separate companies and 28 separate platoons. Minimum troop strength is 36,300 of which 26,850 are combat troops and 9,450 are support troops. Additionally, there are 17,650 militia.

(2) Immediate reinforcements from II CTZ include two main force battalions and one heavy weapons battalion. Reinforcements available in IV CTZ include one main force regiment (DONG THAP I) and four local force battalions.

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(3) The accepted location of the confirmed enemy units are:

5th VC Div	Northeast PHUOC TUY
274 Regt	West Central PHUOC TUY (HAT DICH)
275 Regt	Northeast PHUOC TUY
9th VC Div	Northeastern War Zone "C"
271 Regt	War Zone "C"
272 Regt	Western BINH DUONG (LONG NGUYEN)
273 Regt	Southern BINH DUONG (LONG NGUYEN)
101 NVA Regt	Western BINH LONG
141 NVA Regt	Northern War Zone "D"
250 NVA Regt	Southern War Zone "D"
70 Regt	Northern TAY NINH
165A Regt	Northeastern BINH DUONG (HO BO)
DONG THAP 17 Regt	Western HAU NGHIA
U80 Artillery Regt	Northern TAY NINH
235 Arty Bn	Northeastern TAY NINH
237 Arty Bn	TAY NINH
239 Arty Bn	PHUOC TUY
241 Arty Bn	BINH DUONG
243 Arty Bn	TAY NINH
PHU LOI Bn	Southeastern BINH DUONG
C320 Bn	Southern TAY NINH
506 Bn	Southern HAU NGHIA
860 Bn	Southern PHUOC TUY
2d Independent Bn	Central LONG AN

(4) During the reporting period, 1st Infantry Division made contact with the 271, 272, and 273 Regiments of the 9th VC Division; elements of the 165A Regiment, the 70th Regiment, the U80 Artillery Regiment and the PHU LOI and C320 Battalions.

b. The VC Main Force Regiments reversed their actions of the previous quarter in which they avoided large scale contact with U.S. forces by engaging in four regimental size battles with U.S. forces in BINH LONG Province as part of their "Monsoon Offensive". Each engagement resulted in a sound defeat for the VC forces and inflicted heavy losses of personnel and equipment on his units. Notwithstanding these defeats there are no indications that the VC are any less determined to seek a victory or that they will cease to attack at a time and place of their choice.

c. VC Losses for the quarter include:

1062 KIA (body count)
1302 KIA (probable)
93 VOC
46 Crew served weapons
257 Small arms
1906 Tons of rice
58 Tons of salt

d. VC Capabilities:

(1) Attack ARVN posts and U.S. positions in BINH LONG Province with up to four regiments. Priority areas of attack:

- (a) LOC BINH
- (b) AN LOC (include CAN LE Bridge XT 7297)
- (c) MINH TRAM

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(d) QUAN LOI

(e) CHON THANH

(2) Attack ARVN posts in PHUOC LONG Province with up to three regiments. Priority areas of attack:

(a) TAU O (XT 7673)

(b) SROC DONG (XU 6303)

(c) BAI LONG (XT 7955)

(3) Increase terrorist activity in vicinity 1st Infantry Division base camps and conduct mortar and recoilless rifle attacks on ARVN - U.S. garrisons.

4. Combat Operations:

a. General. The 1st Infantry Division conducted military operations over a large portion of III Corps Tactical Zone to find and destroy Viet Cong forces and installations. Operations varied in size from squad ambushes to multi-battalion search and destroy missions and were characterized by a rapid response to intelligence.

b. May. During the month of May, the 1st Infantry Division continued extensive operations to find and destroy VC forces, installations and supplies. Operation BIRMINGHAM (Incl 20), initiated on 24 April 1966; continued in close coordination and cooperation with III ARVN Corps Forces and represented the deepest penetration of friendly forces into War Zone C since 1961. This operation deprived the Viet Cong of numerous logistical installations and base camps and unprecedented quantities of supplies. Operation EL PASO I (Incl 19) was conducted in response to a request from 5th ARVN Division based on intelligence indicating the possible presence of up to four VC regiments in the LOC NINH (XU 7310) area. Operation LAN SON II, was initiated jointly by the 1st Infantry Division and 5th ARVN Division in the vicinity of PHU LOI (XT 8575) with the mission to clear, hold, and pacify the area. In the HUNG SAT Special Zone, GVN and Free World Ground Forces influence was extended over the villages and mangrove swamps as a result of the joint participation of 1st Infantry Division, ARVN, and naval authorities in Operation LEXINGTON III. A total of ten separate military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against Viet Cong forces by the division.

(1) Operation BIRMINGHAM, a division operation of two reinforced brigades, continued through 17 May. During the course of the operation, all division units participated with the exception of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry which was deployed on Operation LAN SON II. ARVN participation in Operation BIRMINGHAM included three Ranger battalions and one infantry battalion of the 25th Division and three battalions from the ARVN Airborne Division. CIDG forces from TAY NINH Province participated under control of U.S. Special Forces advisors and were supported by artillery and cavalry elements of the division.

Some of the largest supply caches of the Vietnamese conflict were found and destroyed. As the operational area was shifted westward to the CAI BAC River, the border between Vietnam and Cambodia, large amounts of material confirmed reports of many installations along the Cambodian border. Locations of installations in this area were attributed to the

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relative freedom available to transport supplies within Cambodia, the use of the CAI BAC River and its tributaries as transport routes, and the fact that B-52 strikes have been offset at least 700 meters from the river. Installations uncovered confirmed that the area is used for recuperation, training, and supply. COSVN logistics bases near the Cambodian Border were hard hit as indicated by the losses enumerated in paragraph 9b, Inclosure 20.

From 2 - 7 May, the operation shifted from the Cambodian Border to the plantation area southeast of TAY NINH City (XY 3250). During this phase the brigades conducted search and destroy operations to the south and east of the plantation, but made no significant contacts with the VC. On 8 May, Task Force HOLLINGSWORTH, consisting of Headquarters 3d Brigade, four U.S. infantry battalions, and one ARVN infantry battalion commenced a massive airmobile raid against the suspected location of COSVN Headquarters. However, because of low ceilings and poor visibility the helilift of artillery and artillery ammunition for subsequent LZ preparations was delayed. With weather deteriorating to the extent that both surprise and speed were lost and the lack of assurance that the operation could be supported by air, the operation was cancelled.

The final phase of Operation BIRMINGHAM began on 9 May with emphasis shifting to the MICHELIN Plantation - LONG NGUYEN area, the traditional home of the 272d VC Regiment and the PHU LOI Battalion. Previous intelligence reports had indicated the 271st and 273d VC Regiments had left War Zone D enroute to War Zone C for rest and training and could possibly be in the MICHELIN Plantation - LONG NGUYEN area. Brigade search and destroy operations around the Plantation, across the LONG NGUYEN area to Route 13, and along the SAIGON River to the southeast resulted in no significant enemy contact. However, additional VC supplies were found and destroyed adding to the tremendous losses previously inflicted on the enemy. A significant discovery was made on 13 - 14 May when a regimental size base camp was found and destroyed. The operation terminated on 17 May.

The most significant aspect of Operation BIRMINGHAM was the destruction of vast quantities of VC supplies and facilities including 2,103 tons of rice, 130 small arms, 323 tons of salt, 1,240 gallons of cooking oil, 1,382 gallons of motor oil, 13,949 shirts, 8,603 pairs of pants, and 163 boats and sampans. The impact of this operation will have a long term effect on the VC ability to shelter, feed and equip large numbers of personnel and had immediate effects on his "Honsoon Campaign". Notwithstanding the material losses, the loss of prestige and control in an area formerly considered a safe haven is expected to result in a demoralizing blow to VC stability and influence in TAY NINH Province. It was unfortunate that the weather precluded the penetration of the COSVN Headquarters by Task Force HOLLINGSWORTH. Completion of this raid would have further lessened VC prestige and security within this area.

(2) Operation LEXINGTON III originally scheduled to commence on 4 May was postponed until 21 May when the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry was alerted for Operation BIRMINGHAM. Phase III of Operation LEXINGTON (Incl 18) commenced at 0900 on 21 May. This airmobile and amphibious operation was conducted jointly with U.S. Naval elements and ARVN III Corps Forces. The success of this operation was due to the manner in which the battalion conducted its ambush operations. The U.S. Forces simply worked longer and harder than the VC in the type of swamp fighting peculiar to the MING SAT. Men of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry moved with considerable skill through the swamps and enjoyed increasing success in ambushing the VC who utilized sampans for transportation.

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(3) In early May, a VC Lieutenant was killed about five kilometers southeast of LOC NINH District Town. He had in his possession a plan for the attack on LOC NINH and the Special Forces camp. This event marked the beginning of the Campaign along National Route 13 (Incl 17). In response to this intelligence and at the request of ARVN forces, the 3d Brigade Task Force comprised of three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion commenced Operation EL PASO I (Incl 19) on 19 May. No major forces were contacted, but the rapid deployment of the brigade discouraged a highly probable VC attack in the area.

(4) Operation LAM SON II was initiated by headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery and 5th ARVN Division on 23 May 1966. Planning and execution of this operation, revealed the closest of association and team work between U.S. and ARVN Forces. The PHU LOI Pacification Task Force is made up of a combined U.S. - ARVN staff. The successes of the operation are the result of the extremely close cooperation and coordination between the ARVN, Sector, and U.S. Forces.

This specialized operation conducted in the PHU LOI (XT 8115) area has as its aim the clearing and securing of the operational area to be followed by progressive pacification activities in selected areas. Techniques used in attaining this goal include saturation patrolling, village cordon and search, and the utilization of civil affairs and psychological warfare teams, interrogators, interpreters, engineers, and medical personnel. The phasing of this operation commenced with intensive saturation patrolling followed by the cordon and search of the hamlets. Inhabitants at this time are screened by intelligence and police personnel, are exposed to the CHIEU HOI (Open Arms) program and are processed through MEDCAP and other personal service teams. Emphasis is then placed on having the hamlet develop its own defenses against the Viet Cong. As this is achieved, civic developmental projects such as school and road construction are introduced, thereby improving living conditions and winning hamlet support for the Government of Vietnam. The PHU LOI Pacification Task Force consisting of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, one battery of the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion, elements of the 5th ARVN Division, BINH DUONG Province and District Official, National Police, and ARVN reconnaissance and psychological warfare elements, conducted its first hamlet operation with the surrounding of BINH PHU/BINH PHUOC complex (XT 806144) at 260300 H, 1966. Extremely encouraging results were obtained from the first try. Initial screening yielded one VC, two VC political cadre, seven personnel with false ID cards, 11 ARVN deserters, and 34 men of draft age who were turned over to GVN custody for further interrogation. The first captive offered to show where mines and booby traps were located. During the "County Fair" (Hamlet Festival) portion of the operation, MEDCAP teams treated 750 patients and intelligence personnel screened 521 adults. Three thousand lunches were served and entertainment was provided by two Vietnamese cultural teams and the 1st Infantry Division Band. Upon attainment of desired military and political goals, similar operations will be shifted to adjacent areas in the LAM SON TAUR. After action report for the first hamlet search and festival is attached Inclosure 12.

(5) During May, 83,286 rounds (2,744 tons) of artillery were fired during a total of 19,318 missions in support of operations. Close air support sorties for the 1st Infantry Division totaled 967. Air delivered ordnance consisted of 461.3 tons of high explosive, 224.4 tons of napalm, 60.9 tons of fragmentation bombs, 19.5 tons of white phosphorus, 425 rockets, and 133 canisters of CBU.

c. June. Throughout the month of June, forces of the 1st Infantry Division operated in BINH HOA, LONG KHANH, PHUOC THANH, BINH DUONG,

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TAY NINH, BINH LONG, and PHUOC LONG Provinces. Eight separate military operations of battalion size or larger continued and/or were initiated against Viet Cong Forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone. All resulted in contact.

(1) Operation EL PASO II was initiated on 2 June 1966, in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division and III ARVN Corps Forces. Intelligence indicated the 9th VC Division had positioned three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese Army regiments in preparation for attacks against the LOC NINH - HON QUAN - MINH THANH - SONG BE area. Responding to this change in the intelligence situation and the request from the Commanding General, 5th ARVN Division, the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division ordered one infantry battalion (2d Battalion, 28th Infantry) and one artillery battalion minus (2d Battalion, 33d Artillery (-)) to LOC NINH immediately with the mission to participate in the defense of the Special Forces camp at LOC NINH. On 4 June, the perimeter at LOC NINH received mortar fire and the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was then ordered to LOC NINH on 6 June to reinforce the Task Force at that location.

Three significant contacts occurred with the enemy who made a determined effort to repel this major introduction of U.S. Forces into the area. Additional reinforcements were planned and the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry were ordered to HON QUAN on 8 June. The plan called for Troop A to move up Route 13 and the infantry battalion to move from CAMP COX by helicopter to LAI KHE initially and then to HON QUAN subsequent to the passage of the road column through LAI KHE. In this manner, the infantry would be in an excellent posture to react to any contact made by the road column. At 1440 hours the column engaged the 272d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through AP TAU O, an area between CHON THANH (XT 766616) and HON QUAN (XT 755391). During the four-hour battle, combined firepower from the tanks and APCs, artillery, and air strikes inflicted losses on the enemy force that included 93 KIA (BC) and 250 KIA (Prob). The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry swept south from their location at HON QUAN. The division deployed the 1st Brigade with 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry to MINH THANH.

The second major engagement, the Battle of LOC NINH Plantation (Incl 15), commenced on 11 June 1966 at 1010 hours. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry and CIDG Forces made contact with a battalion of the 273d VC Main Force Regiment located in heavily fortified bunkers. By 1730 the enemy positions were overrun by the infantry after massive artillery, mortar, and air strikes. VC losses were 98 KIA (BC) and 150 KIA (Prob).

The third engagement occurred on 30 June when elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry engaged and decisively defeated the 271st VC Regiment in the vicinity of SROK DONG (XU 7201). The 5th ARVN Division and III ARVN Corps Forces participated by occupying blocking positions both north and south of the battle area. In addition to the organic weapons of the infantry and cavalry units, massive artillery and close air support was skillfully employed against the enemy resulting in 270 KIA (BC) and 300 KIA (Prob). Twenty-three automatic weapons and forty-nine small arms were captured (Incl 14). The narrative of the Battle of SROK DONG is attached Inclosure 16.

With an increase in the VC threat against the SONG BE Special Forces Camp (YU 1507), 3d Brigade elements were airlifted to the area on 20 June. On 26 June 1966, 1st Battalion, 23th Infantry made contact with an estimated VC battalion, inflicting 7 KIA (BC) and 21 KIA (Prob) on the enemy force.

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Based on excellent intelligence, a highly successful one battalion airborne raid was conducted on a suspected rice and supply storage area northwest of DAU TIENG (XT 447537) on 21 June. During the raid, 1506 tons of rice and 5400 sheets of tin were discovered. From this discovery and other supply caches and base camps located, it became evident the area contained major VC supply storage and distribution points. Because of the large quantity of material discovered a second battalion was airlifted into the area as reinforcements. The caches were destroyed by ground troops and by air and chemical attacks.

(2) Operation LAM SON II, the highly specialized pacification operation, continued with emphasis on developing local self defense capabilities and developmental projects. The Joint PHU LOI Pacification Task Force, consisting primarily of 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 5th ARVN Division elements, and BINH DUONG Sector personnel, conducted clearing and saturation operations in designated areas of BINH DUONG Province. Efforts were devoted to locating and destroying main force and guerrilla units, thus permitting and/or stimulating progressive pacification activities in selected areas. Offensive operations by the U.S. and ARVN Forces consisted of platoon size search and clear operations, squad size ambush patrols, and hamlet seal operations. During the month, 391 platoon search and clear operations were conducted with 16.5 percent making contact and 496 ambush patrols were conducted with approximately three percent making contact. By the end of the month, the effectiveness of operations was showing a sharp improvement as a result of increased knowledge of the terrain and the local enemy, as well as the gradual refinement of techniques.

During June, the Pacification Task Force efforts expanded to significant proportions. Initial ARVN skepticism concerning effectiveness of operations was dispelled during the task force's first operation, 27 May, in the village of BINH CHUAN. Combined ARVN-U.S. planning for the second operation went extremely well, and the combined task force was given all the support and forces required.

The second major hamlet seal and search operation centered on the TAN PHUOC KHANH hamlet complex (XT 884163), 1 - 4 June (incl 13). This operation exemplified the general success of the search technique as evidenced by the return to GVN control of a VC security chief, VC hamlet chief, 118 draft dodgers, 21 deserters, 13 former VC parole violators, and 89 VC suspects. The core of the VC infrastructure was severely damaged if not destroyed by the return to GVN control and capture of these personnel. A VC review of the operation estimated a 50% loss of their capability and a two month period required for recuperation. The people generally cooperated while visiting the 969 interrogation vans for interview, stating they were happy to have Revolutionary Development Cadre and U.S. soldiers present in the village. For example, one girl indicated where ten VC were hiding.

In addition to the TAN PHUOC KHANH operation, seven other hamlet seal operations were conducted. Total results of all operations for June included eight VC KIA (BC), 33 VCC, 484 VCS broken down as follows: former VC - 23; individuals on Blacklist - 31; false ID cards - 8; deserters (ARVN) - 38; draft dodgers - 175; and uncategorized - 209. In all instances of seal and search activities, the results have been encouraging, especially in the villages. Here the cooperation given to the 969 program and Cadre Teams has been better than in the hamlets.

The Hamlet Festival (County Fair), which normally accompanies the hamlet search, has been continuously successful. Military and civilian agencies which were at first reluctant to participate, have been increasingly more active in the Hamlet Festival and rural construction activities.

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Conversations with villagers at festivals and follow-up activities indicate an upward trend in their interest in the GVN. Use of ARVN Paywar Teams and their vehicles proved imperative for successful face-to-face communication. However, Vietnamese officers and NCO's in charge seem unwilling to use these teams to their fullest capability. The U.S. Paywar officer has continually assisted these teams, accounting for improvements in their techniques. Use of Rural Construction Cadre for internal crowd control during the Hamlet Festival proved advantageous. This assisted the cadre in establishing rapport with the population and subsequently permitted them to more easily initiate their development activities in the hamlet.

(3) Operation LEXINGTON III (Incl 18) was terminated 9 June 1966. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry operation, conducted jointly with U.S. Naval elements and ARVN III Corps Forces, significantly reduced the VC capability to move freely throughout the RUNG SAT Special Zone. The many rivers and canals interlacing the nearly level marsh were interdicted through the use of helicopters and landing craft, thereby denying the VC the important link in their supply system for traffic between SAIGON and VUNG TAU.

(4) Operations ADELAIDE I & II. These 1st Brigade operations were conducted during the respective periods 30 May - 9 June and 31 May - 8 June in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division elements to destroy VC forces and bases.

During Operation ADELAIDE I, search and destroy operations were conducted along Interprovincial Route 16 north of TAN UYEN. Security was provided for 1st Engineer Battalion elements improving Route 16 to Class 60 from TAN UYEN to PHUOC VINH. In addition a long term project was initiated aimed at the complete penetration and reduction of the ONG DONG Jungle (XT 9027). This dense area has traditionally been a VC safe haven and operating base. The area is to be defoliated and systematically sliced into checkerboard squares by bulldozers to provide pioneer roads for 1st Infantry Division and ARVN forces to rapidly move into the area, encircle, and eliminate VC forces.

Operation ADELAIDE II was conducted in coordination with PHU GIA District Forces. Search and destroy operations were conducted to eliminate major base areas and minor supply installations in the area. Cordon and search operations were conducted around three known VC villages in the area.

(5) Artillery units fired 69,081 rounds in support of operations during June. Close air support sorties totaled 1,151 and expended the following ordnance: 493.5 tons of high explosive; 221.8 tons of napalm; 95.9 tons of fragmentation; 180 canisters of CHU; and 112 pods of rockets.

d. July. During the month of July, the 1st Infantry Division employed forces on four major operations in BINH LONG, LONG THANH, and BINH DUONG Provinces. All major operations resulted in contact with Viet Cong Forces. Two contacts were made with identified VC Main Force units and in each instance the enemy was soundly defeated.

(1) Operation EL PASO II/III, initiated on 2 June, continued in the LOC NINH - BAN QUAN area of BINH LONG Province in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division forces. This large scale operation continued to have excellent results as information gained from interrogation of VC captives was exploited. This intelligence revealed that the VC regiments operating in the area had been given the mission of destroying U.S. and GVN forces operating along National Route 13.

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The first significant engagement occurred on 1 - 2 July between the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and elements of the 273d VC Regiment (Incl 16). Subsequent to the Battle of SROK DONG on 30 June in which the 271st VC Regiment was decisively defeated, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was helilifted to positions west of the battle area, approximately three kilometers from the Cambodian Border (XU 591024). This area was selected to seal escape routes the 271st Regiment might use and to interdict infiltration routes coming into Vietnam from Cambodia. Shortly after the air-lift at 1600 hours, 1 July, Company A made contact with an unknown size VC force approximately 1400 meters south of the battalion CP and C Company location. Contact continued and became more intensive and A Company was reinforced by C Company and the Recon Platoon by 1800 hours. During the early evening, all of these units received mortar and automatic weapons fire. Contact was broken at 2020 hours but resumed at 0545 hours on 2 July. Five assaults were made against the perimeter by the VC before contact was finally broken at 0900 hours. Artillery and fighter bomber strikes, brought in under a 200 foot ceiling, assisted in repulsing the assaults. During the battle, the 3d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment suffered the loss of 79 KIA (BC). Three additional battalions were committed, but only minor contact was made. All forces were withdrawn from operational areas on 4 July for rest, resupply, and maintenance.

Based on two previous successful armor operations, the 1st Brigade positioned forces on 8 July in preparation for a ROAD RUNNER reconnaissance in force from HON QUAN to MINH THANH. An additional infantry battalion was infiltrated to MINH THANH and another to a position approximately eight kilometers southwest of HON QUAN. Two forward artillery bases were established south of HON QUAN. The brigade plan included an overlay designating all landing zones that could possibly be used for the reaction forces to be helilifted into the battle area once contact was made and the disposition of VC forces or the withdrawal routes were known. In addition to the infantry battalion and helicopters prepositioned southwest of HON QUAN, an infantry battalion was standing by at the QUAN LOI airfield for commitment. The two battalions at MINH THANH were positioned primarily to the east and northeast of the rubber plantation to permit a rapid reaction if needed. Artillery and airstrikes were planned along the route of march. A deception plan was released that indicated a troop (-) would be making the reconnaissance, but the actual column consisted of Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry with one attached rifle company. On 9 July, in the vicinity XT 6774, the column received heavy fire from mortars, automatic weapons, and recoilless rifles. The two battalions at MINH THANH moved immediately by foot to strike the VC from the south (rear). Two battalions were moved by helicopter to the northeast and north. One battalion attacked south while the second blocked withdrawal routes to the northwest. The major contact was broken after one hour and 45 minutes and only small skirmishes occurred as the VC infiltrated across the SALOON River. The 272d VC Regiment's losses for the battle included 238 KIA (BC) and 300 KIA (Prob).

Because of the defeats suffered by the VC, the pressure was relieved on the LOC NINH - MINH THANH - HON QUAN area. The 1st and 3d Brigades were extracted to PHUOC VINH and LAI KHE on 13 and 14 July. The 2d Brigade replaced them and Phase III of Operation EL PASO was initiated. Local patrolling, search and destroy operations, and village cordon and search operations continued for the remainder of July.

(2) The PHU LOI Pacification Task Force continued Operation LAI SON II with clearing and saturation patrolling operations in key areas of BINH DUONG Province. On 16 July, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry as the major U.S. element of the combined task force. In addition to supporting national construction plans, the operation also provided essential tactical security to the PHU LOI base complex.

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Offensive operations by the U.S. and 5th ARVN Division forces consisted of platoon size search and clear operations, squad size ambush patrols, and hamlet seal operations. During July, 127 platoon search and clear operations were conducted, ten percent of which made contact with the VC. Six percent of the 257 ambush patrols made contact. Effectiveness increased as personnel became more familiar with terrain and the local enemy and techniques were refined.

Task force hamlet seal operations continued with emphasis on Revolutionary Development. Excellent cooperation was given by all parties during combined ARVN - U.S. planning. The hamlet seal operation conducted in PHU CHANH (IT 858234), 13 July, exemplified the continuing general success of operational techniques. A VC cell member, four guerrillas, 20 draft dodgers, and four deserters were captured. An arms cache was uncovered that contained 11 Mauser rifles, two U.S. shotguns, one Thompson submachinegun, and several thousand rounds of assorted small arms ammunition. The people were cooperative and volunteered the names of 14 VC guerrillas. Total results of all operations for the month included four confirmed VC KIA; 17 confirmed VC captured; 21 false ID cards; 25 deserters; 147 draft evaders; and 46 uncategorized suspects.

(3) The 1st Brigade initiated Operation CEDAR RAPIDS I at 0740 hours 17 July. Two battalions conducted search and destroy operations in AO's adjacent to Interprovincial Route 16 in conjunction with resupply convoys between DI AN and PHUOC VINH. All convoys were conducted without incident and contact with AO's was limited to skirmishes with small groups of VC and mines and booby traps. On 23 July the plan to reduce the VC safe haven in the ONG DONG Jungle was resumed. The 1st Brigade attempted to isolate, seize and destroy VC forces, base camps, and fortified positions in the western sector of the ONG DONG Jungle. Three battalions (1/2 Inf, 1/16 Inf, 1/26 Inf) attacked south while the fourth (2/2 Inf detached from LAI SON II) blocked on the west. Contact with VC forces was limited to no larger than platoon size elements. However, several base camps, bunkers, and tunnels were discovered and destroyed along with the caches of ammunition and supplies stored in them. One large bunker contained 12 - .45 caliber submachineguns and about 2000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. Fourteen sorties of Navy aircraft employed 1000 and 2000 pound bombs against trenches, foxholes, bunkers, and tunnels. Operation CEDAR RAPIDS II terminated at 1300 hours 21 July.

(4) Operation SPRINGFIELD II was initiated by 3d Brigade to exploit intelligence of VC activity within the TAOR. A rallier gave information on 20 January 1966 which indicated a base camp and headquarters facility for the PHU LOI Battalion and 3d Battalion, 165A Regiment was located in the northeastern section of the 3d Brigade TAOR. Read out by imagery interpreters also indicated the possible existence of these facilities and a trail network. Two long range reconnaissance patrols operating in the area on 23 - 24 July confirmed the presence of two battalion size VC units and two large base camps. Both patrols were discovered and had to be extracted. On 27 July, the 3d Brigade initiated Operation SPRINGFIELD II by clearing National Route 13 from LAI KHE to AP BAN BANG with two battalions and establishing an artillery base at BAN BANG. Following two B-52 strikes on 28 July, one battalion moved into blocking positions while two battalions conducted airborne assaults into the objective area. Numerous base camps, fortifications, and supply caches were discovered, but enemy contact was minor. During the nights of 29 and 30 July, the VC probed the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry perimeter around the artillery base at BAN BANG. MI fires by air and artillery were placed in the area and the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was moved into a blocking position. Although an attack by one or more VC regiments appeared imminent, the VC backed off either because of the fire or the rapid deployment of the infantry battalion. Operation SPRINGFIELD II continued into August.

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(5) There were 79,492 rounds (2,868.3 tons) of artillery fired and 1,731 fighter bomber sorties flown in support of the division during July.

5. Training: The status of training in the division is excellent. Since the key to success in the type of combat experienced in the counterinsurgency environment is the proper use of squad and platoon size elements, intensified combat training programs were conducted by squads and platoons rotating to base camps from operational areas. Emphasis was placed on squad and platoon battle drills, designed to correct mistakes observed during operations and integrate replacements into effective fighting teams. The training program includes defensive fires, artillery adjustment, patrolling and small unit fire and movement. The effectiveness of units improved with the initiation of live fire and quick fire reaction courses. Combat training was conducted with emphasis on the OVERWATCH principle of fire and movement (Incl 6).

Because of the large number of replacements received in the months of June and July, emphasis has been placed on indoctrination and training of these personnel prior to participation in combat operations. Training in primary MOS duties is being accomplished on the job. To insure that each individual replacement receives a minimum of 40 hours of instruction prior to participation in combat operations, 1st Infantry Division Training Circular Number 20-6 was published 19 July 1966 (Incl 3). This training is required for all replacements since all units must be capable of participating in tactical operations or base camp defense. Training in airmobile assault techniques continues to insure smoother execution. Many of the problems involving airlift have been resolved through habitual association between maneuver elements and airmobile companies.

The 1st Infantry Division Mobile Training Team to the Philippines Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) completed the final details of their training program in preparation for departure to Fort Magsaysay in early August. The team, consisting of two officers and three NCO's, will conduct the tactical training and complements the engineer and medical teams that will accompany the 1st Infantry Division team to the Philippine Islands. While operating in-country under the control of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, the team will provide: an accelerated orientation in general subjects for PHILCAG non-combatants; and an intensive training program for the PHILCAG security battalions. The latter group will receive instruction on defensive and counterinsurgency tactics, application of the older family of weapons to the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, M-16 Rifle, and communist weapons and material identification and employment. The training program in-country is expected to require a minimum of 30 days for completion.

Training continues throughout the division to cope with the problem of VC tunnel exploitation, destruction, and denial. The Division Chemical Officer, with attached chemical units, is presently constructing a tunnel system to be used in conjunction with the tunnel operations training program.

The 35th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) has been conducting a training program since its attachment to the division on 16 June 1966. The platoon deployed from COMUS prior to completion of their training cycle and have been completing this training in-country. In addition to the program for untrained dogs, refresher training is being conducted for the older dogs and handlers. Plans are being made to coordinate future training at the ARVN Scout Dog Training Center since the facilities there are more adequate.

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6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action: The intensified use of PsyOp during the reporting period has proven to be of great value in supporting combat operations. The Division Civic Action Program continues to grow and is constantly supporting the 1966 MILCAP in close coordination with district and province officials.

a. Psychological Operations.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division installed and commenced operating a 1250W Multilith press on 21 June 1966. The availability of this press has proven to be an asset to the Division PsyOp Program. Situations have developed where immediate reaction, in the form of a leaflet, has given the friendly forces a distinct advantage and had a definite bearing on the effectiveness of the VC soldier. Though the support rendered by supporting PsyOp company and JUSPAO has been satisfactory, the responsiveness of a division operated press has provided the tool with which the G5 can produce highly effective and timely PsyOp media. The delivery time for a fast reaction leaflet has been as little as six hours. This includes the development of the text, making of the plate, printing, cutting, boxing and delivery on target. During the reporting period 21 June to 31 July 1966, the division press has produced approximately 3,500,000 leaflets. Attached as Inclosures 9 are samples of some of the leaflets published by the division. The utilization of the press has not restricted the necessity for support from the 246th PsyOp Company and JUSPAO. In addition to leaflets printed by the division, over 30,000,000 were obtained from another source and delivered by various means, e.g., C-47, HU-10, U-10, and OH-13 aircraft. Some leaflets were distributed by U.S. military and ARVN personnel while participating in operations.

(2) Tapes and Loudspeakers. The availability of 1000 watt loud speaker sets, in each brigade, has provided the means of exploiting Chieu Hoi, captured VC, and ralliers. The immediate use of intelligence information gained from these individuals has proven most effective. Approximately 500 flying hours were spent in support of loudspeaker missions. This includes time provided by the 5th Air Commando Squadron's C-47 and U-10 aircraft. Loudspeaker support is provided for during all operations within the division. In addition to aircraft, vehicular and backpack sets are utilized. The attachment of ARVN GA/PsyOp Teams to the division has provided additional support particularly in the LAI SON Operational Area.

b. Civic Action.

(1) The fund provided under MACV Directive 37-13 has provided the division with a readily available source of funds to assist in the Division Civic Action Program. The fund was placed into operation on 2 July 1966. The procedures in administering the fund are relatively simple and is not a burden on the controlling officer. The 200,000 piasters per month (July only) was sufficient to meet the requirements of the division. Projects that have benefited from the fund are:

(a) Renovation of THU DUC grade school: 44,100 piasters. Assistance was provided by the division engineer battalion and local Vietnamese participated in the construction.

(b) Purchase of athletic suits, educational supplies and personal hygiene equipment, 75,000 piasters. Expenditures were utilized in the LAI SON II area.

(c) Newspaper subscriptions for DI AN High School, one year subscription 2,200 piasters.

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(d) Milk program in two base camps to supplement local health projects, 12,200 piasters.

(e) Construction of wells in LAI SON II area. Local Vietnamese were utilized as labors and paid through this fund 7,000 piasters.

(f) AN LOC Orphanage supported with 20,000 piasters to refurbish the building.

(2) MEDCAP: The Division MEDCAP Program has expanded to support the dependents of the ARVN 5th Division. The MEDCAP activities conducted in conjunction with the LAI SON Operation can account for the treatment of over 27,000 patients of the 59,000 total for the division. The large increase over the previous report is primarily due to the introduction of LAI SON II. MEDCAP continues to be conducted in conjunction with all division operations plus the normal treatment around base camp areas.

(3) Civic Action projects consist of support rendered to orphanages, refugee camps, Boy Scouts, construction of wells and latrines, repairs to existing facilities, churches, schools, and dispensaries. Donations to support orphanages, leprosarium, churches, hospitals and schools were collected through Division Chaplain sources. 32,055.42 and 172,548 piasters were donated. The division conducted a drive to contribute funds for the III Corp DONG HAI Orphanage, and in excess of 55,000 was donated.

7. Aviation: The 1st Aviation Battalion continued to support the division through planning and conducting airmobile operations, aerial resupply, providing aerial command and control, providing aviation support of division administrative operations, and conducting medical evacuations. The battalion operates and controls the division's instrumented airfield at PHU LOI. In addition to the normal operations support, Division Artillery was supported with personnel and equipment in the Area Pacification Operation LAI SON II. The general support mission was limited somewhat in July by the weather conditions prevalent during the monsoon season. Navigational facilities are not available to permit instrument flight and consequently some missions were delayed or cancelled.

During the period the battalion flew six combat assaults/ extractions. Rotary wing aircraft flew 17,004 sorties and 6,923 combat hours. Fixed wing aircraft flew 1,856 missions and 745 combat hours. A total of 18,000 passengers and 460 tons of cargo was transported during the period.

8. Logistics:

a. General. During the period 1 May to 31 July 1966 the 1st Infantry Division continued tactical operations in assigned TAOs and forward operational areas. Logistical support was provided to divisional units from five base camps and four forward logistical base areas. All tactical operations were adequately supported logistically despite difficulties in obtaining required amounts of airlift which was curtailed in many instances due to adverse weather conditions. With the exception of airlift, no major logistical problems were encountered.

b. Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Incl 7).

c. Construction. Overall construction throughout the division continued to be at a minimum due to the ever increasing requirements for Engineer Combat Support. Emphasis has been placed on completing base camp improvement, particularly the defensive perimeter at Cam Cox and replacing unserviceable tents with temporary buildings.

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(1) Horizontal Construction.

Location	Percentage Completed
DI AN (less air strip)	94%
PHUOC VINH	34%
LAI KHE	32%
PHU LOI	64%
BEAR CAT	37%

(2) Vertical Construction.

DI AN	62%
PHUOC VINH	24%
LAI KHE	42%
PHU LOI	62%
BEAR CAT	69%

(3) Construction of the airfield at DI AN is 24% complete.

9. Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) There was a marked improvement in the division strength during this period. Assigned strength as of 31 July was 114% of the authorized strength. This is an increase of 4% over the previous report period. The present for duty strength compared to authorized strength is 107%. This is an increase of 6% over the previous period. Casualties, both battle and non-battle, took their toll. As of 1 May, the division sustained 213 KIA, 1077 WIA, 12 non-battle dead, and 107 non-battle injured, for a total of 1409 casualties. The total casualties the division has sustained numbered 4543 as of 31 July 1966. Losses due to rotation, IIS, administrative discharge and reassignment within Vietnam were 2979 during the period. Division gains during the quarter totaled 3993. The command remains critically short of personnel in two enlisted MOS's; 94D20 (cook), and 96C20 (interrogator). A number replacements from OOMUS arrived with Class 3 profile. As a result, these personnel cannot be utilized in their infantry MOS field. A replacement short fall has developed in the M5, M6, infantry MOS field as a result.

(b) Division strength as of 31 July 1966 is:

	OFF	MO	MI	AOB
AUTH:	943	166	14249	15375
ASGD:	1190	133	16270	17553
PDX:	1138	123	15150	16411

(c) Casualties (by month)

1. May:

	OFF	MO	MI	AOB
KIA:	2	0	39	41
WIA:	13	0	339	352
Missing:	1	0	1	2
Non-battle dead:	0	1	5	4
Non-battle inj:	1	1	40	42

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2. June:

	OFF	NO	EL	AGG
KIA:	3	0	101	104
WIA:	31	3	435	469
Missing:	0	0	0	0
Non-battle dead:	0	0	2	2
Non-battle inj:	0	0	23	23

3. July:

	OFF	NO	EL	AGG
KIA:	0	0	66	66
WIA:	16	5	290	311
Missing:	0	0	0	0
Non-battle dead:	0	0	4	4
Non-battle inj:	2	0	40	42

4. Statistical analysis of battle casualties attached as Incl 10.

(2) Civilian Personnel:

(a) An additional 163 positions were approved by the Industrial Relations Office, Saigon, for hire. The command now has 936 positions established and filled 714 of the authorized 1000 spaces allocated. This is an increase of 232 positions filled since the previous quarter. Skilled labor continues to be short and 200 spaces were reclassified from skilled to unskilled. An additional 1200 spaces will be requested in the next quarter to meet the needs of the 2d and 3d Brigades.

(b) On 1 April 1966 the 1st Infantry Division Temporary Hire Program was authorized 11,907,000\$VN for the period 1 April 1966 to 30 June 1966. The division hired a daily average of 1838 local nationals during that period. On 1 July 1966 the division was authorized 19,136,000\$VN for the period 1 July - 30 September 1966. The daily average of local nationals increased to 2600 during the month of July. It is anticipated that the division will operate at the current level for the next quarter.

b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The discipline in the division has been excellent the past quarter. No stragglers were apprehended. No personnel assigned to the division were apprehended as stragglers. There were 91 reported AMOLs and 16 serious incidents reported during the three month period.

(2) During the report period the Court-Martial rate increased from an average of 42 per month to 52 per month. Discipline rates within the division continue to be excellent.

(3) The Division IG handled 136 complaints and requests for assistance during the period. This is a marked increase over the previous period. However, the majority of the cases were due to adjustment of DaROS dates and requests for curtailment.

c. Development and Maintenance of morale:

(1) The state of morale within the division remains excellent as a result of continued emphasis on improving services and facilities.

(2) Finance: The 3.2% across the board pay raise was paid to all members of the division during the month of July. A monthly Finance Newsletter has been initiated to keep members of the division currently informed

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on pay changes and procedures. The Finance Courier Teams initiated a new program of conducting pay clinics at the units to resolve individual finance problems and to insure improved services.

(3) Chaplain: On 20 June 1966, the Reverend Calvin Thielman, White House Chaplain, visited the 1st Infantry Division. On 10 July 1966, the 3d Brigade Chapel was dedicated. During the quarter the Chaplains conducted 1244 religious services and had a combined attendance of 34,471 personnel.

(4) Special Services: Out-of-country R&R quotas increased from 2714 at the end of the last period to 3872 on 31 July 1966. This was a gain of 3158 quotas. In-country quotas increased from 1890 to 2720. This is a gain of 920 quotas. In July the in-country R&R quota was increased from 12 every 3 days to 25 for every 3 days.

(5) Red Cross: There was an increase of 12% in the total number of services rendered in comparison to the previous period. A total of 2997 new and re-opened cases were handled during the period.

(6) Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 3235 awards given for valor and meritorious service during this period as follows:

Silver Star	27
Legion of Merit	11
Distinguished Flying Cross	34
Soldier's Medal	15
Air Medal - V	42
Bronze Star - V	442
Bronze Star - H	425
Army Commendation Medal - V	100
Army Commendation Medal -	367
Air Medal	1157
Purple Heart	665

During the report period 84 members of the division were honored by the Vietnamese Government. Awards given are as follows:

National Legion of Honor 5th Class	2
Cross of Gallantry with Palm	3
Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star	21
Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star	53

(7) Burials and Graves Registration: During this period the Graves Registration Platoon processed and evacuated 173 remains. Nine of these were non-divisional.

10. Chemical Operations: The Division Chemical Section developed and field tested two expedient type CS munitions. The first of these munitions was a 55 gallon shipping drum of CS-1 fitted with a burster and fuse. These drums were dropped from both fixed and rotary wing aircraft and functioned with excellent results in so far as height of burst and target coverage was concerned. Effects on enemy forces have not been determined. This munition has been used extensively during operations conducted by the division. The chemical section also tested a 105mm base ejection shell filled with CS-1. There was no significant contamination in the target area, and the project was discontinued.

The Division Chemical Section and the attached 266th Chemical Platoon and 242d Chemical Detachment continued to support the tunnel exploitation

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program throughout the division. These personnel are presently constructing a tunnel system at DI AN to assist in the training of personnel in the exploitation, denial, and destruction of tunnel systems.

The division was issued twelve Chemical Manpack Personnel Detectors, in June with a total of thirty detectors to be eventually issued throughout the division. A training area has been selected in vicinity Camp Cox, and a training package has been prepared. Dates have not been set for the course because troops needed to secure the area are currently not available due to other operational commitments. Day and night tests of the detector were conducted by the 266th Chemical Platoon to determine its effectiveness and the requirements of the training program.

Six requests were prepared and submitted for defoliation missions and one has been approved as of 31 July 1966. The 266th Chemical Platoon has accomplished both herbicide and insecticide operations throughout the division forward and rear areas.

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II Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

1. Observations (Lessons Learned):

PERSONNEL

Replacements

Item: Replacement pool.

Discussion: Providing a steady flow of personnel to units with out holding a reserve at the replacement detachment has proved to be a problem when units are in contact and sustain large numbers of serious casualties.

Observation: By pooling personnel at the replacement detachment, a ready reserve is on hand, giving the necessary flexibility to react and provide mass replacements for units when needed.

Replacements

Item: Replacement of casualties.

Discussion: Replacements have been requested for casualties that were hospitalized for short periods of time (2 to 4 days).

Observation: Casualties should be carefully screened to preclude requesting of replacements for personnel who will be returned to duty within 2 or 3 days.

Finance

Item: Resolution of pay problems.

Discussion: Many man-hours are lost and the individual soldiers are inconvenienced if they are referred to the Division Finance Officer to resolve pay complaints.

Observation: A form has been developed to permit the soldier to communicate his pay problem and receive an immediate answer without personally visiting the finance office. In addition Finance Courier Teams conduct clinics and provide better service at unit level.

OPERATIONS

Combined Artillery/Air Operations

Item: Artillery and air operations can be conducted simultaneously in the same area.

Discussion: Detailed pre-planning to include the establishment of safe air corridors will allow for the continuation of artillery preparations during airmobile operations without risk to friendly aircraft and personnel. An effective means of simultaneous employment of artillery/airstrikes incorporates the use of fire coordination lines with artillery employed on one side and air on the other.

Observation: All tactical plans, to include employment of reaction forces, must provide for uninterrupted simultaneous employment of artillery and airstrikes. Cease fire of artillery should not be imposed during airmobile operations or airstrikes except in extreme emergencies.

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Airmobile Operations

Item: Aircraft scheduling for airmobile operations.

Discussion: The number of aircraft originally allocated for a given airmobile operation habitually decreases as the operation progresses because of maintenance problems and/or combat losses.

Observation: A realistic and comprehensive schedule of aircraft allocations for airmobile operations should be established utilizing an experience factor for aircraft attrition.

Artillery Observers

Item: Use of aerial observers during heavy contact.

Discussion: Engagements with Viet Cong forces assembled in ambush positions along roads provide exceptionally good targets for artillery. Aerial observers contribute to the success of these engagements in the following ways:

1. Provide aerial observation posts with a rapid reaction time in reporting ground activity not detectable by personnel on the ground.
2. Provide accurate and timely observed artillery support to the maneuver elements.
3. Pin-point concentrations of enemy troops during the confusion of battle.
4. Observe and report routes of escape when the enemy breaks contact.
5. Provide battle field surveillance during mopping-up action.

Observation: Provision of aerial observers and aircraft for sustained operations must be included in all tactical plans for maneuver of forces or convoy operations.

Noise Discipline

Item: Reduction of inner-perimeter noise during enemy activity.

Discussion: Generators and vehicular noises are distracting to personnel manning perimeters and interfere with their ability to detect enemy movement.

Observation: Vehicle batteries may be used as a power source for short periods of time. Generators should have a back-up battery power source for use in emergencies.

Map Reading

Item: Map inspected coordinates.

Discussion: Units occupying unfamiliar terrain, terrain that is devoid of prominent terrain features, or heavily forested areas have difficulty inspecting their positions from maps. Misjudgment of the actual location through erroneous map inspection may result in injury to personnel by friendly artillery.

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Observation: Map inspected coordinates should be verified by an airborne observer whenever possible.

Map Reading

Item: Points of origin.

Discussion: Points of origin provide a fast means of locating friendly forces without compromising their positions. They also provide an accurate and simple encoding system for passing target information.

Observation: There are several things that should be considered when a point of origin system is established:

1. The system should be published at the highest level necessary to insure all interested agencies will have access. It should be published for use both during field operations and at base camps, and changed periodically to cover compromise.
2. Points should originate at random 1000 meter grid intersections to facilitate artillery targeting.
3. The system should incorporate the use of broad categories (cars/colors) for quick reference (Ford, Chevy/Red, Blue).

Employment of Artillery

Item: Standard 105mm battery package of airlift.

Discussion: A standard package for CH-47 airlift of a 105mm howitzer battery can be established as follows:

	<u>Firing Btry</u>	<u>Hq Btry</u>
Personnel	90	80
Howitzers	6	-
105mm Ammo	600	-
1 T Trk	1	1
1 T Tlr	-	1
3/4 T Trk	2	4
Total Lift (Ch-47)	12	7

Observation: Like artillery units should establish a standard combat configuration to facilitate computation of airlift requirements and rapid deployment of units.

Employment of Artillery

Item: Tactical tailoring of artillery batteries.

Discussion: Tactical planning frequently requires tailoring of artillery when batteries are attached to other headquarters. Although this serves the purpose of providing the artillery support necessary to accomplish the particular mission, it also creates a greater need for early planning and liaison between units.

Observation: In the interest of unity of effort and timely response to orders, the tactical tailoring of units based on habitual association is desirable when practicable. When it is not feasible, adequate time for planning and liaison between unfamiliar units is necessary.

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M10 Howitzer

Item: Repeated firing of the M10 8 inch self-propelled howitzer after the weapon has settled deeply into the soft ground may result in damage to the weapon.

Discussion: Although the M10 has proven its capability to operate over soft terrain, damage to weapons has resulted from their settling into the mud while firing. As long as the hull bottom remains clear of the ground, the lookout suspension system provides proper support. However, continuous firing in soft terrain causes the tracks and spade to sink in the mud until the weight of the weapon is resting on the hull rather than the suspension system with the eventual result of structural damage to the piece. This is probably the major cause of ruptured fuel tanks, since the tanks are an integral part of the hull. It is also probable that damage to hydraulic lines, structural members, and drive shafts may be attributed to "bottoming".

Observation: Firing battery personnel must be continually alert for evidence of "bottoming" when firing in soft ground. When this condition is detected, the howitzer should be moved and relaid immediately.

Helicopter Damage

Item: Helicopter damage caused by radio antennas.

Discussion: Due to extensive use of helicopters in transporting troops and supplies, a continuing hazard exists for unknowledgeable individuals that approach a helicopter while the blade is turning. Individuals have been known to drive vehicles with radio antennas too close to the blades, resulting in severed antennas, damage rotor blades, and flying debris dangerous to bystanders and helicopters. Back pack radios with long antennas constitute an equal hazard.

Observation: Personnel involved in operations around aircraft must be indoctrinated on the possible hazards of rotating blades. Control of vehicular movement around airfields and landing zones must be rigidly enforced.

Aerial Artillery Observation

Item: Aircraft proximity to exploding projectiles.

Discussion: Due to restricted visibility during rain showers, aerial observers will have to fly closer to the target to observe the bursts. Consideration must be given in these cases to erratic fuse action and possibility of shrapnel travelling greater distances than the normal bursting radius of the projectile.

Observation: Aerial observers must be aware of the possibility of being too close to the point of impact and advise pilots of the hazards involved.

VC Tactics

Item: VC fire discipline.

Discussion: During instances where convoys have been ambushed, the convoy has been preceded by an observer in O1 aircraft. The ambush areas were crossed at approximately 50 foot altitude. The VC did not fire at the aircraft, but held the fire until the . . . re in the ambush area.

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Observation: Personnel must be made aware of the fact that VC are well trained in fire/camouflage discipline and that negative sightings do not necessarily indicate there are no VC present and continuous alertness must be maintained at all times.

HAI Fires

Item: CWT and time fuse HAI fires.

Discussion: A great number of mines and booby traps are emplaced on roads at night. Curfew regulations prohibit civilian travel at night.

Observation: CWT and time fuse HAI fires over likely areas the VC may emplace mines and booby traps on highways and roads will discourage this practice.

Saturation Patrolling

Item: Saturation patrolling is effective.

Discussion: Saturation patrolling can contribute as an effective measure to severely hinder VC activities in populated areas. VC main forces are forced to withdraw because of the difficulty in pin pointing the friendly main force location by infiltration. Populated areas regain a sense of security achieved from the everpresent network of patrols about the area. Integration of ARVN forces in the saturation patrol plan instills in the people a loyalty to the GVN and activates increased participation of the people in the Revolutionary Development Program.

Observation: Saturation patrolling should be a prime consideration in establishing security in populated areas designated for Revolutionary Development Programs.

Combined ARVN - US Pacification Operations

Item: Combined ARVN - US pacification operations are necessary and workable.

Discussion: To win the cooperation of the people in outlying areas, security against VC terrorism is essential. The people must see stability and the capability of the GVN to maintain peaceful and improving conditions. When a mutual understanding of the goals and the characteristics of ARVN and US personnel exists, combined pacification operations will work. Patience and willingness to cooperate are necessary components that both sides must possess. Pacification operations conducted as a combined ARVN - US effort have been productive and these factors are the basic reasons for the definite continued success.

Observation: Combined ARVN - US pacification operations should be employed against the VC operating in the populated outlying areas. Understanding of the goals and a mutual willingness for cooperation and patience must be present.

Revolutionary Development

Item: Dissemination of propaganda material in areas undergoing pacification.

Discussion: House-to-house dissemination of propaganda literature has been the most effective method to insure maximum coverage. However, dissemination requires saturation coverage to be effective, a practice that is wasteful and tends to antagonize some villagers. House-to-house

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dissemination eliminates waste and guarantees adequate population coverage, especially when the activity is supported by a loudspeaker.

Observation: Avoid aerial dissemination of propaganda literature in semi-secure areas whenever possible. When security conditions permit, an attempt should be made to distribute literature by house-to-house canvass, supported by loudspeakers. This method allows the villagers to become accustomed to US presence.

Revolutionary Development

Item: Introduction of Revolutionary Development Cadre at hamlet festivals.

Discussion: The Revolutionary Development Cadre members can be used during hamlet festival activities as guides in establishing and maintaining crowd control. This has proved to be a very effective technique since the cadre are trained to work with people and do an excellent job in providing crowd control and general assistance. This is one of the best methods to introduce the cadre into the pacification program. Introduction in this manner establishes rapport and enlightens the people to the fact of their existence.

Observation: Crowd control at hamlet festivals is essential and Revolutionary Development Cadre are best utilized for this purpose. This will not only take advantage of their training, but is an excellent introduction of the teams into the program.

Army Aviation

Item: Flight following.

Discussion: Due to the number of aircraft involved in combat operations and administrative flights, a system of flight following is required. This procedure is necessary for the safety of aircraft travelling in congested areas, and through areas in which artillery is firing, rapid search and rescue of downed aircraft, and redirection or recall of aircraft from one mission to another of higher priority with a minimum of delay.

Observation: Aviation battalion operations centers should improve flight following techniques and procedures for organic aircraft operating within the TAOB. The battalion should be augmented with air traffic control personnel for control of non-organic aircraft operating within the TAOB.

Military Police Operations

Item: VC collecting points.

Discussion: On many occasions the division TAC CP will be collocated with a brigade CP, or units will be operating under division control. It is not feasible for each unit to establish separate VC collecting points.

Observation: VC collecting points should be collocated when two or more headquarters are operating in close proximity to each other. This will not only economize on security forces, but will facilitate processing and interrogation and dissemination of intelligence.

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TRAINING

Artillery Observation

Item: Infantry and armored cavalry should be trained in artillery adjustment procedures.

Discussion: During contact with enemy forces, artillery ground observers with infantry and armored cavalry units will be killed or wounded and require evacuation.

Observation: Infantry and armored cavalry platoon and squad leaders should be thoroughly trained in observer procedures to take over in the absence of an observer from the supporting artillery unit.

INTELLIGENCE

Mobile Interrogation Vans

Item: Effectiveness of mobile interrogation teams.

Discussion: The use of mobile interrogation teams during seal and search operations has caused the indigenous population to volunteer significant information concerning VC activity in the area. Once the seal and search of the village is complete, mobile interrogation teams should re-enter the area in an effort to gain voluntary information from civilians. During these interviews, IPW teams should attempt the first phase of the recruitment of informers. It has been effective to reward all persons entering the van on a voluntary basis an appropriate gift. If significant information can be confirmed, the person is rewarded substantially.

Observation: Mobile interrogation teams should be utilized to gain information from sympathetic civilians. They should be interviewed rather than interrogated. The teams should be combined Vietnamese and US and the number of teams should be tailored to the population figures.

National Police Screening

Item: National Police screening is effective in population control.

Discussion: Detailed screening of all draft age men can contribute greatly to the population control of a particular hamlet or village. Not only does effective screening filter out those men avoiding the draft, but the National Police are successful in apprehending deserters, holders of false ID cards, and VC suspects indicated on the "blacklist". The National Police are also able to exert their influence on the local population, after which, plans can be made for the introduction of permanent police forces in the hamlet for purposes of security and population and resources control.

Observation: Detailed screening of all draft age males by the National Police should be a prime consideration when planning for a hamlet seal and search operation.

VC Tactics

Item: VC use route of attack as initial route of withdrawal.

Discussion: Several VC captives have stated during interrogation that the initial route of withdrawal from an objective area or ambush site was the same that was used in moving to the attack. This makes it easier for

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the soldier to find his way back to assembly areas. In three regimental size attacks against division convoys the VC never attacked through the column. Their withdrawal was always in the direction from which they attacked.

Observation: When VC routes of attack are known, they should be covered with blocking artillery fire or airstrikes when it appears the VC are attempting to break contact and withdraw.

VC Strength

Item: VC have shown ability to recuperate rapidly after heavy losses.

Discussion: On 8 June two battalions of the 272d VC Main Force Regiment were badly mauled when they attacked a US column on National Route 13 and lost an estimated 340 personnel. On 9 July, the same regiment attacked another column with three battalions. Captives from this battle stated up to 800 NVA replacements had joined the regiment on 7 July. On 30 July a returnee from the 271st VC Main Force Regiment stated his regiment had lost approximately 570 men on 30 June when it attacked a US column of Route 13. All NVA replacements were trained soldiers and gave the VC regiments the capability to regain combat effectiveness in short order.

Observation: Enemy units that are badly defeated cannot be considered deleted from enemy order of battle. The VC have the capability to replace battle losses with trained personnel quickly and because a unit is defeated in one battle it should not be eliminated as a threat. The intelligence effort should continue to determine its location.

Integrated Intelligence

Item: An integrated intelligence effort will result in a clearer picture of the enemy situation.

Discussion: Many sources of information are available to intelligence gathering agencies. Some of these sources are ralliers, aerial photography and imagery interpretation, airborne sensory devices (infra red and side looking airborne radar), long range reconnaissance patrols, and captured VC and documents.

Observation: All efforts at gathering intelligence must be integrated to form the complete enemy situation if the enemy is to be located and destroyed.

COMMUNICATIONS

RC-292 Antenna

Item: Elevating the RC-292 antenna.

Discussion: Heavy vegetation and dampness in Vietnam decreases the effectiveness of the ground wave in R. communications which in turn decreases range.

Observation: To overcome this difficulty, and to get the maximum use of the RC-292 antenna, it can be elevated higher than the mast sections provided for in the issued kit. This can be done by using one each Kit Mast AB 235/0 with stakes GP-2 (E: 687-27) which will provide an antenna height of 60 feet (24 feet higher than maximum height of the conventional RC-292).

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This additional height increases the range of the VRC-12 series radios from 30 miles to approximately 50 miles. There is little variation of readability or signal strength during adverse weather conditions.

AN/PRC-25

Item: AN/PRC-25 transmitting difficulties.

Discussion: Difficulties has been experienced while transmitting in heavy jungle, especially rubber plantations, while utilizing the short whip antenna.

Observation: When difficulty in transmitting with the whip antenna exists, the long antenna should be tried. If this does not clear up the problem, an airborne relay station should be established.

Radio Exposure

Item: Retransmit R/U and audio connectors are susceptible to moisture.

Discussion: During the rainy season in Vietnam, moisture collects in the audio connectors on the face of the radio set which causes the set to automatically key when in operation.

Observation: Use of canvas covers will help prevent moisture from getting on the face of radio sets. The AN/PRC-25 is provided with rubber audio connector caps secured to the set by a nylon cord. These same caps also fit the RT-524. Precautions should be taken to secure the cap to the set to prevent loss.

Rectifier RA-91

Item: The Rectifier, RA-91, can be utilized as a power supply for AN/VRC-12 series radios.

Discussion: During short duration tactical operations where radios are mounted in vehicles, it is practical to remote radios into the tents. This is not so when operations are to be set up in one place for extended periods of time. Extended idling of engines to keep batteries charged causes the engine to carbon up. If the engine is not used to charge the batteries, a separate generator for each radio in operation will have to be used. This shortens battery life and causes excess wear on generators. Remoteing of radios also ties down a vehicle that could be used for other purposes, requires extra gasoline for generators, and a higher consumption of batteries for remote units.

Observation: Radios can be removed from the vehicles and placed in a tent. The power source consists of two 50 Amp, 12 volt batteries (in series) which are charged by a 15 Amp RA-91 rectifier, powered by a 120 volt 60 cycle 5 kw generator. The rectifier has the capability of a constant control of amperage output, eliminating the erratic output common to dc generators which is harmful to all radios.

AN/PRC-69

Item: Overheating of equipment in the AN/PRC-69 causes tube failure.

Discussion: The high temperatures experienced in Vietnam combined with the normal amount of heat generated through operation of the equipment, causes the components of the AN/PRC-69 to overheat with subsequent tube failure.

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Observation: The most assured way to reduce the temperature within the AN/IRC-69 is through the use of air conditioners. The following expedient methods are recommended for use in the absence of air conditioners:

1. Keep exhaust fans in continuous operations, keeping the air path clear.
2. Leave the shelter door open for circulation of air.
3. Pull equipment components slightly from recesses to allow the heat to escape.
4. Paint the top of all shelters white to reflect the heat from the sun. Sandbagging the entire structure will give some relief from the sun and also protection from enemy fire.

Base Camp Communications

Item: The AN/ATC-3 and the AN/ATC-1 is inadequate for division main base camp communications.

Discussion: As the division became more firmly established, and base camp facilities began to expand, it became evident that an AN/ATC-3 switchboard at Support Command and an AN/ATC-1 at Division Main would be totally inadequate to handle either the internal base camp communications or the growing demand for trunking facilities. Because of this ever expanding requirement and the large number of calls being placed, it was necessary to install a second AN/ATC-1. Three AN/ATC-1 switchboards are now in use in the Division Main Base Camp, one for Division Main locals, one for Support Command locals and one for all trunking facilities. This last change over took place in 5 June 1966. Each of the three switchboards has trunk lines interconnecting it with the remaining two switchboards in the base camp.

Observation: Even though all of the telephone requirements of the division, are being filled at the present time the point has been reached where it would be definitely advantageous to replace the three existing AN/ATC-1 switchboards with one AN/ATC-9. This change is necessary for two reasons. First, the local and trunking needs of the division are ever increasing and second, the use of one switchboard and one frame (AN/ATC-9) as opposed to three switchboards and frames (AN/ATC-1) would increase capabilities and operating efficiency while at the same time greatly reducing the number of personnel needed to operate the board.

Wire Communication


Item: Utilizing a wirehead to allow a "Clean Patch" state in the patch panel.

Discussion: The 121st Signal Battalion has developed wireheads to be utilized in conjunction with the patch panel in each base camp signal complex. The wirehead has provided more efficient and effective circuit control in base camp installations where temporary tactical and permanent administrative circuits are integrated.

The wirehead at Division Main was built inside a standard Conex container. The interior was framed and lined with 3/4 inch plywood. Junction boxes J-1077 and JD-2317 were installed to terminate 26 pair cables from the patch panel and commercial cable from local subscribers. Jumper wire was used to connect appropriate circuits to the switchboard frame. Common trunk circuits between Danger Main and Danger LD switchboards were wired directly between frames, by-passing the wirehead. This was done primarily to conserve jumper wire.

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The principle advantage of the wirehead is that it takes advantage of the "normal through" characteristic of the patch panel. The resulting clean patch feature reduces considerable congestion in the limited space available within the SE-611 patch panel. As a result, the fallibility of the patch cords due to handling, heat, dirt and moisture is eliminated. Additionally, most of the patches in base camp signal center are of a permanent nature. The only exception to the "clean patch" occurs when temporary tactical circuits are established to forward areas by patching as necessary in the patch panel. Permanent circuits which are interrupted, pre-empted or re-routed as a result of circuit outage or installation of temporary tactical circuits, are quickly restored by pulling the patch cord and reverting back to the normal through characteristic of the patch panel and the original patch found in the wirehead.

The wirehead necessitates additional circuit records. Tagged or color coded jumper wire is a necessity with the wirehead.

Observation: In permanent or semi-permanent signal center, the advantages of a wirehead outweigh the disadvantages. In effect, permanent patches are made in the wirehead resulting in a normally uncluttered patch panel board. Circuit outages as a result of patch cord failure are thereby eliminated. Temporary circuits and re-routes are accomplished with patches in the patch panel. Circuit testing and restoration is enhanced significantly as a result of the clean patch.

Airlift of S-144 Shelters

Item: Equipment Shelters S-144 are structurally unsound for airlift.

Discussion: The 121st Signal Battalion has experienced an increasing requirement to provide highly mobile and flexible communication support to the infantry brigades. Due to difficulties experienced in highway movement, brigades are normally airlifted to and from areas of operations. The Forward Signal Platoons must also displace by air. As a result of the last five division sized air assault operations, the S-144 Shelters have been proved to be structurally unsound for sling load airlift. Two AN/SC-69 shelters have been dropped from altitudes of 250 feet and 2000 feet while being carried by OH-47 Chinooks. On at least two other S-144 Shelters, the lifting points have been examined closely and have been found to be pulling loose from the frame of the shelter.

Air safety standards require a minimum of six feet of nylon strap on each leg of load sling sets. Inherent vibrations and oscillations in rotary winged aircraft are believed to be the cause for lifting point failures. The lifting points are inadequate for anything except lifting

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the shelter on and off vehicles. Examination of lifting points after an airlift has revealed that the shelter frame is not durable enough to carry the strain applied to the upper shelter corners during lift-off, varying air currents in level flight, and rotary winged vibrations.

Observation: In order to support an infantry division under current concepts of tactical deployment in the Republic of Vietnam, signal equipment must be air transportable. Signal shelters (2 1/2 ton truck variety) are structurally unsound and unsafe in meeting the demands imposed by airlift. If the S-144 shelters are to be used in this manner, reinforcement of the shelter and lifting points is necessary. An alternate solution is to discontinue lifting the shelter and remove the equipment for installation in other suitable shelters. This solution has been adopted in this unit. One stack (radio and carrier equipment) has been removed and mounted in a 3/4 ton trailer. This presents a package similar to the new AN/PRC-111 Radio Relay Terminal. The trailer mounted package can be loaded internally into CH-47 Chinooks.

Camera Equipment

Item: Need for cameras with water-proof housings.

Discussion: The TOS cameras for still photography utilized by the division photographic section are not suitable for combat photography in this environment. The extremes of rain, dust, and heat have caused an inordinate number of malfunctions. Further, the rough handling of cameras is unavoidable when the combat photographer is photographing friendly forces engaged in ground operations against a hostile force.

Observation: There is available a relatively inexpensive, extremely sturdy, 35mm camera which is enclosed in a water-proof housing. Three of these cameras (by Nikkors) have been requisitioned (over authorized allowance).

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYOPS

Civil Affairs Planning

Item: Preparing and planning CA projects in pacified areas.

Discussion: One important phase of any pacification plan is the development of CA projects. Prior to initiating and completing a project, coordination must be effected with sub-sector officials and their advisors. Coordination informs these officials of projects being developed in their area and will preclude any duplication of effort.

Observation: Planning of CA projects (all of which are of the self-help variety) must include utilization of village help. Coordination with village officials will assist in enlisting village help. Projects become meaningless, no matter how imposing or important it may be, unless the villagers associate themselves with it by actual participation.

Psych Leaflet Printing

Item: Use of a Multilith press at division level.

Discussion: The availability of a Multilith printing press at the division level, provides the G3 with a capability to produce highly effective and timely PsyOp media. Immediate exploitation of combat situations gives US forces a definite advantage in the PsyOp area.

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Observation: The availability of the press at division level increases the capability of the division to employ printed PsyOps media rapidly. The time from initiation of request for a leaflet has been reduced from 2 or 3 days to generally 12 to 24 hours.

MEDICAL

Helicopter Evacuation

Item: Army air ambulances equipped with "Forest Penetrators" and "Stokes Litter".

Discussion: In many instances wounded personnel must be evacuated from landing zones where clearance is less than the minimum required for Army air ambulances. In these instances Air Force helicopters equipped with the "Forest Penetrator" capability have been called.

Observation: Army air ambulances equipped with the modified "Forest Penetrator" and "Stokes Litter" would decrease the time lag that now exists between request for evacuation and determination that Air Force assistance will be required.

Helicopter Evacuation

Item: Standby "Dust Off" air ambulances.

Discussion: As operations have penetrated deeper into northern provinces, the flying distance from forward areas to medical facilities has increased. This requires more time for "Dust Off" aircraft to make the circuit from their base and back to the medical facility.

Observation: "Dust Off" aircraft have been centrally located in or near the area of operations. This has reduced the distance of the first leg and gets the casualty to the medical facility much sooner.

Superficial Wounds

Item: Superficial cuts and wounds should be given immediate treatment.

Discussion: Superficial cuts and wounds are being neglected, especially those associated with bamboo. Wounds of this type often lead to boils and skin infections which require treatment with antibiotics.

Observation: Personnel must be made aware of the seriousness involved in neglecting these type wounds and that immediate first aid measures must be taken when personnel receive a cut or wound.

CHEMICAL

Tunnel Support

Item: Chemical Section Tunnel Team.

Discussion: Numerous spider holes, wells and clay mines are found during division operations and are mistaken for tunnel systems. On several occasions the Chemical Section Tunnel Team was called only to find out that they were not needed.

Observation: There is a requirement to have trained tunnel teams in the infantry battalions able to exploit, deny and/or destroy Viet Cong tunnels. A training program has been set up by the Division Chemical Section to provide these personnel and a training facility is under construction.

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Field Expedient Munitions (CS)

Item: Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-1.

Discussion: Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-1 can be successfully constructed into field expedient munitions and employed against suspected or known enemy targets.

1. The downwind area of effectiveness may be as much as nine kilometers.
2. The application of agent CS should be about thirty drums (2400 lbs) per square kilometer of target area, when area is to be exploited by ground forces, and ninety drums (7200 lbs) for temporary denial.
3. CS strikes should always be followed by air and artillery preparation and then, when possible, exploited by ground forces.

Observation: Massive CS attacks on suspected or known enemy concentrations are feasible and practical.

Power Driven Decon Apparatus

Item: Power Driven Decon Apparatus, truck mounted 400 gallon, M9.

Discussion: The use of defoliant in the M9 PDDA has caused damage and leaks to the connection and discharge valve after prolonged use.

1. Hose reel group: Deterioration of rubber gasket at hose connection.
2. Gun group: Deterioration of gaskets and packing.
3. Discharge and pipe systems: Deterioration of joint and pipe sealants.
4. Drive assembly and clutch: Clutch and drive assembly become coated with defoliant causing friction and deterioration of belts and clutch disc.

Observation: After continuous use of herbicide, orange, purple, and blue, extensive repairs on the above listed items had to be performed. Shortage of spare parts for the PDDA in this command resulted in a high deadline rate of these items.

40 GPH Insecticide Sprayer

Item: 40 GPH Insecticide Sprayer.

Discussion: The use of "orange" defoliants in the 40 GPH Sprayer causes deterioration to the O-Rings and cluttering of the strainer.

1. Deterioration of O-Ring in the flow control gage.
2. Coats and stops flow of liquid through suction strainer line.
3. Coats and blocks flow of agent through line strainers.

Observation: The entire flow system must be flushed immediately after use and all strainers must be removed and cleaned with solvent.

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Tunnel Destruction

Item: Acetylene Tunnel Destruction Device.

Discussion: This device has been employed several times around the perimeter of the 1st Infantry Division Base Camp on tunnels that were found in the area. Listed below are the findings of personnel who have been exploiting tunnels for the Division Chemical Section during the past year.

1. The Acetylene Destruction Device systems demonstrated are extremely bulky when compared to the combination of explosives and CS-1 presently being satisfactorily utilized by the division.

2. The situation for satisfactory use of the device requires a certain size air opening, a certain size tunnel passage and some room compartment in the tunnel. When this device was tested on the tunnels in the division area the tunnels were not collapsed but were just flashed through by the explosion yielding little if any tunnel collapse. These tunnels tested by the division, though typical, were too straight or had openings too wide, or had too much overburden for the device.

3. The item required liquid oxygen to obtain any destruction in the tunnel. The liquid oxygen dispenser provided had to be recharged every forty-eight hours. The only supply of liquid oxygen for this division is at the two main air bases near SAIGON and it is impractical to reach these areas while on combat operations.

4. The concept of not exploring the tunnel before it is blown is impractical. The tunnel direction must be known for safety of personnel above ground when the device is exploded. These tunnels run in zig-zag patterns and, therefore making exploration a mandatory precaution.

Observation: The Acetylene Destruction Device has very limited application in this area of Vietnam and because of its limited application it should only be stocked in limited quantities at division level.

2. Recommendations:

a. Organization:

(1) Recommend approval of the 1st Infantry Division Modification Tables of Organization at the earliest practicable date in order that the changes can be implemented in the near future.

(2) Recommend an increase in the support capability of Air Traffic Control Teams. A major problem in air safety exists during operations due to the lack of control teams and facilities available for control of the very large number of fixed and rotary wing aircraft involved in logistical and administrative flights and assault helicopters operating out of the same airfield. Provisional control teams, primarily staffed with pathfinder personnel are being utilized by the division, but do not have the capability nor the equipment to cope with the situation. It is further recommended that the control teams be provided with the following items:

(a) A reliable navigation beacon to aid C-130 aircraft in locating forward airfields.

(b) A lightweight GCA radar for use during periods of marginal weather.

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(c) Sufficient runway lights for lighting a minimum of 3000 feet to facilitate the landing of USAF aircraft.

b. Equipment:

(1) Recommend a suitable camera with water proof casing be procured. The camera currently issued for combat photography is not water proof and as a result requires constant repair. Requests have been submitted for the purchase of an interim camera, however, the need exists for the development of a water proof camera for combat photography.

(2) Recommend a new type of ration using other than tin cans be developed to replace the present "C" Ration. "C" Rations are too bulky and heavy and create a disposal problem in the field.

(3) Recommend a lightweight poncho be developed, designed both for an individual outer raincoat and shelter.

(4) Recommend that a sufficient amount of the canister round for the M79 Grenade Launcher be issued for training of all personnel. Initial tests conducted with the rounds indicated different sighting characteristics from those of the standard round.

(5) Recommend a standard fusing system be developed for dissemination of C3-1 by aerial delivery. The expedient methods currently being used create a wide variance in height of burst. A device is needed to obtain a height of burst from 25 - 50 feet to reduce downwind loss of agent from the target area.

(6) Recommend additional tests be conducted in-country with experimental fuse M395 (jungle penetration fuse). The previous tests were inconclusive because the canopy was not greater than 20 meters.

c. Personnel:

(1) Recommend that enlisted personnel records be screened more closely to insure replacements with Class 3 profiles affecting duties in a combat MOS are not assigned to fill these allocation. This problem is being coordinated with U.S. Army Vietnam, but arises with the individual at the time he receives overseas orders.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:



R.G. RETTLE
LTC, AOC
Adjutant General

W.H. GLASCOCK JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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III INCLOSURES

INCLOSURE 1
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

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Inlosure 1 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Key Officer Personnel

UNIT	POSITION	NAME, GRADE, SN	DATES
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CG	DEPUY, WILLIAM E. MAJ GEN, 034710	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ADC-A	ZAIS, MELVIN BRIG GEN, 033471	1 May - 18 Jul
		DEANE, JOHN R. JR. BRIG GEN, 024835	27 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ADC-B	HOLLINGSWORTH, JAMES BRIG GEN, 034155	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CofS	GLASGOW, WILLIAM N. JR. COL, 025905	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G1	OVERALL, JESSE V. III LTC, 046630	1 May - 2 May
		STARR, ROBERT N. LTC, 060351	2 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G2	LEGRO, WILLIAM E. LTC, 067837	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G3	WALKER, SAM S. LTC, 023197	1 May - 24 Jul
		HAIG, ALEXANDER M. LTC, 050790	24 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G4	D'AMBROSIO, EUGENE LTC, 073783	1 May - 14 Jul
		SNYDER, IRA W. JR. LTC, 050759	14 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G5	HAUSMAN, CONRAD K. MAJ, 081453	1 May
Support Command	CO	GHANLING, FREDIE W. COL, 062115	1 May
1st S&T Bn	CO	SMITH, HERBERT F. LTC, 01597930	1 May
701st Maint Bn	CO	KOLANKIEWICZ, CHARLES LTC, 079880	1 May
1st Med Bn	CO	BATLEY, RICHARD H. LTC, 094988	1 May - 30 Jul
		HUTCKE, EDWARD J. LTC, 075214	30 Jul
1st Avn Bn	CO	KESBAUGH, HAROLD G. LTC, 069705	1 May - 14 Jun
		HUPFREYS, JOHN H. MAJ, 01913459	14 Jun - 20 Jul
		BUTLER, OLIVA B. LTC, 050507	20 Jul
1/4th Cav	CO	LEWANE, LEONARD L. LTC, 061744	1 May
1st Engr Bn	CO	SARGENT, HOWARD L. LTC, 050586	1 May - 16 Jul
		KIRKMAN, JOSEPH M., JR. LTC, 057075	16 Jul
121st Sig Bn	CO	CURINGTON, RUSSELL LTC, 056170	1 May
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	GLOTZBACH, EDGAR W. COL, 027011	1 May - 24 May
		FISHER, PAUL N. LTC, 080759	24 May - 9 Jun
		BRAY, SIMON B. JR. COL, 057233	9 Jun

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Inelousure 1 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Key Officer Personnel (Con't)

UNIT	POSITION	NAME, GRADE, SN	DATES
Hq, 1/2d Inf	CO	PRILLAMAN, RICHARD LTC, 066073	1 May
Hq, 1/26th Inf	CO	SMITH, ERSKINE LTC, 027747	1 May - 30 May
		WERESYNSKI, HENRY J. MAJ, 095739	30 May - 11 Jun
		GORIAN, PAUL F. LTC, 062379	11 Jun
Hq, 1/28th Inf	CO	HALDANE, ROBERT LTC, 050742	1 May
Hq, 2d Bde	CO	MILLOY, ALBERT E. COL, 035289	1 May - 4 Jul
		SMITH, DEWITT C. JR. COL, 030187	4 Jul - 14 Jul
		McCRYSTAL, HERBERT LTC, 027327	14 Jul - 24 Jul
		WALKER, SAM S. LTC, 028197	24 Jul
Hq, 2/16th Inf	CO	HATHAWAY, WILLIAM S. LTC, 060538	1 May
Hq, 1/18th Inf	CO	MORTON, KARL R. LTC, 089112	1 May - 19 May
		BARD, JOHN C. MAJ, 070602	19 May - 14 Jul
		GOODWIN, WARNER S. JR. LTC, 064322	14 Jul
Hq, 2/18th Inf	CO	McCRYSTAL, HERBERT LTC, 027327	1 May - 20 Jul
		BAUMANN, LEWIS R. LTC, 062803	20 Jul
Hq, 3d Bde	CO	BRODBECK, WILLIAM D. COL, 034565	1 May - 27 Jul
		WALLACE, GEORGE H. III LTC, 027556	27 Jul
Hq, 2/2d Inf	CO	CONN, JACK L. LTC, 066143	1 May
Hq, 1/16th Inf	CO	HENRY, LEE S. LTC, 063337	1 May - 20 Jun
		LAZELL, RUFUS G. LTC, 064634	20 Jun - 9 Jul
		WALLACE, GEORGE H. III LTC, 027556	9 Jul
Hq, 2/28th Inf	CO	BOWIE, KYLE W. LTC, 028599	1 May - 14 Jul
		JONES, THOMAS H. LTC, 065099	14 Jul
1st Div Arty	CO	CAMP, MARLIN W. COL, 039999	1 May
Hq, 1/5th Arty	CO	ROGERS, DAVID G. LTC, 02030416	1 May
Hq, 8/6th Arty	CO	McGUFFEY, JOHN R. LTC, 058972	1 May

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Inclosure 1 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Key Officer Personnel (Con't)

UNIT	POSITION	NAME, GRADE, SN	DATE
Hq, 1/7th Arty	CO	FYE, JOHN H. III	1 May - 27 May
		LTC, 037715	
		BIRDSEYE, ELMER H.	27 May - 2 Jul
		MAJ, 064024	
Hq, 2/34 Arty	CO	NEEK, CARROLL S.	2 Jul
		LTC, 059274	
		TIMS, FRANK R.	1 May - 15 Jul
		LTC, 01046301	
		KOENIG, JAMES R.	15 Jul
		LTC, 059475	

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INCLOSURE 2
ORGANIZATION CHART



**Original
Attached**

CONFIDENTIAL.

INCLOSURE 3
SWITCHBOARD DESIGNATORS

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Inelasure 3 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66

1st Infantry Division Switchboard Designators (Effective 1 July 1966)

1st Infantry Division	DANGER
1st Brigade	DEVIL
1st Battalion, 2d Infantry	DRACULA
1st Battalion, 26th Infantry	DOBOL
1st Battalion, 28th Infantry	DEFIANT
2d Brigade	DAGGER
2d Battalion, 16th Infantry	DAMAGE
1st Battalion, 13th Infantry	DUCHESS
2d Battalion, 18th Infantry	DIRENESS
3d Brigade	DUTY
2d Battalion, 2d Infantry	DECOY
1st Battalion, 16th Infantry	DEVOUR
2d Battalion, 28th Infantry	DAUNTLESS
Division Artillery	DIRTY FIRE
1st Battalion, 5th Artillery	DESTROYER
8th Battalion, 6th Artillery	DYNAMITE
1st Battalion, 7th Artillery	DETONATE
2d Battalion, 33d Artillery	DURGEON
1st Aviation Battalion	DART
1st Engineer Battalion	DIEHARD
1st Medical Battalion	DOCTOR
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry	DRAGON
121st Signal Battalion	DYNAMO
1st Military Police Company	DEPUTY
Support Company	DURABLE
1st Supply and Transportation Battalion	DELIVER
701st Maintenance Battalion	DILIGENT
1st Administrative Company	DE JON
11th Radio Research Unit	DEAL
Phi Lai Pacification Task Force	HELPER

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INCLOSURE 4
USARV GO 4079

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96307

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 4079

22 June 1966

REASSIGNMENT OF UNIT SECTION I
DETACHMENT OF UNITS SECTION II
ATTACHMENT OF UNITS SECTION III

* * * * *

SECTION III

3. TO 015. For units ATTACHMENT dir as indic.

* * * * *

35TH INFANTRY PLATOON (SCOUT DOG)
Atch to: 1st Infantry Division
Eff date: 16 June 1966
Auth: VOGG date ofm
Sp instr: NA

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

RICHARD J. SEITZ
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

/s/K D Hamilton
/t/K.D. HAMILTON
Lt Colonel, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

* * * * *

"A TRUE COPY"


William L. Powder Jr.
WILLIAM L. POWDER JR
Major, Artillery

Inclosure 4 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66

INCLOSURE 5
LIGHT ASSAULT ARTILLERY BATTERY

Inlosure 5 Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Light Assault Artillery Battery

LIGHT ASSAULT FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY, INFANTRY DIVISION



MISSION. To provide direct support artillery to maneuver elements of the division.

ASSIGNMENT. Assigned to the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery.

CAPABILITIES. a. Furnishes one or two air mobile six gun firing platoons in direct support of division maneuver elements.

b. Personnel and equipment are provided from division assets.

c. This unit is dependent on Hq and Hq Battery, Division Artillery for all survey and radio repair support.

d. This unit is capable of participating in the defense of its firing positions.

MOBILITY. a. Assault elements of this unit are airmobile by UH-1 aircraft.

b. The entire unit is mobile by vehicle or CH-47 aircraft.

STRENGTH. 5 Officers, 199 Enlisted Men

Inclosure 5 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Light Assault Artillery Battery (Con't)

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT.

Truck, Utility $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 6
Truck, Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	- 18
Truck, Platform Utility $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 2
Trailer, Cargo $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 6
Trailer, Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	- 6
Mortar, 4.2 inch	- 12
Radio Set, AN/VRC-46 mtd in $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 3
Radio Set, AN/VRC-47 mtd in $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 6
Radio Set, AN/VRC-47 mtd in $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	- 3
Radio Set, AN/PRC-25	- 6

INCLOSURE 6
COMMANDERS NOTES #3

INCLOSURE 6 Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #3 - The Rifle Squad

1. The basic fighting element in an infantry division is the rifle squad. Although on the one hand, it is the smallest tactical unit; it is on the other hand in many respects, the most difficult and challenging to command properly.

2. The division commander deals with brigades and battalions; the brigade commander with battalions and companies; the company commander with platoons and squads, platoon commander with squads; but the squad leader deals almost directly with individuals. It is much easier to deal with organizations than with individuals and it is for this reason that squads are divided into fire teams so that the squad leader, also, will have an organizational framework with which to operate.

3. When a squad is well organized and team leaders are strong, and when every member of the squad understands fully the fact that the two teams constantly support one another, then the squad will operate well. However, if the squad is not well organized and tightly controlled, it tends to break down into six, eight, or ten individuals and loses its integrity. It is a constant struggle in combat to maintain integrity. There are many forces and factors which tend to make the soldier think of himself as an individual instead of as a member of a team or of a squad. Fatigue, hunger, thirst and fear are the greatest enemies of squad integrity. When the time comes that the individual members of the squad are preoccupied with any, or all, of these factors, and they are no longer thinking in terms of mutually supporting fire teams, the squad, at that point in time, ceases to exist as a military organization. When the squads cease to exist, neither the platoon, company, battalion, brigade or division can operate or function properly. Therefore, of all the problems in an infantry division, the first and most important problem is to maintain the organizational integrity of the rifle squads while in combat.

4. Because the impact of hunger, thirst, fatigue and fear are persistent and great, they can only be overcome by repetitious training, indoctrination and practice. The individual soldier must be reminded daily of his place and duties in the fire team and the role of the two fire teams as they relate to the support of one another. As in baseball, there is a requirement for a constant flow of instructions from squad leaders to their teams, and from team leaders to their men. To the extent that such instructions continuously flow, to that same extent is the squad an integrated team. To the extent that the instructions do not flow, to that same extent the team begins to disintegrate. If a squad is left on the field of battle under fire for ten minutes without instructions or orders, chances are it will disintegrate into individual soldiers each one of whom will consider the odds against him to be great. However, under a steady barrage of orders and instructions, the individual soldier knows that he is not alone on the battlefield, but rather continues to be a member of a functioning military unit.

5. Relatively speaking, those military units which serve a piece of equipment such as a tank, a howitzer, a helicopter or a ship at sea, have the great advantage of a machine of war around which to organize their effort. By the very presence of the howitzer on the field of battle, each artilleryman knows 24 hours a day how his contribution leads to the accomplishment of the mission. In the rifle squad, however, there is no single piece of equipment around which all activity is centered and to which all thought is devoted. Instead, the rifle squad exists only when

INCLOSURE 6 Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
(Con't)

all the members of the squad understand what it is the squad is doing and how it proposes to accomplish its mission. The squad leader, therefore, has the greatest command challenge of any infantry leader.

6. The turnover in squad and team leaders is great and thus a simple system must be adopted which can be easily taught, and readily understood.

7. The key concept which can be expressed in one word is "OVERWATCH". Within a rifle squad, it is the duty of the two teams always to support one another. It is important that the A Team understand that it must always come to the aid of the B Team and vice versa. In the defense this is clear and simple as long as each individual soldier has selected a proper position, with cover and concealment and preferably with both.

8. However, when the squad is advancing or moving, the relationship of mutual support becomes even more important. When the leading team is advancing, whether in the attack, in movement to contact, on patrol, or on its way to a base-of-fire position, the following team must understand at all times that it is in an OVERWATCHING position -- that is, it follows the lead team, prepared to support it with fire or with maneuver. The normal formation for a rifle squad is with one team leading and the other following. Only when the platoon as a whole is in the assault, or after the second team has maneuvered, should we find the two teams on line.

9. When a squad is simply moving from point A to point B as an interior unit -- that is, it is not the leading element, or a flanking element, or an independent element -- it is in a travelling formation in which one team follows the other at close interval with the individual soldiers 5 meters apart to reduce their vulnerability to mortar fire and recoilless weapons, as well as claymores and booby traps. Unless there is some reason to be moving single file while passing through a defile or through thick jungle where trail breaking is necessary, each team should normally be a 'V' formation with the team leader leading at the apex of the 'V'. The distance between teams in a squad which is in the travelling formation is again only 5 meters. However, when the squad is the leading element or a flanking element or on patrol, or on its way independently to an OVERWATCHING fire position (a base of fire), it moves either in a Travelling or in a Bounding OVERWATCH.

10. TRAVELLING OVERWATCH. The TRAVELLING OVERWATCH formation simply means that the second team drops back 25, 50, 100 or in open country 200 to 300 meters so that it is not engaged by the same fire which may be directed upon the leading team. This will permit it to maneuver and to employ OVERWATCHING fires in support of the leading team. This formation permits the squad leader to act as a military commander to influence the battle, to take initiative and avoid bringing the entire squad under the same fire at a time and place selected solely by the VC. Naturally, the teams rotate so that one team is not always leading. This rotation is taken care of by the desire of the soldiers to share the dangers of the leading element by alternating the teams. The TRAVELLING OVERWATCH is useful when the squad must move out with some speed or when contact with the enemy is either not imminent or the enemy situation is unknown.

11. BOUNDING OVERWATCH. When contact with the enemy is imminent or when light sniper fire has already been received or when crossing dangerous areas, the squad should resort to the BOUNDING OVERWATCH. This technique simply means that one team is in firing position to cover the movement of the other team and then in a leap-frogging manner, the teams alternate

INCLOSURE 6 Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
(Con't)

between advancing and OVERWATCHING from stationary positions. The distance involved in each bound is entirely dependent upon the terrain and the judgment of the squad leader. As in the TRAVELLING OVERWATCH, movement by bounds should prevent the entire squad from being surprised or from being caught in the open or should prevent both teams from being engaged by the same small group of enemy forces.

12. The techniques at platoon level are the same as at squad level in that a platoon leader moving forward without expecting imminent contact, will always place one squad sufficiently far in advance so that the platoon does not come into the beaten zone of fire directed at the leading squad. The squads leading or flanking the platoon will use either the TRAVELLING or BOUNDING OVERWATCH, or if they are back in the column, will move in a TRAVELLING formation. Platoon leaders moving in areas in which contact is imminent will not only advance a squad to a forward OVERWATCH position to the front, but on many occasions will advance squads to flanking OVERWATCH positions with the understanding that as the platoon passes through the area and the OVERWATCH position is no longer useful, the squad leader without further orders will rejoin the platoon column. Thus, the platoon leader is able to walk across the countryside from squad position to squad position, and at all times at least one of his three major maneuver elements is in a stationary OVERWATCH, prepared to place fire in support of his advance, or to repel any enemy movement within his area.

13. If the squads and platoons of the Division will master and employ these tactics, the effectiveness of the infantry element will be increased by several hundred percent. Furthermore, because each squad and platoon leader understands exactly the tactics being followed by all others, the control of the infantry elements will be simplified and units will be able to work together with greater effectiveness. Commanders at all times will be able to visualize the formation of the infantry unit on the ground, the amount of terrain covered by them and the techniques by which they are advancing or attacking. The BOUNDING OVERWATCH does not change in concept when the firing starts - when contact is made - the tactics are identical. The only difference is that the movement from one stationary OVERWATCHING position to the next will be done with greater care and more attention to the selection of routes of advance. Whereas, prior to the fire fight, teams and squads will advance to forward OVERWATCH positions at a walk, taking advantage of cover and concealment as available; once the fire fight starts, these forward movements will usually be accomplished by running or crawling. The distances between the successive OVERWATCHING positions will be less. Once a squad leader or platoon leader has moved his elements toward the enemy, always endeavoring to maneuver around the flank, and all his units are engaged, he will endeavor to advance his line by crawling. The next higher commander will automatically make a wider envelopment.

14. All commanders will establish battle runs and will repeatedly exercise their teams, squads and platoons until they have achieved a high level of effectiveness. Training will be continuous and also will be conducted by reserve elements on operations.

INCLOSURE 7
SUPPLY AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

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Inclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities

1. Supply: The average strength supported during the reporting period was slightly under 21,500 troops. The supply levels for the division as of 31 July 1966 were as follows:

a. Class I.

TYPE RATION

DAYS OF SUPPLY OBJECTIVE ON HAND

(1) MCI

(a) Forward battalions and separate companies	5	5
(b) DI AN battalions and separate companies	1	1
(c) Brigade and division artillery	5	6 (Avg)
(d) Division reserve (S&T Bn)	5	4.1

(2) "B" Rations.

(a) Brigades and division artillery	15	12.4 (Avg)
(b) At DIRM battalions and separate companies	3	3
(c) Division reserve	15	15

(3) "A" Rations.

3 0"

*Note "A" Ration supplements are on hand for issue with "B" Rations.

b. Class III.

TYPE FUEL/COMMODITY

DAYS OF SUPPLY OBJECTIVE ON HAND

(1) At Base Areas

(a) JP-4	5	5
(b) AVGAS	5	5
(c) MCGAS	5	5
(d) Diesel	5	5

(2) Division Reserve

(a) JP-4	5	5
(b) AVGAS	5	5

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Inclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

TYPE FUEL/COMMODITY	DAYS OF SUPPLY	
	OBJECTIVE	ON HAND
(c) HOGAS	5	5
(d) Diesel	5	5
(3) Package Lubes and Oils		
(a) Base Areas	15	15
(b) Division Reserve	15	15

c. Class II & IV (less repair parts). The following items are in short supply and may be critically required in the division in the near future:

- (1) Batteries - BA50, BA61, BA261, and BA1389.
- (2) Replacement radios for combat losses. (New family, AN/VRC-12 radios.)
- (3) Tentage and poles.
- (4) Underwear and socks.
- (5) Quick release strap.
- (6) Canteen collapsible, 2 qt.
- (7) Survival kit.
- (8) Armor (aircrew).
- (9) Tropical clothing.
- (10) Generators.
- (11) Insulated food containers.
- (12) Expendables, paper plates, steel wool, scouring powder.
- (13) Components of demolitions sets.
- (14) Compasses.
- (15) Watches, non-maintainable.
- (16) Tanks - 100 (4 ea).
- (17) M16 rifles and magazines.
- (18) M16 plotting boards.
- (19) Office furniture.
- (20) Oxygen and acetylene (gas and bottles).

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Enclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

- (21) Trailer, water.
- (22) Insignia.
- (23) Decorations.
- (24) Aviators gloves and sunglasses.
- (25) Petroleum handling equipment, i.e., miniports, light weight pumps, and 10,000 gallon tanks.
- (26) Typewriters.
- (27) Folding chairs.
- (28) Camouflage covers for steel helmets.
- (29) Water cans (plastic).
- (30) Mortar sight, M4.
- (31) Pump for water purification equipment 1500 gal.
- (32) 600 gal water purification sets.
- (33) M-1937 fire units.

d. Class II & IV (Repair Parts). Parts for the new series radios are in short supply. The short and long antennas for the AN/RC-25 radios are in critical short supply.

(1) The following is a summary of repair parts and assemblies received and shipped by the Technical Supply Activities of the 701st Maintenance Battalion for the 2d Quarter, 1966:

(a) Hq & Company A, 701st Maintenance Battalion

Received - 560.5 tons
Shipped - 461.0 tons

(b) Company B, 701st Maintenance Battalion

Received - 610.9 tons
Shipped - 430.9 tons

(2) The following is a summary of requisitions handled by the Technical Supply Activities of the 701st Maintenance Battalion for the 2d Quarter, 1966:

COMPANY	REQ & PROG	ISSUED	PASSED
Hq & Co A	37,918	18,926	7,593
Co B	6,544	1,934	2,863
Co C	3,477	3,234	3,331
Co D	10,276	5,275	7,128
Co E	8,936	3,551	4,979
Totals	72,153	32,920	25,394

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Inclusion 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

(3) The supply portion of the maintenance program has remained critical. Due-puts established by the 701st Maintenance Battalion continued to increase throughout the 2d Quarter of 1966. Sufficient quantities of repair parts were not received to fill the requisitions that are generated within the division.

e. Procurement. The following items/services were procured by 1st Logistical Command to support divisional requirements during the reporting period.

	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>QUALITY</u>
(1) Potable and non-potable ice.	48,003 (blocks)	Satisfactory
(2) Wood pallets.	575 (each)	Excellent
(3) Bread.	90,000 (loaves)	Excellent

2. Combat Service Support Activities:

a. Medical Evacuation. The following number of personnel were treated during the reporting period:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DISEASE</u>	<u>NON-BATTLE INJ</u>	<u>INJ RECEIVED HOSTILE ACTION</u>
Admissions direct	2,926	2,058	358	510
Disposition to duty	1,474	1,212	129	133
Disposition by transfer	1,560	902	238	420
Deaths	123		4	119

b. Transportation.

(1) The following quantities of supplies and equipment were moved during the reporting period:

- (a) By surface - 33,477.7 short tons
- (b) By air - 10,705.4 short tons

(2) A total of nine supply and troop convoys were made.

(3) The slow responsiveness in obtaining USAF logistical lift continues to hamper resupply operations. Bad weather also contributed to airlift problems. In spite of these areas of concern, airlift was obtained to meet the majority of logistical requirements. In at least four instances during Operation EL PASO II (conducted in June and July 1966), resupply requirements were not met by USAF airlift due to bad weather. Required support was obtained, however, by using Army airlift (OH-47 and CV-2 aircraft) to meet emergency requirement. Prolonged use of Army airlift could not be achieved due to the prohibitive tonnages required, the distances involved, and the number of available aircraft.

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**Inclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)**

c. Services.

(1) Maintenance.

(a) Support of M107/M110 Artillery: The float M110 of the 23d Artillery Group was converted to a M107. Engineer support for 23d Artillery Group units has been assigned to the LONG BINH area. The entire support of the group will soon be assigned to LONG BINH, but no date has been announced.

(b) Repair Parts for M1937 Ranges: Those repair parts are extremely critical to the division. Some parts were received at the end of May; however, no appreciable quantity has been received since then. These parts are essential for proper food preparation and the shortage is of concern to the Division Food Service Advisor. A message has been sent to 1st Logistical Command for assistance in obtaining these parts.

(c) Combat Vehicle Parts: Combat vehicles are being used extensively on all combat operations in the division. Due to this fact repair parts must be on hand to support these vehicles during these combat operations. Major assemblies for M48A3 tanks and M113 personnel carriers are most critical. Also, other piece-parts for these vehicles are either critically low stockage or at zero balance. Every effort is being taken to procure these items from all available sources. Without these combat vehicles the tactical mission of this division would be seriously hampered. A plan is needed for phase-out of these vehicles and to replace them with rebuilt vehicles.

(d) Cleaning Equipment for M16 Rifles: Cleaning rods, chamber brushes and bore brushes for M16 rifles are not on hand in sufficient quantity to properly maintain these weapons. Without them, stoppages occur and the combat effectiveness of a fighting unit is impaired. A message was sent to 1st Logistical Command to initiate expeditious action in obtaining these items for combat units. A test was made to determine why so many stoppages occurred when a full magazine was used. Normally the second round failed to feed. It was determined this was caused by dirty chambers, thereby increasing the force required to extract the spent cartridge. The bolt would not retract far enough to the rear to properly feed the next round and a failure to feed would result. This can only be resolved by having the proper tools to keep these weapons clean.

(e) Cracked Truck Frames: A number of vehicles have had cracked frames with relatively low mileage. MIR's were submitted and an answer has been received. A new frame is presently undergoing extensive testing to provide a stronger frame for these vehicles.

(f) Calibration Team: A calibration team started calibrating all test equipment in the maintenance battalion. Equipment was last tested and calibrated in February 1966.

(g) A draft regulation on Operation, Maintenance and Care of Engineer Generators was written and published. USARV Generator Instructor team conducted classes in LAI KHE, BEAR CAT and THU LOI to 1st Division units in each area. These classes consisted of organizational maintenance and operation of generators at unit level. Classes of this type have now been conducted in all base areas.

Inclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

(h) A liaison visit was made to the 1st Cavalry Division for the purpose of obtaining LL data plus data pertaining to loading methods, use of special types of equipment and problem areas they have encountered on construction equipment. The visit was successful.

(i) All TD-24 tractor repair parts have been turned-in and no new parts for this tractor are being requisitioned.

(j) Repair parts for H9001 scoop loaders and 250 CFM Joy Air Compressors were in short supply. Some assemblies for scoop loaders have been received, but quantities of other required parts were not received.

(k) Requisitions for end items required for construction equipment maintenance float have not been filled. Follow-up action has been accomplished with negative results. Due to the amount of time required to requisition and receive construction equipment repair parts it is imperative that the units have float assets of this type stock.

(l) Aircraft Maintenance: Back up support continued to be a problem due to the many mission and flying hours required during the last quarter. The problems are restricted to the 1st Aviation Battalion and 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, as these are the units which participate in all missions required by the 1st Infantry Division. These problems will continue as the aircraft are rapidly approaching the flying hour time when engine changes, transmission changes and general overhauls are required.

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INCLOSURE 8
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

TRAINING CIRCULAR
NUMBER 20-6

19 July 1966

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Replacement Training Program

1. PURPOSE: This training circular prescribes policy and provides guidance for commanders in establishing a training program for replacement personnel.

2. OBJECTIVE: To insure that each individual replacement receives, as a minimum, 40 hours of instruction prior to his participation in combat operations in Vietnam. This training is required of all personnel assigned to the division since all combat support and service units must be capable of conducting combat patrols, defending base camps and actively engaging in close combat when required.

3. GENERAL: Individual replacements arriving in Vietnam directly from CONUS training centers are well-trained but lack unit experience. Transition training emphasizing teamwork, the combined arms team, and adjustment to a new environment is required to prepare them for combat.

4. RESPONSIBILITY:

a. The ACoS, G3, has staff responsibility for the program and will monitor training of replacements.

b. The Adjutant General will establish a briefing program for officers and senior NCO's in grades E7 through E9 in accordance with the proposed briefing program at Inclosure 1 and guide sequence of events at Inclosure 2 for all incoming personnel that will include as a minimum the following subjects:

(1) Orientation to Vietnam

- (a) Unit history, organization and mission
- (b) Personal security measures
- (c) Unit security plan
- (d) Issue, handling of firearms and ammunition
- (e) Local off-limits areas

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TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6 , HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, 19 July 1966

- (f) Uniform regulations
- (g) Safety program
- (h) Leaves and passes
- (i) Guidelines to good relations in Vietnam
- (2) Character guidance
- (3) Medical orientation
- (4) Law and order

c. Major subordinate (base) commanders will establish training programs in accordance with the proposed training program at Inclosure 5 for all replacements to include as a minimum, the following subjects:

- (1) M-16 Training
 - (a) Characteristics
 - (b) Assembly and disassembly
 - (c) Zeroing, care and cleaning
 - (d) Qualification
- (2) Mines and booby traps
- (3) Squad tactics, battle drill and immediate action drills
- (4) Patrolling
 - (a) Combat patrols and raids
 - (b) Recon patrols
- (5) Hand grenades
- (6) Demolitions with emphasis on tunnel operations
- (7) Fundamentals of air mobile operations
- (8) Personal hygiene and field sanitation in Vietnam
- (9) Combat Intelligence in Vietnam

TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6, HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, 19 July 1966

5. IMPLEMENTING PUBLICATIONS: Two copies of all PQI's, lesson plans and implementing publications will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVID-T not later than 15 August 1966.

6. REFERENCES:

a. USARV Training Circular #1 dated 27 April 1966, Subject: Command Information.

b. USARV Training Circular #2 dated 7 May 1966, Subject: Replacement Training.

c. USARV Regulation 360-2, dated 5 November 1965, Subject: Command Orientation.

d. USMACV Circular 612-2, dated 10 January 1966, Subject: Orientation Briefing.

(AVID-T)
FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

W. M. GLASGOW JR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

George P. Reynolds
GEORGE P. REYNOLDS
Major, AGC
Asst AG

5 Incls-

1-Proposed Officer and Senior NCO
Briefing Program for 1st Inf Div
Replacement Detachment


65

TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6, HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION 19 July 66

- 2-Sequence of Events for the
Processing of Incoming Officers
and Senior NCO's at 1st Inf Div
Replacement Detachment
- 3-Proposed Replacement Training
Program for 1st Inf Div Replace-
ment Detachment
- 4-Sequence of Events for the
Processing of Incoming Personnel
at 1st Inf Div Replacement
Detachment
- 5-Proposed Replacement Training
Program for Major Commands

DISTRIBUTION: B and D
Plus 25 G-3

INCLOSURE 9
PSYOPS LEAFLETS



PEOPLE OF LONG-THANH

THE VC OFTEN TELL YOU THAT THEY WILL COME AND LIBERATE YOU. WHY DO THEY MORTAR AND KILL THE INNOCENT CHILDREN. THE VC TELL YOU THEY ARE FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE, YET THEY KILL THE LITTLE CHILDREN.

GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES ARE HERE TO HELP THE PEOPLE. WE WANT TO GET THE VC WHO KILL INNOCENT CHILDREN. TELL US WHERE THE VC ARE. IF ANYONE KNOWS WHERE THE VC ARE THAT KILLED YOUR CHILDREN. TELL US. TELL THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OR NEAREST ALLIED FORCES. HELP TO CAPTURE THE EVIL VC.



"Attention Citizens:

You are in an area protected by GVN and the 1st Infantry Division. In order to protect you from the VC, the 1st Infantry Division must fire small arms, artillery, and drop bombs. We do not wish to hurt those loyal to the GVN. If you are loyal to the GVN, do not enter this area after today. If you are caught in this area, you will be considered VC, and will be turned over to the District Chief".

1st Inf. Div
#8



SOLDIERS OF THE 9TH DIV.

**YOU ARE IN THE OPERATING AREA OF THE POWERFUL 1ST U.S. INF. DIV. WE
KNOW YOU ARE SOUTH EAST OF MINH-THANH.**

**MORE UNITS OF THE 1ST INF. DIV. WILL BE UPON YOU. SURRENDER OR DIE.
IF YOU WANT TO SURRENDER REMOVE YOUR SHIRTS. SLING YOUR WEAPONS MUZZLE DOWN,
AND PUT YOUR HANDS BEHIND YOUR NECK. THEN REPORT TO THE FIRST SOLDIER YOU
SEE.**


SURRENDER NOW OR DIE UNDER THE POWER OF THE 1ST INF. DIV.

CHÍNH PHỦ VIỆT NAM CÔNG HÒA GIÚP ĐỠ ĐỒNG BÀO, ĐỒNG
BÀO HÃY KÊU GỌI VC Ở TRONG LÀNG CỦA ĐỒNG BÀO VỀ
QUI CHÁNH VỚI CHÁNH NGHĨA QUỐC GIA.



FRONT: The government of Republic Vietnam helps the people. The people who remain in the villages appeal to the VC to rally with the National Government now.

BACK: To the people who Love Peace. We know that the people are very afraid of the fighting going on around their villages. As long as the VC are there, the government will have operations to destroy them. The government will use its airplanes, tanks, artillery and superior firepower to stop all VC terrorist action. By letting the VC hide in your village, it will become a battle field. Rally to the National government and they will help you construct a new and better village. Then you can live in peace without fear.



QUÂN ĐỘI ĐỒNG MINH PHỤC VỤ VÌ LỢI ÍCH CỦA NHÂN DÂN.

FRONT: (CAPTION) "THE ALLIED FORCES WORK FOR THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE"

BACK: (TEXT)

THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ASSISTS THE GVN IN MANY WAYS. IN ADDITION TO ACTUALLY FIGHTING THE VC, THE SOLDIERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AID IN MANY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS IN SUCH FIELDS AS SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND MEDICAL HELP. ONE OF THE PROJECTS THEY ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON IN THE TAY-NINH AREA IS ROAD IMPROVEMENT.

ENGINEERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION HAVE IMPROVED THESE ROADS TO EASE TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA AND TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR FARMERS TO GET THEIR PRODUCE TO MARKET.

IN VC CONTROLLED AREAS THE PEOPLE GET FALSE PROMISE AND TERRORISM WHILE IN GVN AREAS THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSTANTLY BUILDING TOWARD A BETTER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE.

10

INCLOSURE 10

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES

70

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Enclosure 10 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Statistical Analysis of 4160 Battle Casualties as of
31 July 1966

A statistical analysis of the 4160 battle casualties sustained
as of 31 July 1966 by the 1st Infantry Division reveals the following:

a. The 4160 battle casualties were distributed as follows:

UNIT	KHA	WHA	UNIT	KHA	WHA
Hq 1st Inf Div	1	2	1st Bn 28th Inf	53	273
1st Admin Co	1	7	Hq Co 2d Bde	0	10
Hq Co & Band Spt Cnd	1	12	2d Bn 16th Inf	74	329
1st S & T Bn	0	15	1st Bn 13th Inf	28	191
701st Maint Bn	2	4	2d Bn 18th Inf	71	347
1st Med Bn	1	1	Hq Co 3d Bde	1	2
1st Avn Bn	6	6	2d Bn 2d Inf	94	418
1st MP Co	3	7	1st Bn 16th Inf	42	252
1st Sqdn 4th Cav	74	434	2d Bn 28th Inf	80	348
1st Bn 1st Bde	15	138	Hq Btry Div Arty	0	21
121st Sig Bn	0	16	1st Bn 5th Arty	8	49
Hq Co 1st Bde	0	3	8th Bn 6th Arty	7	38
1st Bn 26th Inf	49	275	1st Bn 7th Arty	1	27
1st Bn 2d Inf	47	186	2d Bn 33d Arty	7	00
242d Chem Det	0	0	266th Chem Plt	0	3
17th Mil Hist Det	0	0	234th Arty Det	0	0

b. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by hour:

HOURL	CASUALTIES	KHA	WHA	HOURL	CASUALTIES	KHA	WHA
0100	48	7	41	1300	335	51	274
0200	43	7	36	1400	365	95	270
0300	30	4	26	1500	355	46	309
0400	70	10	60	1600	223	26	197
0500	52	4	48	1700	204	30	174
0600	76	10	66	1800	296	55	241
0700	193	37	156	1900	179	24	155
0800	163	31	132	2000	62	8	54
0900	208	19	189	2100	113	16	97
1000	302	66	236	2200	79	5	74
1100	330	56	274	2300	108	11	97
1200	308	36	272	2400	18	2	16

c. The five most critical days for battle casualties were:

- (1) 5 Dec 65 - 170
- (2) 9 Jul 66 - 150
- (3) 12 Nov 65 - 134
- (4) 24 Feb 66 - 129
- (5) 11 Apr 66 - 125

d. The prevalent location of wound:

	TYPE	KHA	WHA	TOTAL	% OF CASUALTIES
(1)	Leg	55	1088	1143	27.4
(2)	Arm	21	787	808	19.4
(3)	Head	229	379	608	14.6
(4)	Chest	174	164	338	8.1
(5)	Back	30	227	257	6.1
(6)	Stomach	46	81	127	3.1
(7)	Other	111	768	879	21.1

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Inclosure 10 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Statistical Analysis of 4160 Battle Casualties as of
31 July 1966 (Con't)

e. The source of wounds is broken out as follows:

	SOURCE	KHA	WHA	TOTAL	% OF CASUALTIES
(1)	Mortar	182	1011	1193	28.5
(2)	Mines	133	746	879	21.1
(3)	Small Arms	232	588	820	19.7
(4)	Booby Trap	20	370	390	9.4
(5)	Sniper	46	341	387	9.3
(6)	Other	53	438	491	11.8

f. Grades of casualties are broken out as follows:

GRADE	AUTH	CAS	% OF AUTH	% OF CAS	GRADE	AUTH	CAS	% OF AUTH	% OF CAS
Lt Col	41	4	9.7	.09	E-8	183	18	9.3	.43
Maj	112	11	9.8	.26	E-7	358	78	21.7	1.87
Capt	338	55	16.2	1.32	E-6	1158	429	37.0	10.31
Lt	446	163	36.5	3.91	E-5	2805	720	25.6	17.30
WO	166	11	6.6	.26	E-4	4881	864	17.7	20.76
E-9	37	6	16.2	.14	E-3-1	4850	1801	37.1	43.29

g. The majority of the battle casualties were sustained by individuals possessing the following MOS:

MOS	TITLE	AUTH	CAS	% OF AUTH	% OF CAS
11	Infantry and Armor	6284	3244	51.6	77.98
12	Combat Engineer	507	94	18.5	2.25
13	Artillery	1252	177	14.1	4.25
91	Medical	611	129	21.1	3.10

h. A break out of the 160 battle casualties by situation is as follows:

	KHA	WHA	TOTAL
(1) S & D	493	2392	2885
(2) Defense	61	406	467
(3) Convoy	42	288	330
(4) Patrol	41	177	218
(5) Base Area	3	98	101
(6) In Flight	10	46	56
(7) Occupy Ambush Site	6	22	28
(8) Admin Mvt	0	27	27
(9) Attack	5	21	26
(10) Other	5	17	22

i. The following is a breakout of non-battle casualties by month during the past six months:

	MONTH	NRD	FRM	TOTAL
(1)	Feb	2	18	20
(2)	Mar	5	19	24
(3)	Apr	6	31	37
(4)	May	4	40	44
(5)	Jun	3	23	26
(6)	Jul	4	44	48

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Statistical Analysis of 4160 Battle Casualties as of
31 July 1966 (Con't)

j. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month during the past six months:

	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(1)	Feb	79	483	562
(2)	Mar	60	244	304
(3)	Apr	94	356	450
(4)	May	41	367	408
(5)	Jun	85	348	433
(6)	Jul	82	378	460

k. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month and by source of wound:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MINES</u>	<u>SMALL ARMS</u>	<u>MORTAR</u>	<u>BOOBY TRAP</u>	<u>SNIPER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Feb	122	123	192	48	53	24	562
Mar	55	52	91	37	16	53	304
Apr	80	109	136	58	34	33	450
May	115	33	70	49	24	117	408
Jun	64	111	107	43	27	81	430
Jul	32	71	172	42	11	132	460

l. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by situation and source of wound:

<u>SITUATION</u>	<u>MINES</u>	<u>SMALL ARMS</u>	<u>MORTAR</u>	<u>BOOBY TRAP</u>	<u>SNIPER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
S & D	540	619	841	323	231	331	2885
Defense	37	65	210	15	59	81	467
Convoy	192	36	51	28	18	5	330
Patrol	79	42	21	19	14	43	218
Base Area	7	10	55	2	18	9	101
In Flight	0	25	0	0	14	17	56
Occupy Am- bush Site	14	4	3	0	6	1	28
Admin Pvt	1	2	2	0	22	0	27
Attack	4	11	7	0	4	0	26
Other	5	6	3	3	1	4	22

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INCLOSURE 11

OUT-OF-COUNTRY VISITORS

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Inclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country

1 May 66 - 31 May 66

1 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE I. FORSYTHE, USAFAC, G-3
General orientation visit, with emphasis on tactical operations and Force Development.

7 May 1966

COLONEL L.G. JONES
COLONEL F.H. BUCH
MR. G.C. DALLAPA, GS-15
MR. C.E. DUDWIG, GS-14
(U.S. Army Aviation Command Liaison Team)
Determine aviation supply and maintenance needs and help to improve requisitioning, packaging and replacement flow of zoms.

12 May 1966

HONORABLE HOWARD H. CALLAWAY, Congressman (R-Ga)
HONORABLE DONALD HUNSFELD, Congressman (R-Ill)
MR. HERBERT ROHBACH
(Staff administration, Congressional Subcommittee on Military Operations) To obtain first hand observation of U.S. Forces at lowest possible level. Orientation visit.

19 May 1966

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAL D. McCOWN, USA, Director Vietnam Support Expediting Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
COLONEL J.R. HENSLER
LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM STORM III, USMC,
To discuss current and future resource support problems and discuss civilian casualties.

24 May 1966

GENERAL DWIGHT E. BEACH, Commanding General, UN Command Korea and Commanding General, 8th U.S. Army
MAJOR GENERAL J.H. SKELDON, Chief Army Advisory Group, Korea
COLONEL A.J. CASTAGNA, Chief Marine Advisory Group, Korea
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.L. LEGGETT, Aide-De-Camp, General Beach
Orientation visit.

25 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL, THE HONORABLE, AILEEN FRANCIS FITZALAN HOWARD, CBE, MC,
Director of Management and Support of Intelligence Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom.
CAPTAIN T.B. HENMAN, British Royal Navy
Orientation visit.

26 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL V.R. PERS, SACSA, JCS
COLONEL H.R. AAROT, USA, Office of SACSA, JCS
CAPTAIN J.E. BOWELL, USN, Office of SACSA, JCS
Orientation visit. To observe PsyOps, Political Warfare and Civic Action operation in the 1st Infantry Division.

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Inclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

30 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL BRUCE E. KENDALL, Deputy Commanding General Designate,
USARVIS
COLONEL PAUL A. FISHER
CAPTAIN R.W. HEALY
SERGEANT MAJOR GLENN C. ROBERTS
Orientation visit for newly assigned DCG Designate for USARVIS
with emphasis on G-4 aspects.

31 May 1966

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT A. CRONK, Representing the Commandant of the
U.S. Army Infantry School. To identify, through personal contacts
and on-the-scene observations, the current needs, of USAIS students
who are being trained for duty in Vietnam.

MAJOR GENERAL CARL C. TURNER, Provost Marshal General, DA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY H. TUFTS, DA Escort
MAJOR JACK G. PHUETT, DA

To identify requirements for DA support of Provost Marshal activities,
control of blackmarketeering, and handling of POW's.

1 June 1966 - 30 June 1966

13 June 1966

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. POLK, ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL D.L. ORLWRIGHT, Office of ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R.W. MACKINNAH, Office of ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL T.B. FLYNN, Office of ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL W.H. HENRY JR., Office of ACSforDA
MAJOR R.E. BUCHALTER, Office of ACSforDA

Furtherance of Army support of operational requirements, particularly
in the areas of airmobile operations, logistic units, Army Aviation,
operational and organizational concepts of TOE.

MR. A.J. DELAGARE, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Far and South-
eastern Affairs, United Kingdom.

MR. SMITH, UNITED KINGDOM Ambassador to Vietnam
Briefing on G-5 activities in THU DAU MOT area and visit major ARVN
units.

15 June 1966

GENERAL J.F. COLLINS, (Ret) President American Red Cross
MR. ROBERT C. LEWIS, GS-17, Vice-President American Red Cross
MR. HARRY McCOLLONS, Director ARC, Southeast Asia
Receive orientation of Red Cross activities in the 1st Infantry
Division.

17 June 1966

MR. ARTHUR L. CHAITT, Executive Secretary of the Society of the 1st
Infantry Division.
To discuss ways the Society can assist members of the 1st Infantry
Division to complete plans now under way by the Society to honor
personnel who are fighting in Vietnam.

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List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

18 June 1966

MR. ROBERT H. MILBROUGH, Ohio candidate for U.S. House of Representatives,
Visit U.S. Forces to obtain first hand information and meet constituents.

COLONEL B.L. JOHNSON JR., USAF, USSTRICOM
COLONEL WILLIAM PESSRUCK, USAF, USSTRICOM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R.M. HANEY, USA, USSTRICOM
MAJOR P.J. OPITY, USA, USSTRICOM

Study on airlift data (ALOC) and characteristics of on load and off load of aircraft and problem areas.

20 June 1966

REVEREND CALVIN THIELMAN, Minister of Montreal Presbyterian Church,
Montreal, N.C.

REVEREND FATHER DANIEL LYONS, S.J., Professor, Gonzaga University,
Spokane, Wash

CAPTAIN LOYD V. YOUNG, USN, Office Secretary of Defense
Visit Military Civic Action Activities in the 1st Infantry Division area.

24 June 1966

MR. COLMER, Special Assistant to the President on Pacification
To see LAM SON II operation and talk to action people.

27 June 1966

MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR S. COLLINS JR., CG, 4th Infantry Division
LIEUTENANT COLONEL KITCHEN, 4th Infantry Division Staff
LIEUTENANT COLONEL BEZICK, 4th Infantry Division Staff
LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRATH, 4th Infantry Division Staff
To gain first hand information of current situation.

28 June 1966

BRIGADIER GENERAL G.V. TOBIAS, CG, Philippine, FMIAF
COLONEL BANZUE, DCO, Philippine, FMIAF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ZAGALA, Construction Group Service Officer
MAJOR DIZON, Engineer
MAJOR ZERADAN, Engineer
CAPTAIN MAGNO, Aide-De-Camp
COLONEL LOONEY, JUSMAG, Philippines
COMMANDER EHLEKINGER, FMIAO, Philippines
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HINDIC, Asst JUSMAG, Philippines
MAJOR COUY, FMIAO and Korean LNO

Receive orientation briefing from 1st Infantry Division and ROK construction group. Discuss with LIFFORCEV, C-3 the procedures for coordination of fire support, area security, and other tactical procedures in III Corps Tactical Zone.

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Inclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

1 July 1966 - 31 July 1966

3 July 1966

MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL S. DAVISON, Commandant, USAC&GCS (Designate)
To observe operations and conduct discussion with Field Commanders
relative to the responsibilities of the Commandant, US Army C&GCS
and CG, Combined Arms Group, CGC.

8 July 1966

REPRESENTATIVE ROMAN C. PUCINSKI, (D-III)
REPRESENTATIVE TEO RONGALIO, (D-Wyo)
Visit, briefing and tour 1st Division area. See civic action and
aid programs. Talk to troops and meet constituents.

COLONEL JACK T. PINK, Director of Army Education and Morale Support
Directorate, Department of the Army
MAJOR DONALD W. CHRISTENSON, Plans and Requirements Officer
MISS AGNES P. CRAWFORD, GS-14, Chief Librarian
MISS ESTER WALSH, GS-12, Assistant Service Club Director
MISS MAXINE TRETSKE, GS-12, Assistant Director Crafts Branch
Department of the Army Special Service Team conduct a survey of the
Special Service Facilities, programs, and recreational activities in
the Republic of Vietnam.

10 July 1966

MR. CARL ORLANDO, US Army Electronics Command, New Material Introductory
Team
MR. THOMAS PATTERSON, Team Member
MR. JOHN GAIHEL, Team Member
CWO RAYMOND WILSON, Team Member
Present briefing on the AN/TSQ-43 (Tactical Imagery Interpretation
Facility).

19 July 1966

MR. YOZO KATO, Former Minister of Defense, Japan
To observe Civic Action programs.

COLONEL JAMES K. TERRY, USAADC, Combined Arms Group
COLONEL E.C. CAMPBELL, LNO, USARPAC from CGC
To discuss doctrinal matters and to coordinate collection of
operational data required by HQ, USAADC.

21 July 1966

PROFESSOR HENRY KISSINGER, Special Assistant to the President
To discuss international affairs as they pertain to Vietnam.

23 July 1966

GENERAL JOHN K. WATERS, CINCSARPAC
LIEUTENANT COLONEL B.E. TUTTCHILL, AD
SERGEANT MAJOR F.M. MICHAEL, Command Sergeant Major
COLONEL D.R. DART (Sr Escort)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL F.J. EGAN (USARPAC LNO)
Receive an up-date briefing covering events since his last briefing
in March 1966.

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Inlosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

30 July 1966

SERGEANT MAJOR T.L. DOBOL
Making the presentation of the Dobol award.

31 July 1966

77th Bomber Wing
LIEUTENANT COLONEL W.G. COONE
MAJOR L. TATUM
MAJOR H.C. STIVAL
CAPTAIN SMITH
CAPTAIN HARRIGEN
MASTER SERGEANT MERRELL

284th Bomber Wing
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS
MAJOR DUPONT
CAPTAIN GAUDREAU
CAPTAIN KIDD
CAPTAIN RIGGS
MASTER SERGEANT SMITH

To more closely identify the contribution made by ARCLIGHT Strikes
to the total U.S. effort in RVN.

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INCLOSURE 12

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION LAM SON II

12

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US Forces 96345

SUBJECT: After-action Report-Phu Loi Pacification Task Force-
Hamlet Development Program

TO: See Distribution

1. Reference: 1st Infantry Division OPLAN 10-66 (Lamson II)
2. The Phu Loi Pacification Task Force conducted its first "County Fair" and hamlet search operation beginning 260300 May 66. By 1600 hrs the Task Force had completed a comprehensive effort to attack VC infrastructure while attaining a psychological initiative with the population. While the two hamlets were being searched, the villagers were collected near the center of the hamlets. Here they were screened, and moved to the Hamlet Fair area. While all males between the ages of 15-45 were taken to the National Police Bqs. for further records check. The approximately 2000 people remaining in the hamlet were moved into a Hamlet Fair area. Here 16 teams, plus the village, District and Province Chiefs were used to explain the purposes of the operation, feed and control the crowd, and obtain intelligence information.
3. Extensive measures were taken to allay the fears of the people and explain the reasons for the search operation, entertainment and pay activities, official speeches, rice distribution, medical assistance, intelligence interrogations, records checks, VC apprehensions and feeding and on the spot compensation for damage. All these contributed to impressing the hamlet residents that government forces, assisted by the US, were determined to conduct a strong but fair campaign to permanently destroy VC influence in the Dinh Phu-Binh Phuoc area. After several initial control problems were solved on the spot, this portion of the operation proceeded satisfactorily.
4. The primary accomplishment was the demonstration of an effective technique to bring the government, including necessary force to initiate law and order, to a contested hamlet. Without the cordon and search the operation would have been merely a festival. Without the "Hamlet Fair" the operation would have been another "police action". Together, the effort was a useful means of beginning a pacification drive. All participants, US and ARVN, were impressed with the demonstrated potential. In addition to the efforts of police to speed necessary checks, other gestures of concern had a visible effect on the crowd as the day progressed. People relaxed, ate, and began to talk among themselves, and left in a generally friendly mood.
5. Problems areas encountered by the Task Force and assorted civil and military units were defined at several critiques attended by all GVN, ARVN and US staff and command elements involved. A detailed listing of these problems and solutions is attached Appendix 1. Emphasis is centered primarily on US/Vietnamese coordination and the lack of understanding of functions and relationships within the

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

operation. In addition, several essential items of equipment and operating techniques were identified. The experience gained in this operation provides the basis for positive improvements in the next Hamlet Fair.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Willington J Strickfaden
/t/WELLINGTON J. STRICKFADEN
Major Artillery
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

Special
5 - 5th ARVN
5 - Binh Duong Sector

"A TRUE COPY"

William L Ponder Jr.
WILLIAM L PONDER JR
Major, Artillery

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Con't)

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CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 1 TO "HAMLET FAIR" AFTER ACTION - PROBLEM AREAS AND STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. The following problem areas in the conduct of the pacification operation were identified by Binh Duong Province, 5th ARVN Division, MACV Advisory, and Pacification Task Force personnel and a combined critique conducted at Binh Duong Sector Headquarters.

a. Planning Phase:

(1) Problem: Difficulty in identifying and orienting all individuals, both US and Vietnamese, who were to be actually involved in accomplishing the planning and execution of the operations.

b. Search Phase:

(1) Problem: Insufficient number of search dogs to accompany search teams.

Solution: The number of dog teams available will be dependent on the number of search areas in a particular hamlet. As a general rule two (2) dog teams should be assigned directly to each group of 5 - 10 search teams.

(2) Problem: Lack of flashlights for inspecting tunnels.

Solution: It will be the responsibility of the search element chain of command to insure that a flashlight is assigned to each search team prior to the operation.

(3) Problem: Search CP operation was hampered by overflow and area congestion from Hamlet Development Fair site and inadequate communications.

(a) Solution: The search command post will be placed in a location so congestion is not caused by vehicles, civilians, or VC suspects being processed or interrogated.

(b) The Search CP will have adequate communications with all search leaders as well as Fair officials.

(c) Sector will provide PRC-6's to net with search control headquarters.

(4) Problem: Search teams were not trained in search team techniques.

Solutions:

(a) It will be the responsibility of the National Police to instruct all personnel of the search teams in proper methods of searching.

(b) Rehearsals will be scheduled on local houses to insure search teams are aware of their responsibilities.

(c) A check list will be available for each house to insure that all areas of the search have been conducted. It will be the responsibility of the area team chief to personally inspect the check list at each house, (Checklist attached) as each house is

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searched, it will be given a number applicable to a number system on a master overlay to the search command post. Each search team chief will insure marking material is available.

(d) It will be the responsibility of each search team leader to know his exact location at all times in accordance with the master overlay.

c. Assembly Area Phase.

(1) Problem: Adequate control of the population.

(a) It will be the responsibility of the National Police to establish screening teams in the assembly area for those men being evacuated to the National Police and those being taken to the Fair. Loudspeakers will be available from pa/ war units to assist in this control.

(b) National Police units will also insure that control is present for movements of the population from the assembly area to the Fair.

(c) Engineer tape should be used to encircle the entire assembly area as well as the County Fair.

(d) RF/PF forces should secure area.

(e) Loudspeakers should be used to explain to civilians why the men between 15-45 are being taken to National Police Headquarters. They should state that they will return as soon as possible.

2. Problem: Air and ground loudspeakers did not broadcast the same text.

Solution: Since a sufficient number of ground units are available, ground elements only will be used.

d. Hamlet Fair Phase.

(1) Problem: Fair operations require an OIC.

Solution: District Chief is in charge of the search and Fair operation; the Sector S-5 will be directly responsible for the Fair operations. A parallel US chain of command will be formed.

(2) Problem: A requirement exists for better control and coordination of the hamlet fair area.

Solutions:

(a) A fair coordination and control point will be established and manned by the ARVN OIC and US representatives to coordinate the over all activities and to facilitate immediate reaction to problems.

(b) Each station within the hamlet fair area should have ARVN and US representatives in charge responsible to the ARVN and US OIC for control and coordination.

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(c) All personnel in the hamlet fair area must initially be briefed in detail by the ARVN OIC as to the procedures to be followed and activities available in the fair area.

(d) A program will be prepared covering the schedule of fair activities.

(e) Engineer tape and rope will be used to assist in controlling movement between stations.

(f) When the people are released to the fair area they will be sub-divided into initial groups.

(3) Problem: Tendency of people to leave the fair area prior to completion of the search.

(4) Problem: The ID and 969 area tends to distract the people from the rest of the activities in the hamlet fair area.

Solutions:

(a) Detailed explanation of the 969 and ID area should be accomplished by the District Chief in the Assembly Area.

(b) The 969 and ID area should be cordoned off from the rest of the Hamlet Fair stations with adequate ARVN guard and control personnel present.

(c) A segment of the people in the assembly area should be designated for the 969 and ID card stations. The remainder of the people will be free to take part in the other activities in the Hamlet fair area until such time as they are required to enter the 969-ID area.

(5) Problem: Insufficient number and type of stations in the hamlet fair area.

Solution: The ARVN/US staff should increase the number and type stations for each activity dependent on the population density.

(6) Problem: Overcrowding of the entertainment area by ARVN and US soldiers and National Police.

Solutions:

(a) It will be the responsibility of the OIC (US) of the Hamlet Fair area to insure that US soldiers stay away from the Hamlet Fair area and particularly the entertainment stations unless absolutely necessary.

(b) The OIC (ARVN) of the Hamlet Fair area will insure that ARVN soldiers not mingle with the villagers within the fair area unless absolutely necessary.

(c) National Police officials will insure that members of National Police search teams stay within their areas of responsibility and out of the Hamlet Fair area. Those National Police assigned to the fair perimeter guard will not leave their posts to mingle with the villagers unless called for by the Hamlet Fair Officials.

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(d) All troops will be briefed on this problem prior to movement to the target area.

(7) Problem: There is a need for a clearly defined relief area.

Solution: Two latrine screens for male and female will be located adjacent to the Hamlet Fair area and appropriately marked.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) Problem: Vehicles loaded with perishable market goods were detained in the hamlet area resulted in spoilage.

Solution:

(a) After the hamlet area is sealed, all vehicles trying to enter the area should not be allowed to enter.

(b) Personnel with perishable goods on hand could be given priority to process through the 969 van and temporary ID card stations and allowed to depart the area.

(c) The District Chief did pay compensation for those items that spoiled during the day of the Hamlet Fair. He will continue to pay villagers for this spoilage.

(2) Problem: ARVN and US vehicles blocked the road along the Hamlet Fair area.

Solution: Parkings area should be specified for ARVN and US vehicles and should be located away from the Hamlet Fair area. Only vehicles essential for the hamlet Fair operations will be allowed to remain in the area.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY:

a. National Police.

- (1) Total screened 294
- (2) VC Cadre captured 2
- (3) ARVN deserters 3
- (4) Tunnels 2

b. 969 Van Interviewed 420

c. MEDCAP 750

d. Materials Distributed.

- (1) Rice (kilos) 1000
- (2) Candy (cans) 8
- (3) Milk (cans) 620

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e. Psychological Operations.

(1) Leaflets (total 76,000-969)

- (a) Airdropped in operation area 36,000.
- (b) Hand Distributed (including routes) 40,000.

(2) Other printed material.

- (a) "Support ARVN" posters 500.
- (b) "Why your men are in the Army" 300.
- (c) "Why fight the VC" 300.
- (d) "Defeat the VC" booklet 300.
- (e) GVN song book 300.
- (f) Honolulu Conference 300

(3) Audio Communications.

(a) Face to face: 2,000 people, continuous operations 8 hours 40 minutes, alternating 8 Pay/air and entertainment units.

(b) Loudspeaker ship: 5 hamlets in A, B, C areas OPLAN 10-66 2 hours, 20 minutes. Curfew regulations.

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Appendix 2 (Checklist for House Search) to AFTER ACTION REPORT

CHECKLIST FOR HOUSE SEARCH

HOUSE NUMBER _____

SEARCH PARTY NUMBER _____

1. House checked inside? Yes ☐ No ☐
2. House checked outside? Yes ☐ No ☐
3. Garage or storage area checked? Yes ☐ No ☐
4. Outside wooded area checked? Yes ☐ No ☐
5. Pro-Government in house or surrounding area? Yes ☐ No ☐
6. Pro-VC indications in house or surroundings? Yes ☐ No ☐
7. Tunnels
 1. Depth of tunnel or cave?

0m	1m	3m	5m	more
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
 2. Number of side passages?

1	2	3	more
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
 3. Checked? Yes ☐ No ☐
 4. Requires Dog Team check? Yes ☐ No ☐
8. Rice Bins or Water Barrels
 1. False bottoms checked? Yes ☐ No ☐
 2. Requires mine-detector check? Yes ☐ No ☐
9. Waterholes
 1. Number of waterholes checked?

0	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
 2. All water-hole bottoms checked? Yes ☐ No ☐
 3. Requires Mine-detector check? Yes ☐ No ☐

SEARCH TEAM CHIEF _____

FOLLOW-UP CHECK

AREA TEAM CHIEF _____

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INCLOSURE 13

TAN PHUOC KHANH - OPERATION SUMMARY

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HEADQUARTERS
PHU LOI PACIFICATION TASK FORCE
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US Forces 96345

11 June 1966

SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary

TO: See Distribution

1. GENERAL: The second major hamlet seal and search operation conducted by the Phu Loi Pacification Task Force centered on the Tan Phuoc Khanh hamlet complex. XT884168. Initial skepticism concerning the effectiveness of search operations was dispelled during the TF's first operation in Binh Thuan, XT887144. Combined US-ARVN planning for the second operation went extremely well, and at the decision briefing given to the commander, 5th ARVN Division and the APO, 1st Inf Div, the combined task force was given all the support and forces required. As a consequence, the task organization expanded to include, in addition to 1/26 Inf, A/1/4th Cav (+) and 1st Inf Div MEDCAP and support troops, and the 2/7 Inf, 5th Recon Co, Psywar, Civic Action, and cultural teams, and the Division Band, all from 5th ARVN Division. In addition, numerous Binh Duong sector forces were committed to include: 262 RF Co; 265 RF Co; Plat. 775 RF Co; Sector Intel Platoon; National Police Platoon; RF-PF Band; Chieu Hoi Squad; Sector Cultural Team and the Province Youth and Agricultural Services. Six search dog teams were furnished by the III Corps Adv Sp. Two interrogation teams were furnished by MACV. Task organization utilization is depicted in appendix one.

2. SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS:

a. The operation commenced at 011845H June when elements of the 1/26 Inf (-), with attached A/1/4 Cav (+) and the 7th Co, 7th ARVN Regt initiated movement to surround Tan Phuoc Khanh, XT 884168. A, B and C 1/26 conducted airmobile assaults into LZ's north, east, and south of the target area, while the remaining elements moved by ground. The rapid movement to seal the village, accomplished by 2010 hours, 1 Jun 66, was essential in order to off-set the loss of strategic surprise occasioned by the publicity given to the previous operation. In order to cut off possible VC escape routes north, a night airmobile assault was conducted, landing A/1/26 Inf in blocking positions via XT883190 at 012220H June 1966.

b. At 020605 June the 2/7 Inf (-), ARVN entered Tan Phuoc Khanh hamlet complex, population approximately 9000, and established cordon lines dividing the hamlet into three sections. Binh Duong Province search forces followed, and after they had deployed throughout the village, all men ages 15-45 were assembled, with search force assistance, and moved to the National Police headquarters at Phu Quong for screening. Of the total of 740 men screened, interim reports from the National Police show: 29-VC suspects, 9-deserters, 4 with false ID cards, 13-former VC (probation violation), and 62-draft dodgers. All the above are being detained at National Police headquarters.

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SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary

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c. After the men had departed the hamlet, internal cordon elements changed to divide the hamlet complex in half. All search forces (three companies (+)) were concentrated in the northern and eastern portion of the hamlet and the residents of that area were moved to the hamlet festival area. After search of the first half of the village had been completed search forces were re-deployed to the western half of the hamlet where they searched until 1700 hours. The search forces in conjunction with both internal and external cordon elements, were successful in apprehending an additional twenty five (25) suspects, to include three women carrying medical supplies, and ten men hiding in haystacks and wooded areas. Two tunnels were found by attached scout dogs.

d. At 020830 June the Binh Duong Province Band sounded the start of the Hamlet Festival. Hamlet residents began arriving in the area by 0900 hours, and were greeted by members of the Binh Duong Revolutionary Development Cadre Team V. After the 5th ARVN Band played the Vietnamese National Anthem, cultural teams from 5th ARVN Division and province presented traditional dances and pantomimes. The Province Chief, Lt Col Ba, and District Chief, Capt Phuoc, spoke to the people explaining the government's program and urging them to the GVN cause. The Province Chief was present throughout the day, talking to elders, heads of households, and on one occasion taking over the Youth Services Session. Detailed layout and function of the Hamlet Festival are depicted in Appendix Three.

e. At the MEDCAP station 1,087 men, women and children were treated by medical and dental teams from Div Arty and 5th ARVN Division. 3600 meals of hotdogs, potato salad, and cold milk were served by Task Force elements - the people responded favorable to the change in their menu. The response to the agricultural team's demonstration of bulgar wheat preparation was equally impressive. Six 969 interrogation tents were utilized. Of the 325 individuals interrogated, two were on the blacklist and turned over to National Police authorities. One of these was allegedly the VC village secretary. Also of note is the fact that a sketch of Phu Loi was found on the body of one VC KIA. The majority of the persons questioned in 969 facilities were cooperative and in numerous cases information concerning VC tax collection, guerrillas, and cadre was offered. This information will be exploited. In the late afternoon, VIS representatives showed movies to a sizable collection of adults and children. The Hamlet Festival was concluded at 1530 hours by the 1st Infantry Division Band marching through the town. After search forces had completed their assigned sectors in the eastern half of the hamlet they were moved to the western portion of the hamlet where they searched until 1700 hours. By 1730 all elements of the Hamlet Festival, and three elements of the search forces, the 262 RF Co, 265 RF Co, and 5th ARVN Recon Co, had cleared the hamlet. Tents remaining in the Hamlet Festival were secured by the 2/7 Inf and the Task Force CP area was secured by the Sector Intell Platoon.

f. During the night of 2 June the 1/26 Inf (+) continued to seal the village area. The following morning search forces re-entered Tan Phuoc Khanh at 0615 hours and deployed throughout the western portion of the hamlet to once again search that area while residents from that half of the village assembled for the second day of the Hamlet Festival. The search showed remarkable success - during the day 48 VCS were located in various hiding places throughout the village, from haystacks and tunnels to woodpiles and watch towers.

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The cooperation of the villagers in assisting search forces was heartening. At the mobile interrogation facility, one individual volunteered information concerning a VC hiding in a pottery factory; as a consequence, National Police were successful in apprehending 10 VCS. Another villager indicated that 4 VC hiding near their house and search teams were able to capture the men. VC captured included two female nurses, one intelligence specialist, two finance and economy cadre, and one cell leader.

g. By the end of two days, activities of the hamlet festival elements had succeeded in softening and changing the attitudes of individuals hostile to the government. Over 2000 people had gone through either the MEDCAP or dental facility, a two day total of 6800 meals had been served, and 1200 bags of rice had been distributed. The cadre team was extremely effective in controlling the movement of people within the area as well as influencing their attitudes. By introducing the teams via the hamlet festival, the transition from primarily a military presence to the civilian aspects of revolutionary development is facilitated. Late in the afternoon, the Province Chief stopped the festival in order to show the people a number of captured VC and weapons. The psychological impact of this presentation was impressive.

h. By the close of the second day of searching through Tan Phuoc Khanh, there was still a substantial amount of intelligence, relating to VC yet hiding in the village, which had not been exploited. As a consequence, it was decided to extend the operation further. At 040630 June search forces consisting of an RF company, an intelligence platoon, and a National Police platoon returned to the hamlet to conduct searches in select locations. A total of 19 persons to include 2 females, were apprehended in the village area. One VC suspect was brought to the TF HQ by villagers who found him hiding in a wooded area. A confirmed VC led an intelligence platoon to a VC weapons cache consisting of one US M-1 Carbine, one CHICOM Carbine, 35 rounds of .30 cal ammunition, web equipment, and VC tax collection statistics.

i. During the third day of operations, 4 June, a total of 92 civilians were screened within the 969 interrogation tents. One woman who had volunteered information leading to the apprehension of a VC suspect hiding in a coffin was given 200 \$VN. All villagers appeared to be very cooperative and sincere about their answers. Very few men volunteered to furnish information in order to obtain a sack of rice and the women questioned generally did not know information concerning VC installations. Many women did, however, furnish numerous names of VC sympathizers in the Tan Phuoc Khanh area. These names were added to existing "blacklists".

j. As the day's operation closed, it was evident that the civilian population truly wanted to assist friendly units securing their village. Many individuals spoke of VC harassing tactics in the village and stated that, if they had sufficient security, many more people would come to live there.

k. The Phu Loi Pacification Task Force completed seal and search operations in the Tan Phuoc Khanh area on 5 June with a search of Koi Nhut hamlet, XT885176. At 0400 hours, elements of 1/26 Inf (+) and 7th Co, 7th Regt ARVN moved from night patrol bases to seal off the hamlet area. One platoon, 1/26 Inf, was kept aloft in helicopters should VCs be seen leaving the area. At 0610 hours, search forces elements from Binh Duong entered the hamlet, assembled the men for

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transport to the National Police Headquarters at Phu Cuong and, once the women and children had left their dwellings for the hamlet festival area, commenced searching of the area. The search was completed by 1200 hours, and from the meagre results, it was clear that the Viet Cong living in the area had departed while the Task Force was operating in Tan Phuoc Khanh proper. A number of women questioned at the 969 tents indicated that small groups of VC (2-3) had passed through the village headed north when Tan Phuoc Khanh was surrounded.

1. The Tan Phuoc Khanh operation was concluded at 1700 hours on 5 June when the last elements of search and hamlet festival forces had cleared the area. As the results cited above and the statistics noted in Appendix Two indicate, the operation was a significant success. A VC review of the operation estimated a 50% loss to their capability and a two month period required for recuperation.

3. CONCLUSION:

a. Varying the time for surrounding the village area enabled the Task Force to gain tactical surprise.

b. Internal cordon forces as used in this operation must be closely supervised to be effective. There was a tendency for internal cordon elements to permit flow of traffic and women between the two halves of the village.

c. Search forces must be carefully instructed on their duties. A number of search teams performed their assigned tasks in an exemplary manner; others however forgot flashlights and search checklists and did not report the locations of houses in which VCS were found. With the prolonged search period of three days, this disadvantage was overcome.

d. Interrogation of the VCS within the Task Force CP location often was hampered by unauthorized spectators and occasionally by improper techniques. Prisoners were not isolated from their cohorts when interrogated, and in addition, the flow of information between the National Police HQ's, the 969 vans, and the IPW area was not as rapid as is desirable.

e. The recording and display of information within the Task Force and search headquarters lagged the actual operation considerably. Though this did not hamper the execution of plans, it did cause delay in the changing of instructions. Closer coordination within the combined staff should overcome this difficulty.

f. Introduction of the cadre to the people via the hamlet festival facilitates the transition from a primarily military presence to the civilian aspects of the pacification program.

g. Displaying VC weapons and captives at the Hamlet Festival is an effective psychological technique for alienating the Viet Cong from the populace.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

Appendices:

One - Utilization of Task Organization
Two - Results
Three - Hamlet Festival

/s/ Wellington J Strickfaden
/t/ WELLINGTON J. STRICKFADEN
Major Artillery
Adjutant

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William L Ponder Jr
WILLIAM L PONDER JR
Major, Artillery

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Appendix One (Task Organization Utilization) To Tan Phuoc Khanh Operation Summary

	1 Jun	2 Jun	3 Jun	4 Jun	5 Jun
<u>External Cordon</u>					
1/26 Infantry	X	X	X	X	X
7th Co, 7th Regt ARVN	X	X	X	X	X
A Troop, 1/4 Cav (-)	X	X	X	X	X
TK Plat, 1/4 Cav	X	X	X		
<u>Internal Cordon</u>					
2/7 Infantry (-), ARVN		X	X		
<u>Search Force</u>					
262 RF Co		X	X	X	X
265 RF Co		X	X	X	
5th Reconnaissance Co		X	X		
Intel Plat, 2/7 Inf		X	X		
Intel Plat, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
NP Plat, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
VTTT Squad, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
Search Dog Tms, III Corps		X	X	X	X
Tunnel Demo Tm, 266 CML Det. (U.S.)		X	X	X	X
<u>Hamlet Festival</u>					
PAT Plat, Cadre Group IV		X	X		
Plat, 775 RF Co.		X	X	X	
5th ARVN Band		X	X	X	X
RF-PF Band, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
Cultural Tm, 5th ARVN		X	X		
Cultural Tm, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
CA Tms, 5th ARVN		X	X		
Pay-war Tms, 5th ARVN		X	X		
VIS Tms, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
Youth Services, Binh Duong		X	X		
Agricultural Service, BD		X	X		
MFDCAP, 5th ARVN		X	X		
MSDCAP, 1st Inf Div		X	X	X	X
Interrogations Tms, 1st Inf Div		X	X	X	X
Logistical Support Teams, 1st Inf Div		X	X	X	X

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Appendix Two (Statistical Summary) to Tan Phuoc Khanh Operation Summary

The following totals have been obtained during the Tan Phuoc Khanh area operations from 011900 June 1966 to 051400 June 1966:

1. Personnel Statistics

VC KIA-2
 VC WIA-4
 VCC-19
 VCS-89
 Deserters-21
 False ID's-4
 Draft Dodgers-118
 Former VC (Probation Violation)-13
 Allied KIA-0
 Allied WIA-9

2. Enemy Equipment and Material Losses

3 Carbines
 1 Russian Rifle
 1 .45 Cal Pistol
 1 .45 Cal Revolver US Double Action
 10 Grenades 7 US/2 CHICOM/1 Homemade
 32 Rds .30 Cal Ammo
 2 Russian Stocks
 4 Magazines w/.30 & .45 Cal Rds
 6 Ammo Pouches
 6 Dry Batteries, Electrical Fuses and Wiring
 Medical Supplies
 2 Web Belts w/Canteens
 Documents: Sketches of Div Arty, Phu Loi, Binh Duong

indicating important installations.

VC tax collection receipts.

False ARVN discharge paper (issued by VC to a Guerrilla)

Sketches of US Signal equipment, PRC-6, PRC-8, and wire reel
 Propaganda booklets.

3. Hamlet Festival

Teeth pulled-107 (2 days)
 MEDCAP-2403 (2 days)
 Meals Served-6800 (2 days)
 Bags of Rice (2-kilo)-1388 (3 days)

Entertainment:

RF-PF Band-3 days
 VIS Combo-3 days
 Province Cultural Teams-3 days
 5th ARVN Band-1 day
 1st Inf Div Band-1 day
 5th ARVN Cultural Teams-1 day

Youth Service Team-3 days

Agricultural Service Demonstration-2 days-300 samples

Cadre Teams-2 days

Leaflets:

969	1,760,000
MEDCAP	88,000
Coffee	110,000
1st Inf Div Good Guy	30,000
Chien Hoi	25,000
Others	112,000

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Appendix Three (Hamlet Festival Operation) to Tan Phuoc Khanh Operations Summary

I. HAMLET FESTIVAL ORGANIZATION

A. Organization of Hamlet Festival Activities

1. 969 - ID (Request for information and district issuance of special passes) stations are used in conjunction with each other. As civilians are required to process through the ID station this enables the intelligence people to choose those they wish to question. It is advisable to locate this station away from noisy activities such as the entertainment area. Since the civilians are apt to crowd this area to receive passes white engineer tape is used to block off the area and funnel them into the stations. One GP medium is sufficient for the ID teams while one small hex tent suffices for each interrogation team. Approximately 5 minutes are allowed for each 969 interview.

2. MEDCAP Station: This area is best located near the 969-ID station as civilians tend to congregate there. Medical teams should be adequate to handle 40% to 50% of the population. For high impact value include a dentist. One GP medium tent can handle 4 MEDCAP teams with supplies. A wash facility is set at the rear outside the tent. Each team includes a doctor, specialist, and interpreter. Follow-up visits to the same hamlet after one or two days are a must.

3. Entertainment Activities: This station attracts much attention continually thus it is imperative that it is run smoothly. A stake and platform trailer is used as a stage. Stairs and a public address system must be provided. Also, a cover for the stage is necessary for protection from the sun and rain. If possible stagger the arrival of the entertainment teams and pre-schedule their performances to alleviate initial confusion. This area is good for color. Erect banners depicting GVN revolutionary themes and have all speeches by Vietnamese officials conducted here.

4. Youth Service Activity: This service is a function of the district and necessary to entertain and control the children at the festival. Games, singing and a candy hand-out are their primary capabilities. One GP medium for shelter is adequate. Movies provided by the Vietnamese Information Service and US military will help them control the children.

5. Vietnamese Information Service: This service is involved in a multitude of activities. They provide two entertainment groups; a jazz combo and a cultural team. Their speakers are used in conjunction with the US public address system in the entertainment area and they provide the equipment for movies. A GP medium is adequate for the movies. This service has also miscellaneous pamphlets and magazines for distribution.

6. Vietnamese Agricultural Service: This service can provide information to the elders about farming. This is an invaluable service as the villagers are most interested in knowing how GVN can help them in this area. As bulgar wheat is a food commodity not necessarily liked by most individuals; this team cooks bulgar over an open fire and distributes samples.

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7. PayWar/CA Teams: The initial cordoning stage requires crowd control. The Vietnamese teams work well here. At the beginning of the search phase they return to the Hamlet Festival for crowd control and to mingle with the crowd to discuss GVN opportunities. The CA team is used initially to guide and control the civilians entering the festival area. During the festival they mingle with the crowd to find out what the people want and need and help the youth service control the children. They are helpful in handing out clothes, etc, to the civilians.

8. Internal Control Cadre: Groups used in this function have been the RF-PF Revolutionary Development cadre and PayWar/CA teams. All have done a tremendous job, but the same group should be used continuously to prevent initial confusion as to their duties. There is a need for ushering the civilians from the assembly area to the festival, greeting them at the entrance, helping them find the various activities, providing control of various activities and serving luncheon lines.

9. Reception Center: A small tent is used for a control center to greet VIP personnel and to solve problems that arise in the festival area. A radio or telephone is located here.

10. Shelter Tents: An adequate number of tents should be provided for the population to protect them from the sun and rain. This feature helps control as it demonstrates interest in their welfare and keeps them at the festival. Tents also provide a good atmosphere for small discussion groups.

II. FUNCTIONING OF HAMLET FESTIVAL

Interest displayed by the Task Force's combined staff helped Hamlet Festival operations in Tan Phuoc Khanh and Hoa Nhut to become a significant success. Ample planning time and continuous coordination resulted in smooth assembly and deployment of the large Festival Task Force. Movement from the assembly area to the Hamlet Festival area was controlled by members of the 5th ARVN Division PsyOps teams. At the entrance the civilians were greeted by members of the Revolutionary Development cadre and then assembled at the entertainment area where the RF-PF Provincial band was playing. The district chief explained the reasons for our presence and the opportunities GVN would bring to them. Next, the sector S-5 spoke explaining the Hamlet Festival and its activities. Cadre members then separated the gathering into groups taking them to the various activities. Entertainment continued throughout the day. The 1st Infantry Division Band played, ending their program by marching through the hamlet streets. Other entertainment groups included the Provincial RF-PF Band, cultural teams and VIS jazz combe. 5th ARVN Division provided their band and cultural teams. Medical aid to include dental service for civilians and RF-PF families was given by elements of the 1st Inf Div Arty and 5th ARVN medical teams. For the enjoyment of everyone the Vietnamese Information Service provided Western and Cultural movies for adults and children. The Vietnamese Youth Service organized the Hamlet children into singing troops and various ball games. In one instance the Province Chief played ball with the children to the delight of everyone. After cooking bulgar wheat over an open fire the Vietnamese Agricultural Service served samples to the hamlet population. As this commodity is sometimes discarded by the Vietnamese as an unfavorable food this helped convince them that when prepared properly it can be an appetizing dish. A "969" Volunteer Information Service interviewed many civilians in an attempt to gather Viet Cong intelligence. A 2-kilo bag of captured VC rice was given to all those interviewed.

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Results of this service can be found in the S-2/3 portion of this report. Coupled with the above activity the Province National Police ran an identification check and issued temporary passes for civilian control. At noon a luncheon consisting of hot dogs, potato salad or rice, milk, juice and all the extras was served to the people. Even though the people commented about the unusual and strange taste of the food they all returned for seconds and thirds. Mingling with the crowd throughout the day were elements of the 5th ARVN and Binh Duong province Paywar teams. They formed small discussion groups relating the facts of GVN opportunities. Many villagers were found to have little knowledge of the government of South Vietnam. During all Hamlet Festivals shelter is provided for the population. Without shelter from the sun or rain many women with small children and the elders desire to return home. Since apprehensions run high with the 15-45 year old age group of men gone every consideration is given to the families remaining. As this demonstrates interest in their welfare this is a step in convincing the people that GVN can meet their needs.

III. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Suggestion: More Hamlet Festival activities will bring more GVN opportunities to the people and establish greater rapport for their return.

Recommendation: More activities such as the Vietnamese Educational Service, Agricultural Service, NACO and Veterinarian Services should be called upon to place displays at the Hamlet Festival.

B. Suggestion: There is a need for extensive internal control. Someone is needed to lead the people from the assembly area to the festival, greet them when they enter and show them the various activities. These people would serve in the mess lines and station themselves at different activities to guide the civilians.

Recommendation: A special team consisting of Vietnamese personnel should be organized at Province level for use at the Hamlet Festival for internal control.

C. Suggestion: In that some villagers are ignorant of VC activity around them and others fully aware of it we would gain psychological advantage by showing what we find.

Recommendation: Prepare a weapons and equipment display for the people. The display would consist of things found in and around the village. Captured personnel could also be displayed by the Province or District Chief.

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
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B. Schematic of Festival Operations



* O Indicates Water Points



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
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

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INCLOSURE 14
PHOTOS OF CAPTURED WEAPONS















INCLOSURE 15

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF LOC NINH PLANTATION

15

Inoclosure 15 Operational Report Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Resume of Battle of LOC NINH Rubber Plantation

1st Bn, 28th Infantry
Loc Ninh, South Vietnam (XU7308)
12 June 66

RESUME of BATTLE of LOC NINH RUBBER PLANTATION

The Battle of the Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation was conducted under the canopy of the gently rolling Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation two kilometers west and northwest of Loc Ninh, coord XU737097. Vegetation under the 60 ft. rubber trees was negligible. Weather for the operation was fair with the exception of heavy ground fog in the early morning. The fog delayed the heliborne portion of the operation from 0620H until 0815H when the fog dissipated sufficiently to allow the HU1D helicopters to make their lift of one CIDG platoon and one platoon from A Co into the LZ vic coord XU702112. Touchdown was 110835H Jun 66 following a five minute gunship preparation in the area.

The ground blocking elements, two platoons from A Co, departed the Loc Ninh area at 0715H along Route Red and Route Blue, respectively. At 0735H these elements reported receiving S/A fire from approximately one platoon of VC vic coord XU715093. A Co's 81mm mortars were fired into the area with unknown results. In the same vic, at 0810H, the blocking elements had three wounded by S/A fire from the VC positions at the top of Hill 150. The 81mm mortars from A Co were again called on the hilltop. Following the mortar barrage the two blocking platoons moved into positions to the south and east of the VC locations on Hill 150, vic coord XU715095.

The heliborne elements after their initial landing, headed south toward their original objective of the Village Nr. 10 complex, centered at XU710100. At 0849H the blocking elements reported receiving MG fire from a bunker at vic coord XU717095. Upon receiving this information the CIDG-A Co elements altered their mission and moved south to assist against what was now estimated to be at least one VC platoon entrenched on top of Hill 150. A Co's platoon moved to the north of the VC positions tying in with the two blocking forces on the east and south, thus forming a U-shaped ring open to the NW. The CIDG platoon attempted to penetrate the VC positions from the NW, but were repulsed by heavy S/A and AW fire coming from the well entrenched enemy. The CIDG elements then displaced, tying in with A Co's blocking elements on the south. 81mm mortars were immediately called in to the north, sealing off any VC route of withdrawal.

Due to the intensity of the fighting C Co was alerted at 0910H to be prepared to move on foot to assist A Co. At 0940H C Co was ordered to move in support of the elements around Hill 150. By 1030H A and C Co had linked up, C Co moving around toward coord XU713098. As C Co moved to effect tie in, A Co indicated that VC were moving to the NE toward Hill 177, vic coord XU721111. C Co was then ordered by the Battalion Commander to move north to intercept and attack the VC in that vicinity.

Upon approaching coord XU720104 C Co ran into intense ground fire from at least one VC company firmly entrenched in bunkers with overhead cover in the vic of Hill 177. Artillery and 4.2" mortar fire was called on the VC positions and to the north to prevent the VC from escaping. At 1200H C Co requested ammunition resupply and further assistance to maneuver against the enemy force. In less than fifteen minutes two helicopter loads of ammunition were air-dropped behind C Co's front lines. The recon Platoon was immediately

Inlosure 15 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
RESUME of BATTLE of LOC NINH RUBBER PLANTATION (CONT'D)

dispatched on foot from Loc Ninh with still additional ammunition and a mission of aiding the C Co attacking elements south of Hill 177.

The Recon element moved to A Co's CP location, via coord XU720092 and then proceeded north to assist C Co, killing three VC snipers along the way. At 1330H Recon and C Co linked up with Recon being placed on C Co left flank via coord XU717104. In preparation for an assault, more artillery was fired on the VC positions around Hill 177. The attack commenced at 1425H with C Co on line east to west and the Recon Platoon pinching in on VC trenchwork from the west along a ridgeline running north via coord XU715113.

At this point the VC concentrated their fire on Recon and C Co platoon on the left, hurling grenades and firing S/A from the trees. Simultaneously, the VC began hitting the Recon Platoon's left flank with intensified SA and AW fire. The Recon in turn attempted to fall back to prevent the VC enveloping movement. While in the process of accomplishing this maneuver, the VC moved a machinegun into a trench occupied by the remaining Recon elements, resulting in the VC overrunning the positions. C Co immediately countered with its reserve platoon, eliminating the VC resistance, pushing the enemy off Hill 177 into the artillery volleys to the north and northwest, terminating this portion of the battle at around 111615H Jun 66.

Meanwhile, in the A Co area to the south, consecutive assaults from the north, south, and west failed to dislodge the VC from their entrenched positions. A CIDG company moving west on patrol was diverted into a blocking position via coord XU 700090. A Company's 81mm mortars continued to pound the VC positions, but to no apparent avail. The Bn Commander then decided to commit his final reserve, B Co, at 1430H, at the same time moving the CIDG company east to XU713090 into a more advantageous blocking and maneuvering location.

When B Co linked up with A Co at 1500H the A Co elements were repositioned to allow the artillery to fire a preparation all along Hill 150 prior to an assault by B Co. In the meantime the CIDG platoon attached to A Co and positioned via coord XU714093 retreated to the south after their interpreter had been killed by the VC, thus creating a gap in the A Co lines on the south. The SF advisor then joined A Co until the battle ended.

Following a sixteen volley artillery bombardment B Co assaulted Hill 150 at 1630H, completely overrunning the VC positions. The VC fled to the south and ran into a heavy volume of fire from the CIDG blocking force, causing the VC to scatter SW in complete disorganization.

After the final assault, consolidations were made in the Battalion Zone of Action. Casualties were then evacuated, ammunition resupply was effected, and the battlefield was policed of VC bodies and equipment with a thorough search of the entire area. The Bn then moved on foot back to base camp location around the Loc Ninh airstrip, final elements closing at 112100H Jun 66.

1. Casualty Figures:

	VC
KIA - 33	KIA - 98 (BC)
WIA - 33	WIA - 1 (Captured)

Inclosure 15 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
RESUME of BATTLE of LOC NINH RUBBER PLANTATION (CONT'D)

The enemy force was estimated to be from two to three main force VC companies. Because of the nature of resistance this estimation was never apparent until approximately 1200H.

2. Enemy Equipment Captured:

- a. 60mm mortar - 1ea complete w/ammunition
- b. SKS Russian Carbine - 1ea
- c. Panzerfaust - 1ea w/ammunition
- d. MG-42 Machinegun - 1ea
- e. VC Webgear
- f. VC medical Supply
- h. Numerous grenades, mines and S/A ammunition

3. Ammunition Expended:

- a. 81mm mortars - 400 HE, 14 Ill.
- b. 4.2" mortars - 95 HE, 5 WP
- c. 105mm Arty - 1143 HE
- d. Small Arms - Two basic loads

4. Air Sorties Flown:

Air was used to block VC route of escape to the west side of the battle area. Sixteen sorties were flown by F-100's, F-40's and Navy A1H aircraft. Ordnance expended as follows: CBU, Napalm, 260 lb. fragmentation bombs, 20mm cannon.

- 3 Incl
1 RESUME OVERLAY
2 FRAG ORDER
3 OPERATION OVERLAY

/s/ Kyle W Bowie
/t/ KYLE W. BOWIE
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"

William J. Powder Jr.
WILLIAM J. POWDER JR
Major, Artillery

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Loc Ninh, South Vietnam (XU7308)
101600H Jun 66
KM

FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)

REFERENCE: MAP, SOUTH VIETNAM; 1:50,000 LOC NINH 6346 IV; LOC THIEU 6346 III.

1. **MISSION:** A Co w/1 platoon CIDG conducts search of Village Nr. 10, Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation, via coord XU7209, to clear area of local VC.
2. **EXECUTION**
 - a. Concept of operations: A Co (-) w/CIDG platoon attached, at 110600H commences move by foot and HU1D helicopter to surround Village Nr. 10 and clear it of VC and VC sympathizers.
 - b. A Co: At 0600H two platoons follow Route Red and Route Blue to blocking positions east and south of Village Nr. 10. At 0630H one platoon from A Co w/one platoon of CIDG helilifted to LZ XU701112, move south, conduct search and clear of VC in Village Nr. 10.
 - c. B Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 20 min. alert.
 - d. C Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 5 min. alert.
 - e. Heavy Mortar: GS, priority to A Co.
 - f. Recon: Reinforce on call.
 - g. AT: Demo support on call.
 - h. Coord. Instructions:
 - (1) A Co send one man to maintain constant coordination with CIDG.
 - (2) Gunship prep of LZ five minutes prior to landing.
 - (3) VC and VCS evacuated to Loc Ninh on foot.
 - (4) Evacuate casualties to rear on foot if possible. Dustoff on call. Dustoff freq: 45.
 - (5) FAC freq: 43.6

ACKNOWLEDGE:

BOWIE
Lt Col

ANNEX: A

DISTRIBUTION: B

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
/s/ Fish
for /s/ RABDAU
SF

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2. 101600H Jun 66

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 Loc Ninh, South Vietnam (XU7308)
 101600H Jun 66
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ANNEX A (OPERATION OVERLAY) to FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)



ALPHABETICALLY
 DISSEMINATION: A


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 12 June 1966
 KM

RECON OVERLAY to FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)

NOT EXACT SCALE: APPROX 1:20,000 LOC NINH-XU7308



ASSEMBLY: 2

BOWIE
 Lt Col

TOTAL

1/1/66

125

INCLOSURE 16

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF SROK DONG AND HO ERIGNOU

16

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NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF SROK DONG
30 JUN 1966

9 AUG 1966

INTRODUCTION (U)

The 271st Viet Cong Main Force Regiment was defeated on 30 June 1966, near the village of SROK DONG in one of the classic engagements of the Vietnam conflict. In continuing their efforts to repel the 1st Infantry Division from the EL PASO II area of operations, the VC attempted to ambush Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and Company C, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. As a consequence, the 271st Regiment suffered heavy losses and was soundly defeated.

BACKGROUND (U)

Operation EL PASO II commenced on 2 June 1966 when intelligence indicated that three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese regiments were poised to resume their "Monsoon Campaign" by attacking GVN and U.S. Special Forces compounds in MINH THANH, HON QUAN, LOC NINH, and SONG BE. Because of this threat, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, directed one infantry and one artillery battalion be deployed to LOC NINH to strengthen the defenses in this area. Subsequently, additional elements were deployed by CG 1st Div until by mid-June the majority of the division was operating throughout BINH LONG and PHUOC LONG Provinces. 1st Infantry Division troop dispositions as of 300600 June are indicated on attached map 1. Two significant engagements had been fought with the VC prior to 30 June. On 8 June, Troop A (+), 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry had spoiled an ambush on Route 13, set by the 272d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through TAU O, an area between CHON THANH and HON QUAN. When the 4-hour engagement ended, the VC had lost 105 KIA (90) with an additional 250 probably killed. The second significant engagement involved elements of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry and CING forces in the Battle of LOC NINH Plantation on 11 June 1966. One battalion of the 273d Main Force Regiment was emplaced in trenches and heavily fortified bunkers but after massive artillery and mortar fire and air strikes, the positions were overrun. VC losses were 98 KIA (80) and 150 KIA (Probable).

For about two weeks the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) had the mission of securing the division base at QUAN LOI and the HON QUAN airfield. From 8 June, the cavalry squadron had been performing reconnaissance to the east, south, southwest, and to the north limited by the destroyed bridge on Route 13 at XT 722973. In coordination with ARVN forces the banks of the stream were prepared to permit emplacement of an armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) just to the left of the one that had been damaged. An operation was planned in conjunction with the emplacement of the AVLB, to commence on 30 June. The squadron plan was submitted to Lt Col Herbert McChrystal, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, and was approved for operations in the area indicated on maps 2 and 3. The mission assigned to Lt Col Leonard Lewane, Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was actually threefold. First the squadron (-) was to cross Check Point GOLDEN GATE (AVLB) and proceed north along Route 13 conducting a reconnaissance in force. Troop C was to operate in area of operation BUSTLE while B Troop would initially operate in FOOTBALL and later in TENNIS. Second, B Troop, in conjunction with operations in TENNIS, would escort an engineer scoop loader from LOC NINH, back to Check Point GOLDEN GATE. Third, the operation was to deceive the enemy as to the actual area in which the division was planning to operate in the near future. Both troops were to close back into HON QUAN by 1930 on 30 June.

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Troop B would have one platoon of C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attached, while the remainder of C Company would move with C Troop. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry maintained B Company on alert as the rapid reaction force. With final planning completed, the operation would begin on 30 June.

The vegetation in the area of the contact is wooded on both sides of the road. The only open areas are rice paddies, some stream lines, and small lakes. Even here, there is adequate concealment due to the chest-high grass. There are heavily forested areas as indicated on map 3 and the sketch maps, with the trees 150 - 200 feet high. Although movement in the grass is difficult to observe from the ground, it can be observed from the air except where the terrain is heavily forested. The chest-high grass comes up to the shoulders of the road. The weather at the time of contact was clear and hot.

THE BATTLE OF SROK DONG (U)

On 30 June, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with attached 1st Platoon, C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and AVLB section departed the squadron perimeter at HON QUAN enroute to Check Point GOLDEN GATE. The column was located at the bridge site by 0859 hours. Troop C was to depart HON QUAN at 0730 with C Company (-). However, this column was delayed until Troop C could reorganize after the search operation conducted until 2400 hours the previous night. At 0910, the column crossed GOLDEN GATE with B Troop leading and proceeded north on Route 13 to the operational areas specified in the order. Upon arrival at Check Point 1, the 3d Platoon with the platoon of infantry turned east and conducted a reconnaissance to the ford at Check Point 2. Due to the depth of the ford, the platoon retraced the route to Check Point 1, turned north on Route 13, passed through the 1st Platoon, and continued north. Order of march was now 3d Platoon with attached infantry, Troop Command Group, 2d Platoon, and 1st Platoon.

Troop C turned west at Check Point 1 and proceeded to the first stream. Three mortar carriers, ten infantrymen, and the 3d Platoon remained at Check Point 1 and established a perimeter. The mortars were laid west to support the troop. As C Troop moved west, they flanked the road on both sides. After crossing the stream, the infantry dismounted and deployed.

At about 0930 hours when the lead personnel carrier of B Troop, moving north on Route 13 toward LOC NINH, reached a point about midway across the rice paddy (sketch map 1), it began receiving mortar, small arms and recoilless rifle fire and appeared to be the only one engaged. 1st Lieutenant James P. Flores, B Troop Commander, could see the mortar rounds bursting from his position in the column about 800 meters to the rear of the lead vehicle. He immediately called Col Levane, who was over the area in an OH-13 helicopter. The 3d Platoon then reported receiving heavy fire from the north and northwest. A preplanned airstrike was currently in progress vicinity XT 7499, which Col Levane diverted to XU 721018 at Lt Flores' request. Lt Flores then called the 2d Platoon forward and deployed them around the 3d Platoon. The 2d Platoon brought their two tanks and one from the 1st Platoon forward. By this time all but one tank and a personnel carrier of the 3d Platoon had returned to Check Point 1 with wounded and to replenish ammunition. All platoons were now in contact on both sides of the road, with the heaviest volume of fire coming from the west.

The Viet Cong had set up the ambush in the shape of an "L", with a heavy security element crossing the road along the trail north of the paddy. The logs piled at road to the east of Check Point 3 afforded good protection and some of the recoilless rifles were probably located here. Mortars were reported by a forward air controller in the woods to the north of the village. The ambush extended for about 2000 meters, but with the exception of a security element to the northeast of Check Point 1, the eastern side of the road was lightly defended. The VC appeared to be lined up all along the west side of the road with the heavy weapons about 150 meters from the road in the heaviest vegetation. The VC were wearing a variety of khaki, black, and green uniforms. One strong point had been established by the VC in vicinity XU 722007. The recoilless rifles caused the most trouble, and were also the most difficult to locate. During the first 30 minutes of the contact, the enemy concentrated on knocking out the tanks. All four B Troop tanks were disabled from hits on the tank commander's cupola and subsequent wounding of the crew.

The 1st Platoon of B Troop was carrying the wounded to GOLDEN GATE with an intermediate aid station set up at Check Point 1. They also helped with the establishment of a strong point at Check Point 1. Because the incoming fire at Check Point 1 was so intense, Dust Off aircraft could not land so the squadron S-3 set-up the Dust Off LZ at GOLDEN GATE and wounded were collected at Check Point 1 and then moved south.

Troop B concentrated on laying down a heavy base of fire to the west. Airstrikes which had been continuous from the initial strike, were being placed to the north and west. Artillery was attacking targets on the east of Route 13 and armed UH-1B's and CH-47's were making firing passes north and south on the areas immediately adjacent to the road. When the 1st Platoon reported receiving fire at Check Point 1, it appeared to Lt Flores that the VC were attempting to cut him off from Check Point 1. An airstrike was immediately called in and the fire slackened at this location. The remaining elements at the head of the column were still receiving heavy fire from all types of weapons and Lt Flores called requesting C Troop come up and help.

When the first contact was reported, Captain Stephen Slattery, C Troop Commander, ordered the infantry to mount up and prepare to move back to Check Point 1, establish a strong point, and be prepared to assist B Troop. The 3d Platoon had been receiving some light fire at Check Point 1, but when the other platoons arrived at this location, the fire became more intense. Several of the infantry riding on the personnel carriers were hit as mortar rounds started falling into the area. Capt Slattery ordered the platoons to deploy and push out the perimeter, primarily to the north. The 3d Platoon was operating northwest of the crossroads, 1st Platoon east, and 2d Platoon west and southwest. The mortars had been re-laid to fire to the north. Check Point 1 was becoming very jammed with C Troop maneuvering and vehicles returning with B Troop wounded. Check Point 1 continued to receive heavy small arms fire with most of it coming from west of the road. Mortar and recoilless fire was being answered with a heavy volume of 50 caliber fire from the personnel carriers at the road junction. Col Lawrence called and ordered C Troop to push north and relieve the pressure on B Troop. The 3d Platoon was finally able to start moving north with the tank from 2d Platoon. About 200 meters from Check Point 1, the tank was hit in the turret and the commander, Sergeant Allison, and the loader were seriously wounded. They were pulled from the tank and evacuated. The tank continued north. The

C Troop column consisted of the 2d Platoon, 1st Platoon, and Troop Command Group (sketch map 2). The 3d Platoon, C Company (-), and mortars remained at the crossroads. Intense fire was received all the way to B Troop's position, but a heavy base of fire was maintained by the personnel carriers and the tank. The brush was so thick and close on both sides of the road, grenades were just tossed over the sides of the vehicles. About 600 meters after the first hit, the tank was hit again, but the driver kept going even though the gunner, Sergeant Riddle was wounded and evacuated. When the Troop C column arrived at the tail of the B Troop position, Lt Flores said to go farther north and fire to the west. The 1st and 2d Platoons moved up and deployed as best as they could since they were confined to the area immediately left and right of the road. Fire was directed east and west with the heaviest volume to the west. Col Lewane ordered C Troop to hold at this point until B Troop could be extracted and move south. The C Troop tank went almost to the O1 grid line before it turned around and came back. Three men from the 2d Platoon joined Sergeant Wilson in the tank and although power to the turret was gone, they succeeded in getting the gun bearing to the north and northwest. Sixty rounds were fired before the ammunition was exhausted. The tank was then moved along side a disabled B Troop tank and the ammunition transferred. VC could be seen jumping around but didn't appear to be withdrawing. Artillery was firing north and east and airstrikes were being concentrated on the west, but appeared to be too far west. Captain Slatatory asked Col Lewane to move them in closer and the next strike came in south to north with CBU which landed very close to the road.

With the arrival of C Troop, Lt Flores pulled all the remaining elements of B Troop back to Check Point 1, to regroup, rearm, and establish a block along the road west from Check Point 1. When the first lifts of A Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry were approaching the LZ, Lt Flores pulled back. Troop B remained at Check Point 1 for about 40 minutes to rearm and get the wounded and dead back to GOLDEN GATE. The next 30 minutes were taken to move the 1st and 2d Platoons down the road to block. The 3d Platoon handled the evacuation of wounded (sketch map 3).

Lieutenant Charles D Cole with the 3d Platoon of C Troop had been handling casualties between the forward elements and GOLDEN GATE. He loaded C Company on the personnel carriers and moved to the head of the column. After the infantry were dropped, the 3d Platoon deployed west of the road while the 2d Platoon moved off to the east in an attempt to push the VC out onto the LZ (sketch map 4). Lt Cole's platoon hit a VC strong point. He was hit in the chest and several others were wounded before they could pull back. The mechanized flame thrower with Lieutenant John K Lyon's 1st Platoon assisted in the extraction of 3d Platoon. As the infantry began to land on LZ 2 and C Company began to deploy, the fire slackened. Fire from the personnel carriers was directed more to the west. The VC started withdrawing and many were killed as they jumped to run through the high grass.

After a delay of about 30 minutes caused by enemy fire received from both sides of the road, B Troop was occupying their blocking position. Initially, the head of the column halted just west of the stream until information was received that a reinforced ARVN APC troop would assist. The block was then extended to about the 70 E-8 grid line. From the blocking position, VC could be seen withdrawing along the trail that parallels the road and were taken under fire.

Troop C established a perimeter along Route 13 until the infantry started making the sweep. By 1530 contact along the road had practically ceased and the personnel moved into the brush to search for dead and wounded VC and weapons. The 3d Platoon, B Troop returned to the blocking position with the Aero Rifle Platoon of D Troop. By 1700 movement had ceased and the two troops remained in position the remainder of the day.

REACTION (U)

For a week prior to 30 June 1966, B Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been maintained on a 30 minute alert as a rapid reaction force and was in this posture at the time B Troop made contact. When it became obvious that both troops and the attached rifle company were heavily engaged, B Company was alerted for probable deployment. Two questions had to be answered first; how they would be employed and by what means of transportation. All helicopters were fully committed on other missions. Twelve 3/4 ton trucks were collected from the various units in the vicinity of the battalion command post at QUAN LOI, and B Company was prepared to move prior to their arrival. At 1026 hours the helicopters supporting the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry in the SONG BE area were diverted to QUAN LOI, but by 1040 hours had not arrived. Company B departed by vehicle for the squadron command post at HON QUAN, and at 1105 passed to control of Col Lewane.

Between 1015 and 1020 hours, A Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was alerted, pulled off the perimeter, and instructed to be on the airfield in the event helicopters became available. Company A was assembled on the airfield by 1100 hours. General DePuy called Col McChrystal to the division command post about 1040 hours to be briefed on what had happened in his battalion. General DePuy made the decision to divert 12 helicopters from SONG BE. All helicopters closed the QUAN LOI airfield at 1130 hours. Col Lewane was informed of the current status of Companies A and B and asked where and how he wished to deploy them. A command and control helicopter arrived for Col McChrystal and he and the battalion S-3 went forward for reconnaissance.

Col Lewane had selected two landing zones; LZ 1 in the rice paddy on the east of Route 13 (XU 727012) and LZ 2 across the road. He decided on the latter with the direction of attack south. At 1145, Col Lewane was informed that the first lift of A Company was loaded. The company commander was briefed that he would land on LZ 2; he should operate his radio on the squadron frequency; and he was under control of the squadron commander. The LZ was prepared by air strikes and artillery and there was marked with smoke from Col McChrystal's aircraft. A Company closed in two lifts.

Company B proceeded north on Route 13 toward CP GOLDEN GATE. Upon arrival at that location, the company would be moved into the battle area by helicopters or personnel carriers. Major Taylor landed at the bridge and discovered there were a number of wounded requiring evacuation by Dust Off helicopters and the pick-up zone would become too congested with assault helicopters landing there also. An alternate pick-up zone was selected at XT 734967 and the road column of B Company was diverted to this location. Company B then made an airborne assault into LZ 2 utilizing four lifts of five aircraft. A command group from the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been prepared for lift after B Company had closed the LZ. As one helicopter in the first lift of B Company landed, it apparently struck a land mine bomb. All personnel cleared the damaged ship.

before it was consumed by fire. Col McChrystal landed with B Company, and assumed command of Companies A and B. Col Lowane was informed of this and that the battalion (-) was attacking in the direction he had specified.

As the companies started pushing south, B was west of Route 13 and A to their right (sketch map 5). Company A met resistance about 200 meters south of the LZ while B Company was mopping up the remaining elements of the enemy just to the west of Route 13. About 300 meters south of the LZ, B Company uncovered C Troop and C Company (-). At this time, Col McChrystal assumed command of these elements. Company C was ordered to reorganize and search the immediate area, while C Troop was to reorganize, recover disabled tanks and personnel carriers, and support from Route 13 as Company B continued sweeping south and A Company southwest. Company B ceased to meet resistance by the time they had progressed about 800 meters from the LZ. However, A Company met stiff resistance along the creek, vicinity KV 715005 (sketch map 6). The Viet Cong had established a strong combat outpost line east and west of the creek. Company A sustained a few wounded. Since no headway was being made, C Company was committed on the right flank of A Company. The link-up was made by 1615 and the strength of the two companies forced the VC out of their positions. Dust Off was completed and the sweep continued south to the blocking positions held by D Troop and the ARVN forces.

At 1600, Col Berry, 1st Brigade Commander, landed and directed the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry to assemble at LZ 2 and become the brigade reserve. The units returned to an assembly area just south of the LZ in the order B, A, and C Company, where the battalion remained overnight. The reconnaissance platoon, and mortar platoon of the battalion were flown in at 1700. Three ambush sites were established on the south, southwest, and the west, but no enemy activity was experienced during the night.

During the time the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was preparing for deployment, the 1st Brigade Commander was alerted at 1003 to move one infantry battalion and the brigade TAC CP in that order to QUAN LOI. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced the move at 1234 hours using C-123 and CV-2 aircraft. The brigade closed the airfield at QUAN LOI at 1530. At 1622, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced an airmobile assault into LZ BLUE, (map 2) and by about 1715 had closed into the area and began sweeping eastward.

Shortly after the contact was reported, the BINH LONG Province Chief offered units immediately available to him for support of the 1st Infantry Division. The 3d Troop, 1st Cavalry, ARVN, with 20 APC's reinforced with the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, ARVN, were attached to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. At 1100 hours the U.S. Advisor reported to the 1st Infantry Division G-3 for a mission. He was directed to immediately proceed north on Route 13 to link up with U.S. elements at Check Point 1. This was accomplished and the blocking position established at approximately 1300 hours (sketch map 5). The 9th Regiment had one other company immediately available for operations which moved to secure the bridge at Check Point GOLDEN GATE. The Regional Force companies were securing the road between the bridge and SON QUAN. One company of the 9th Regiment was called back from an operation south of QUAN LOI as a possible escort for the move of an artillery battery north on Route 13.

At about 1100 hours, two GIN companies were sent from LOC KINH and assumed blocking positions north of the battle area.

The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was ordered at 1000 hours to move from SONG B3 to QUAN LOI. The battalion closed at QUAN LOI at 1620 and A Battery, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery moved by CH-47 from SONG B3, closing at 2245. This battery was moved to LZ BLUE (map 2) at 1115 hours, 1 July.

At 1420 hours, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to terminate its operation, return to LAI KHE and prepare for movement on order. At 1430 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to move one company from the 2d Brigade Base Camp to PHUOC VINH and the battalion (-) to LAI KHE. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry closed into LAI KHE at 1715 and the last of C Company, 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry was on the way to PHUOC VINH in fixed wing aircraft by 1813.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced moving from LAI KHE at 1600 hours utilizing C-123 and CV-2 aircraft. All elements of this battalion had closed into QUAN LOI at 1710.

1 - 2 JULY (U)

On 1 July, follow up action continued against remnants of the 271st VC Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry secured LZ BLUE as Battery A, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery was lifted by CH-47 to support future operations. Company C remained to secure the LZ while the remainder of the battalion moved to seize the bridge at XT 683998; link up with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-); and with B Troop proceed to Objective 1 (XU 698027). Troop C joined Company C, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry at LZ BLUE.

The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into LZ GREEN (XT 616995) at 1000 hours. The battalion moved to secure Objective BASSALL (XT 623996); left one company in blocking positions; and proceeded to vicinity of XU 721021 to conduct a search of the battle area of the previous day. Light contact was made with small groups of VC.

The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry continued to search the battle area and uncovered numerous shallow graves and additional VC bodies. At 1600 hours, the battalion conducted an airmobile assault on LZ PINK (XU 592025) and occupied positions for the night as shown on Overlay 1. Company A made contact with the VC and Company C and Recon Platoon were sent to reinforce. Mortar and small arms fire was received until contact was broken at 2030 hours. At 0545 hours 2 July, the overnight positions of A Company, C Company, and Recon Platoon, were taken under fire by VC automatic weapons and mortars. The VC then launched a series of five assaults from all directions, but the attack was countered by fire support from artillery, gun ships, and fighter bombers. A total of 61 sorties were flown by USAF fighter bombers and included close air support by three flights using SKY SPOT (radar bombing) techniques. Company B was moved at 0730 hours to reinforce Companies A and C and contact was broken at 0900 hours. A body count of VC dead revealed that the attacking 3d Battalion, 273d VC Main Force Regiment suffered the loss of 78 killed.

At 0710 hours, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry moved from overnight positions to support the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. Link-up was made at 0930 hours and both battalions searched the area around the defensive perimeter. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry then continued north toward LZ ROSE (XU 5904) but made no contact.

The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, minus C Company at the artillery base, assembled on Route 13 and was helilifted into LZ RED (XU 657050), closing at 1320 hours. This LZ and adjacent LZ WHITE (XU 657037) were secured by Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and attached ARVN APC troop and rifle company.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was helilifted into LZ PINK and relieved the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry which returned to control of 1st Infantry Division at 1530. During the night the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry came under mortar attack which appeared later to have been a cover for the withdrawal of the VC to the southwest and northwest. A sweep of the area was made with only minor contact.

FIRE SUPPORT (U)

At the time B Troop made contact, a preplanned air strike was in progress vicinity XT 7499. The aircraft had commenced dropping CBU at the time Col Lewane notified the forward air controller (FAC) that the armored column was in contact. The pilot pulled out of his southeast to northwest direction of flight and brought his aircraft down the west side of Route 13, expending the remainder of his CBU, Napalm, and 20mm. A large group of VC were seen running east along the trail north of the rice paddy. The next flight concentrated on the logs at Check Point 3 and the trail. A second FAC arrived about 1030 and started working along the trail. Col Lewane requested the area along Route 13 about 300 meters from the road be hit, however, the troop commanders requested it be moved closer to the road. During the dash of Lt Cole's 3d Platoon forward with the infantry, a napalm strike was placed along side the west of the road assisting his movement. Col Lewane called for a preparation on LZ 2, but delayed the actual landing when he was notified that aircraft were on station with CBU. This strike was placed from the 00 grid line to the LZ. After the LZ preparation, air strikes were directed to the west to cover trails on which VC were withdrawing in groups of from 5 to 15. Napalm strikes were placed ahead of the advancing 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry.

From the initial preplanned strike, close air support was continuous and unlimited. A total of 88 sorties were flown as follows:

A4 - 24
F100 - 40
A1 - 10 (VNAF)
F5 - 6
F4 - 8

Ordinance expended included:

High Explosive - 42.3 tons
Napalm - 48 tons
CBU - 11.5 tons
Rockets - 160

There was a minimum of one FAC on station at all times. These FACs were in constant communication with either the squadron commander, S-3, or troop commanders.

Artillery direct support was provided by Battery B (155mm) and Battery D (8"), 6th Battalion, 6th Artillery located at HOW QUAN (XT 762091). Battery B fired 548 rounds and Battery D fired 277 from the time contact was made until about 1900 hours.

Defensive concentrations had been plotted along the route which facilitated ground observers with the column to call for fire. However, most of the missions were adjusted by air observers. Within minutes after contact began, an air observer was over the battle area. Fire was most intense from the northeast and northwest and artillery was fired on the trail north of the rice paddy. These fires were shifted to the wooded area north of SROK DONG. Col Lewane then directed that artillery would fire to the east of Route 13. This was continued until such time as he directed that artillery be placed as a block along the streamline to the west. Artillery was also used in the preparation of LZ 2 and shifted prior to the landing to the woods on the north. Artillery continued to block along the streamline to the west after the infantry deployed. Groups of VC were seen to walk into the fire, lying down or getting in holes between volleys. By 1700, resistance had ended, but air and artillery continued to interdict likely assembly areas and routes of withdrawal. Interdiction continued throughout the night.

In addition to air and artillery, helicopter gunships supported the engaged units. At 0945 hours an armed CH-47, GO-GO 154, received an ambush reaction mission in support of the armored column. Contact was made with Col Lewane at 1000 hours. The pilot was briefed on the situation and made an immediate attack on the enemy forces 100 meters west of Route 13. The first attack was made at 1008 hours using 20mm and 50 caliber guns and 40mm grenades. After the first pass, Col Lewane requested that fire be moved to within 25 to 50 meters from the road and the second attack was made using the same weapons. A third pass was made using M-18 (7.62 Miniguns) and 50 caliber side and rear guns. The Miniguns appeared to have little suppressive affect and the aircraft received several hits. Transmission warning lights, oil pressure, and temperature gauges indicated heavy damage and an immediate landing was made in the rice paddy east of Route 13. A check indicated the aircraft was safe to fly and the aircraft returned to QUAN LOI to ascertain the extent of damage. At 1130 hours, VUNG TAU was contacted for a replacement aircraft which arrived at 1300 and continued attacks on enemy troops, evacuation routes, assembly areas, and close support of elements occupying blocking positions.

Operations with armed Chinooks ended at 2015 hours. Numerous sorties were flown by armed UH-1B's both as cover for the armed Chinooks and against targets selected by Col Lewane.

RESULTS (U)

Enemy losses included:

270 KIA (Body Count)
300 KIA (Probable)
7 VC Captives
40 Small Arms
23 Crew Served Weapons
1633 Rounds of Ammunition

(G) Friendly losses are as follows:

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry

	KIA	MIA
Ba Troop		5
B Troop	7 (1 DOW)	32
C Troop	5 (2 DOW)	18
Total	12	55

(C) 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
A Company	1	12
B Company	1	10
C Company	5 (1 DOW)	17
Total	7	39

Seven armored personnel carriers and four tanks were damaged. One personnel carrier and one UH-1D were destroyed.

CONCLUSION (U)

As the reaction forces continued to search the battle area, conclusive evidence was found that the 271st VC Regiment had been decisively defeated and again failed in its assigned mission to destroy U.S. armored forces along Route 13. The rout of 271st Regiment can be attributed to several significant facts:

From the first indication of contact until the VC withdrew in defeat, Lt Col Lewane was in complete command of the situation. At the time of contact, the squadron was under OPCON 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. Because he had complete control of the situation, subordinate elements of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry were placed under his control when committed to the battle. Except for short periods of time when he returned to refuel, he was over the battle area. During his absence, he had his S-3 replace him to control the action and coordinate the fire support. Col Lewane was in constant communication with his troop commanders, artillery observers, forward air controllers, and gunships. He coordinated all the fires to insure that the maximum amount of uninterrupted firepower could be brought to bear on the enemy forces.

Lt Col McChrystal's plans for deployment of the rapid reaction force saved many valuable minutes, preventing a larger number of VC from withdrawing.

The decision of General DePuy to divert helicopters for the lift of 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, coupled with the movement of B Company by vehicle to the pickup zone cut to a minimum, the time between landing of the two companies.

Preplanned airstrikes were available for diversion to the area of contact and subsequent close air support was continuous. There was unlimited support with varying quantities and types of ordnance.

Medium and heavy caliber artillery was available within range of the battle area and rapidly responded to requests for fire by Col Lewane.

Troop C was not initially engaged and was available for immediate reinforcement on Col Lewane's order.

The tremendous base of fire laid down by the tanks and personnel carriers, coupled with the tenacity with which personnel fought and the outstanding leadership given the men, were instrumental in overcoming the numerically superior VC force. As squad and platoon leaders were wounded or killed, assistants immediately assumed command so that at no time were the troops lacking direction.


The time contact was made is particularly significant. The battle started at 0938 leaving ten hours of daylight for the battle to develop, a reaction force to be committed, and a search of the battle area to be conducted after contact was broken. This denied the enemy the capability to police the area.


Weather conditions did not limit the ability of the forward air controllers or artillery observers to place effective fire on the enemy.

Incl -- MAP 1 - 1st Inf Div Troop Dispositions
MAP 2 - Area of Operation 1:50,000
MAP 3 - PICTOMAP Area of Operation 1:25,000
Sketch Maps 1 - 6
Overlay - Battle of HO KRIGNOU


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
Major William L Ponder Jr
17th Military History Det
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345




















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



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


SKETCH MAP #2









SKETCH MAP #16

SKETCH MAP - BATTLE OF HO KRIGNOU

- 1) INITIAL VC CONTACT BY CoA
2/13 010000
- 2) SECOND BATTLE STARTED 020045
JULY
- 3) VC ASSAULTED FROM ALL DIRECTIONS

Ho Krignou
(Fond)
Co B Pan Night
02/12 JULY

Co B Moved To CP AREA
020400 JULY

LARGE CONCENTRATION OF
VC OBSERVED 010730 JULY

JUST OFF LZ USED
EVENTS 1 JULY &
FIBERING 2 JULY

VC MORTAR & GROUND
ATTACK 2 JULY

Recon Plat Followed By Co 2
Moved To Reinforce LZ
0130 JULY

VC PLAT 4
BY CP ON
12 JULY

Co C Reinforced 1200 0130 JULY

Initial Pos
Co 2 1 JULY

VC PLAT 1 MOVED
ATTACKED CP AREA 1 JULY
VC PLAT 2 MOVED
ATTACKED CP AREA 1 JULY
VC PLAT 3 MOVED
ATTACKED CP AREA 1 JULY


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2-1500

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INCLOSURE 17

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE 13

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7 AUG 1966

THE CAMPAIGN ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE 13

(C) In early May 1966, a Civilian Irregular Defense Group patrol, led by U.S. Special Forces personnel, killed a Viet Cong Lieutenant about five kilometers southeast of LOC NINH District Town, along National Route 13 in northern BINH LONG Province. Among the papers discovered on the body of this officer was a map and a plan for the attack on LOC NINH Town and the Special Forces camp by three Viet Cong Regiments and one North Vietnamese Army Regiment. The discovery of this document marked the beginning of a prolonged campaign along National Route 13, leading from SAIGON through THU DAU MOT, the provincial capital of BINH DUONG Province; onward to the north through CHON THANH District Town; through HON QUAN (AN LOC), the provincial capital of BINH LONG Province; and finally north through the LOC NINH Plantation to the Cambodian Border.

(C) On 17 May, a CIDG Force and one battalion of the 9th ARVN Regiment engaged a two battalion VC force which included the 2d Battalion, 273d Regiment and possibly a battalion of the 271st Regiment. The action which took place vicinity XU 5904, about two kilometers from the Cambodian Border, resulted in heavy casualties by both sides.

(U) The 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, was dispatched to LOC NINH with three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion on 19 and 20 May 1966. Between 19 and 26 May, this brigade established a defensive perimeter around the LOC NINH airstrip and patrolled and conducted search operations westward to the Cambodian Border without substantial contact. The brigade returned to its base at LAI KHE on 26 May 1966.

(O) Subsequently, intelligence from a number of sources indicated that the VC, having postponed their attack, intended to go ahead with their original plans. Agents reported through the Vietnamese Army that the VC were inaugurating a campaign to last from 20 May until 20 August to destroy friendly forces along Route 13; to interdict the route; and to harass or attack LOC NINH, HON QUAN, CHON THANH, MINH THANH, and SONG BE. VC Forces involved consisted of six regiments. It was assumed that these regiments included three of the 9th Viet Cong Division, 271st, 272d, and 273d; and another grouping of the 101st, 141st, and possibly the 250th Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army.

(O) The 3d Brigade returned to LOC NINH on 2 June 1966 with one infantry battalion and one artillery battalion. At this time, the 5th ARVN Division Commander, with headquarters at THU LOI, informed the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, that he believed the Viet Cong would attack the BINH LONG Provincial capital, HON QUAN. The decision was made to move one troop of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with two ground units to HON QUAN.

(O) On 6 June, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was moved to LAI KHE airfield as an infantry reaction force and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry commenced its move from LAI KHE through CHON THANH to HON QUAN. Although road blocks, mines, and minor harassment were encountered, Troop A arrived at CHON THANH about 1300 without significant contact. At this point the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was moved by helicopters to the HON QUAN airfield, placing it in a better position to react to any engagement between CHON THANH and HON QUAN. At 1440 hours, approximately 12 kilometers south of;

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
EOD RIR 5870.10

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HON QUAN in a densely wooded area, the lead tank received a direct hit from a 75mm recoilless rifle. The ambush by all three battalions of the 272d Viet Cong Regiment was triggered. During the three and a half hours duration of the battle, Troop A was supported by a number of airstrikes, and 105mm, 155mm, and 8" artillery. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was committed in an airmobile assault to the north of the battle area and swept both sides of the woods in support of the cavalry. Coupled with the valiant fight by A Troop, these measures destroyed 90% of the 1st Battalion, 272d Regiment, including the battalion commander. Fifty percent of the 2d Battalion was destroyed, while the 3d Battalion was generally south of the major action. The Chief of Staff, 272d Regiment, reportedly was also killed during the engagement. Troop A and the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry continued to HON QUAN the following day.

(C) On 11 June 1966, A Company, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry committed one rifle platoon with a CIDG reconnaissance platoon in an airmobile reconnaissance operation to the western edge of the LOC NINH Plantation. The remainder of A Company moved by foot from the LOC NINH airstrip to effect a link up. Light contact was made at 0900 and about noon, C Company was committed to assist. By 1400 hours it was apparent that the VC force consisted of at least one battalion and the remainder of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry moved by foot to the LOC NINH Plantation. Massive air and artillery fire power assisted the infantry in overrunning the positions and by 1900 the VC withdrew leaving 98 dead and numerous weapons on the battlefield. Subsequent reports from plantation workers and captured VC revealed that the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry had destroyed over 50% of the 1st Battalion, 273d Regiment.

(C) The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry under OPCON of the 1st Brigade conducted an air mobile raid on 21 June in the area of a reported rice storage area along the SAIGON River west of the MICHELIN Plantation. This raid discovered 1506 tons of rice and large quantities of other supplies. A second unit, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, was committed before the operation terminated on 28 June.

(C) The 1st Infantry Division was deployed, on 30 June as shown on Inclosure 1. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was conducting operations to the southeast of SONG BE; the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry to the northeast. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, under division control with attached 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry(-), was conducting armed reconnaissance operations and infantry reconnaissance patrolling in the general area of the QUAN LOI - AN LOC Plantation. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry was securing engineers finishing the airstrip at MINH THANH. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, under control of the Division Artillery Commander, continued its pacification operations in the PHU LOI area with the BINH DUONG Province Chief and the 7th ARVN Regiment.

(C) About 0900 on 30 June, Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry proceeded north from HON QUAN and emplaced an AVLB adjacent to the damaged CUM LE Bridge. The column then moved north to conduct an armed reconnaissance along Route 13 and secure engineer equipment to be brought on the return trip from LOC NINH to the bridge site. Four thousand meters from the bridge site, Troop B started receiving recoilless rifle, small arms, and mortar fire and this triggered an ambush by all three battalions of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment. The Commanding

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General, 1st Infantry Division was notified of this action while he was with the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry southwest of SONG BE. On the return flight, he alerted the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry at PHUOC VINH for a fixed-wing airlift to QUAN LOI. At 1020 the 3d Brigade Commander was instructed to retract the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry from its operation to the SONG BE airstrip and be prepared upon receipt of helicopters to move to the airfield at QUAN LOI. At 1000 hours the 1st Brigade Commander was ordered to move the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and the Brigade Command Post to QUAN LOI in that order and upon arrival to take command of the operation. By 1330 hours, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been committed into a landing zone north of the cavalry, and placed under the operational control of the squadron commander. It is interesting to note that when the battle started, the Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was under the OPCON of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. However, because he was in command on the ground, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was placed under his command. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry closed QUAN LOI by fixed-wing aircraft at 1530 hours and by 1809 hours was introduced by airmobile assault into an LZ west of the battle area. By 1620 hours, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry had closed into QUAN LOI and was prepared for an airmobile assault. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was ordered to move from LAI KHE by fixed-wing aircraft to QUAN LOI and assume the mission of security for QUAN LOI - HON QUAN. With the infantry sweeping south; the U.S. and ARVN cavalry blocking along Route 13 and the road south of the battle area; and air strikes and artillery covering the routes of withdrawal; the 271st Viet Cong Regiment was defeated by 1700 hours and began withdrawing to the west and northwest. Eighty-eight close air support sorties were flown in support of the battle and the 8" and 155mm batteries expended 277 and 548 rounds respectively. The Viet Cong bodies counted on 30 June totaled 267 killed. Due to bad weather on 1 July, the airmobile assault by the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry into an LZ farther to the west did not take place until 1000 hours. This landing was made into an area in which VC prisoners indicated the 271st Regiment would rally. A heavy preparation by air and artillery was fired, including fires from one battery which had been lifted into the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry LZ by CH-47. Additional wounded VC were picked up in the area, but there was no evidence of a major VC force in the immediate area of this landing zone.

(C) At 1630 hours, 1 July, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was lifted by assault helicopters from their perimeter along Route 13 into two LZ's farther to the northwest. At 1800 hours, A Company proceeded to a major trail crossing and became heavily engaged. C Company and the Recon Platoon were sent to reinforce A Company. Company B was 1500 meters farther to the north and the battalion command post was 1000 meters to the north. Companies A and C received a heavy volume of mortar and automatic weapons fire against their perimeter during the early evening. During the night a VC battalion surrounded the two companies. The battalion headquarters had no significant contact. At 0530, 2 July, the VC launched a series of five assaults against A Company, C Company, and the Recon Platoon. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was sent from the south to link up and B Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry from the north. Fighter bomber strikes were brought in under a 200 foot ceiling and artillery fire was delivered from the landing zone occupied by the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry. The VC attack was repulsed with losses to the 3d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment that included 78 killed. The

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
1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, minus one company at the artillery base, was assembled on Route 13 and helilifted to an LZ east of the battle. The landing zone was secured by the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and the attached ARVN APC troop and rifle company of the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment. The 3d Brigade was ordered to move its headquarters back to LOC NINH at 0900 together with the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to move by fixed-wing aircraft from LAI KHE to LOC NINH and provide a reaction force to be used to the northwest. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry linked up with the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry at 0930 and then proceeded to the lake at XU 5904. The battalion was lightly engaged enroute. A large VC force was then located between the Infantry-Cavalry force on the east and the two infantry battalions on the west. At 1500 hours, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry from QUAN LOI relieved the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, preparatory to a sweep to the east. During the night, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry came under mortar attack which later seemed to be a cover for the withdrawal of the VC both to the southwest and northwest. After sweeping the area with only minor contact, all forces were withdrawn from the operational area on 4 July. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, and 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Infantry were assembled at the QUAN LOI Plantation. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry(-) assembled at the HON QUAN airfield. These troops stood down for two days for rest, resupply, new uniforms, and for maintenance on armored vehicles. The first Chapter of the Campaign Along Route 13 was closed.

(C) While the battles with the 271st and 273d Regiments took place north of HON QUAN, the 272d Regiment at least partially recovered from its battle south of HON QUAN, moved to an area between CHON THANH and HON QUAN. Further reports indicate that another regiment may have taken up positions along Route 13 between CHON THANH and LAI KHE. When the 272d Viet Cong Regiment ambushed A Troop, it may have expected a soft convoy and instead ran into an armored troop. However, a diary taken from the body of a VC captain from the 271st Regiment after the battle on 30 June indicated that his mission was to destroy U.S. armored forces on Route 13. It thus appears that the VC are under orders to fight and win the battle of National Route 13 and that they intend to do so regardless of losses. The remaining chapters in the Campaign Along National Route 13 are yet to be written.

1 Inclosure -- Map

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INCLOSURE 13

AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATION LEXINGTON III

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FIRST BATTALION, 18TH INFANTRY
APO US FORCES 96345

LEXINGTON
III

AFTER ACTION REPORT

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST BATTALION, 18TH INFANTRY
APO US FORCES 96345

20 June 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Operation LEXINGTON III)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
ATTN: S-3
APO US Forces 96345

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVID - T
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation LEXINGTON III, Battalion search and destroy operation in Rung Sat Special Zone.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 210900 May - 091200 June 66.

3. (C) GENERAL: Operation LEXINGTON III was initiated by Headquarters MACV. The operation called for a single battalion operating in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000, Sheets: 6342I, 6342II, 6442IV, 6442III.

The operation was conducted in five phases. Phase I included a airlift and sealift into Operation Base SHARK YSO56647 in TACR "B" (Incl 1 - Overlay of TACR "B") and a motor march into Operation Base PORPOISE (VUNG TAU). Phase II covered company size search and destroy operation in TACR "B" and several in TACR "A" (Incl 2 - Overlay of TACR "A"). Phase III was the move from Operation Base SHARK in TACR "B" to Operation Base BARRACUDA in TACR "A". The move was made by helicopter airlift and sealift. Phase IV covered company size operations in TACR "A". In phase V the 1/18 Inf and A 1/7 Arty moved from Rung Sat Special Zone back to Bearcat by helicopter airlift and sealift.

Throughout Operation LEXINGTON III 1/18 Inf maintained a company size rapid reaction force at the operation base.

The operation was unique in that the 1/18 Inf employed airlift by HUUD and sealift by LCM and LCU. The fire support included A 1/7 Arty in DS of 1/18 Inf, LP Ta (HUB), Naval Gunfire, USAF and Navy Air. A USMC LNO with Naval Gun Fire Team supported the 1/18 Inf the entire operation.

a. Reporting Officer: Maj J.C. Bard, Commanding

b. Task Organization:

- (1) COMNAVFORV LNO: Lt Col A. C. Smith Jr. USMC
Maj E. King USMC
- (2) Co A: Capt L.R. Miller: Commanding
- (3) Co B: Capt J.J. Roberts: Capt K. Allen: Commanding
- (4) Co C: Capt R.V. Tocci: Commanding
- (4) A 1/7 Arty (DS): Capt McGregor: Commanding
- (5) RAG Boat Co, VNN
- (6) Battalion Troops
- (7) HHC 1/18 Inf (-)
- (8) Recon Plt

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Information: Available information on VC Forces prior to commencement of Operation LEXINGTON III indicated that there were supposedly one (1) Engineer Battalion, and Local Forces consisting of four (4) companies, six (6) Platoons, and two (2) squads within the operational area of TACR "A" (QUANG XUYEN District) and TACR "B" (CAN GIO District). Initially eighteen (18) specific target areas (11 in TACR "A", 3 in TACR "B", 4 outside TACR's) were furnished by the Naval Advisory Group, with one (1) more in TACR "A" added during the course of the operation. Information on suspected supply routes and other installations and units were also furnished by MACV intelligence estimates and Combined Intelligence Center reports.

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The RSSZ was also suspected of being a thoroughfare for the 4th Bn, 165A Regt and three (3) other companies. The RSSZ was considered VC controlled without population domination. It was further considered a VC transportation corridor for the movement of arms and ammunition and an important link in the VC resupply system for traffic between Saigon and Vung Tau, from the western region, and by sea from NVN. Also it was considered by the VC as a lucrative area for the interdiction of the shipping channels leading to the port of Saigon, thereby disrupting the economy of the RVN and the friendly war effort.

b. Enemy Situation: There were no large engagements with VC Forces. The VC 225th Engineer Battalion or its elements, as well as the other local force companies, were not encountered. Large massing of VC Forces was not anticipated, and none took place. Contacts with local force units and guerrillas were expected, and took place. Except for a limited amount of booby traps, sniping, SA harassing fire, and one meeting engagement, our forces moved unopposed. It is estimated that the Battalion encountered only local forces and guerrilla elements. The VC forces encountered within or near base areas showed no intention of defending these facilities, as was expected. The majority of the VC KIA's were as a result of night ambushes along streams and/or waterways. Base camps and facilities were found generally near the streams indicating the need for easy accessibility in this type of terrain. Although some of the specific target areas were not checked due to lack of transportation or fire support, as well as denial of operating areas, maximum effort was placed against suspected routes into the target areas with significant results. Targets 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12 did not have installations or activities as reported. The area in the Southern tip of TACR "A" (bounded by the RACH GANH HUNG LON, the SONG DONG TRANH, and the South China Sea), although not a specific target area, did prove lucrative in that a large base camp was uncovered and contact was made with an undetermined amount of VC, resulting in two (2) VC KIA and two (2) weapons captured. This area could not be pursued further as the operation was terminated at this time. Maximum use was made of RED HAZE and SLAR missions. Despite constant surveillance by these devices, no significant movements were noted in the TACR's. The very few SLAR returns indicated there was a limited number of boats used by the VC or the VC chose not to move because of his knowledge of the SLAR capability as well as our presence in the area. RED HAZE sightings were primarily in and around populated areas and main shipping channels.

c. Significant Incidents:

- (1) Seven (7) ambushes against VC in sampans resulting in twenty-six (26) VC KIA, twelve (12) weapons captured or destroyed, and seven (7) sampans destroyed.
- (2) Engagement with VC squad resulting in three (3) VC KIA and two (2) weapons captured.

d. Significant VC facilities uncovered:

- (1) Large incomplete base camp with only fortifications near the LONG THANH VC controlled village via YSL00492.
- (2) Company size base camp w/1900 rds SA and 6 sampans via XS944626.
- (3) Two (2) ammo facilities via XS956628 and XS958616, containing fourteen (14) weapons, grenades, and repair tools.
- (4) Hospital via XS94609 w/13 huts (60 bed capacity), one (1) operating room, 6 sampans, and a few medical supplies.
- (5) Base camp with capacity for forty (40) personnel via YS018578.
- (6) Incomplete base camp w/landing dock via YS029613.
- (7) Base camp w/twenty (20) huts and forty (40) bunkers via XS987541.
- (8) Large base camp (150m x 75m) w/five (5) large huts via YS008563.

e. Terrain and weather were as expected. Showers or thunderstorms did appear in the afternoons, and at times early evening. Mangrove swamp forests were encountered. Concealment from air and ground in this area was excellent. There were LZ's available in TACR "B" (CAN GIO District), but very few in TACR "A" (QUANG XUYEN District). The major obstacles were, of course, the waterways tide level, and the dense, low overgrown mangrove forest areas.

f. Limitations: Aerial photographs requested were not initially available. When they did arrive, the operation had already been complete for the particular coverage received. However, the photographs were excellent, with minimum cloud cover. RED HAZE and SLAR inflight reports were not available until the last few days of the operation. This occurred only because direct liaison was finally made with the surveillance unit, only after repeated requests through channels failed to produce results.

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g. VC Losses and Elements Captured: (see Para 9)

h. Pay War:

- (1) Pay War effort included use of U-10 aircraft for loudspeaker appeals and for dissemination of printed matter, and footmovement for audio appeals and visual contact.
- (2) Pay War personnel accompanying the Med Cap team on visits to the communities of Dong Hoa and Can Gio succeeded in establishing a friendly atmosphere. US aims and reasons for being in Vietnam were explained to villagers.
- (3) Nine loudspeaker missions were flown over the operational area by U-10 aircraft, for a total of 17 hours broadcast time.
- (4) Leaflets dropped on Operation LEXINGTON III were as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
How to surrender	20,000
ARVN versus VC Life	20,000
Symptoms of Disease	20,000
Medical treatment for ralliers	10,000
AP 189	10,000
	80,000

- (5) Areas of drop and broadcast were the southern most section of the Rung Sat Special Zone.

i. Civil Affairs: During the operation the Battalion Civic Action Team accomplished the following tasks:

- (1) Held Medical Sick Call in villages near Battalion CP, especially Ly Nhon XS937590 and Dong Hoa YSC59476. Boats were used to convey medical personnel to all villages in Can Gio sub sector area via YSL63518. Organic Battalion personnel were augmented at times by teams from 2d Bde and Division Headquarters. Advice was given on cleanliness and sanitation for preventive purposes.
- (2) Attempts were initiated to procure certain items such as insect repellent which would be distributed by local MACV officers.
- (3) Efforts were made to conduct an aerial anti-mosquito spraying of Dong Hoa and Ly Nhon. Both attempts were unsuccessful due to danger to crops in Dong Hoa and unavailability of aircraft in Ly Nhon.
- (4) In an attempt to fire 81mm mortar rounds into an area in which small arms fire was observed from operational base SHARK, four rounds landed in the village of Dong Hoa YSO59476, killing 7 persons and wounding 50. The Battalion Surgeon and medical personnel immediately rushed to the village and began administering to and separating the wounded for evacuation. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter within 3 hours to hospitals at Long Binh and Vung Tau. An C-4 personnel quickly visited them at the hospitals, getting their names, conditions and locations for relatives. The next morning, transportation was provided to convey relatives to Vung Tau to visit those hospitalized. Also, aid was given in the purchasing and transporting of coffins for the dead. Work was begun immediately on assessing damage and making repairs. Organic personnel augmented by Division Engineers worked quickly to repair damage. This included carpentry, cementing, and roof repair. Two completely new roofs were installed and repairs were made on approximately nine others. A total of 100 sheets of corrugated roofing was used. Many villagers requested compensation for damage or repair supplies, rather than having the work done by US personnel. This was done through personnel from G-5, 1st Infantry Division. Emergency supplies of food and textile kits were distributed to the families of those killed or injured. One woman was given an immediate payment of 2000 Piastres, due to her being destitute after losing her husband. The people were advised to submit claims for deaths and injuries, as well as crop damage, through appropriate VN channels. MACV personnel in the area worked to have those claims expedited as soon as they were submitted.
- (5) Local advisors in both areas in which the Battalion worked extensively, expressed appreciation for the work of the troops, and indicated that their own efforts had been aided. In reference to Dong Hoa, it was stated that the quick and thorough action taken offset much of the bad feelings possibly encountered.

5. (C) MISSION: 1/18 Inf conducts extensive patrolling, ambushes and search and destroy operations in TACOR "A" and "B".

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

- a. Maneuver: This operation was conducted in five (5) phases.

Phase I OPORD 11 - 66 (corrected from 14 - 66) initiated this phase with a

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motor march to Operation Base PORPOISE YS301484, a sealift from Mike Beach, Saigon to Operation Base SHARK and a airlift from Bearcat to Operation Base SHARK to clear Operation Base SHARK.

Phase II Frag Order 1 thru 7 to OPCODE 11 - 66 covered search and destroy operations in TACR "B" and TACR "A" with maximum ambushes at night. These operations were controlled from Operation Base SHARK. Operations were conducted in TACR "A" during this phase because of the activity encountered on several ambushes in this TACR. Initially there was very little activity in TACR "B".

Phase III: Frag Order 8 to OPCODE 11 - 66 directed the move from Operation Base SHARK in TACR "B" to Operation Base BARRACUDA in TACR "A". The move employed air assault by Co A on Operation Base BARRACUDA to clear and secure this area. Co C was airlifted into Operation Base BARRACUDA from Operation Base PORPOISE as the Bn rapid reaction force. A Btry 1/7 Arty was airlifted by CH-47 from Operation Base SHARK to Operation Base BARRACUDA. Supplies and Supply personnel moved by sealift using LCU and LCM's during this phase.

Phase IV: Frag Order 9 thru 15 covered the search and destroy operations in TACR "A". Operations in TACR "A" were controlled from Operation Base BARRACUDA with A Btry 1/7 Arty in DS.

Phase V: On 091200 June 66 LEXINGTON III was terminated. Co A and HHC (-) moved by sealift to Mike Beach, Saigon and then by motor convoy to Bearcat. Co B and Co C were airlifted from Operation Base BARRACUDA and Operation Base PORPOISE to Bearcat. The Bn rear located at Operation Base PORPOISE conducted a sealift from Operation Base PORPOISE to Mike Beach, Saigon and then moved by motor convoy to Bearcat.

b. Fire Support: Fire Support was provided by Artillery, Naval Gunfire, FAC Air and HUIB Fire Teams. A Btry 1/7 Arty was in direct support of the 1/18 Inf during the entire operation.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Chronology:

18 May

1/18 Inf published OPCODE 11 - 66 (LEXINGTON III)

19 May

191208, sealift convoy departed base camp for VN Navy dockyards, Saigon, and arrived at 191400.

191700 two VN LCU's completed loading and departed embarkation point to anchor over night on SONG MHA BE River.

191750 Bde notified Bn of 24 hr delay in Operation LEXINGTON III.

191855 Convoy Commander and vehicles returned from Saigon.

191940 sealift was notified of 24 hr delay.

Normal security measures taken for Base Camp security.

20 May

1/18 published Frag Order 1 to OPCODE 11 - 66.

201130 Bde notified Bn LEXINGTON III will begin on 21 May 66.

Normal security measures taken for base camp security.

21 May

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 2 to OPCODE 11 - 66.

211135 1/18 Inf initiated LEXINGTON III with the first lift of Alpha Company.

211030 FAC destroyed a sampan at YS137523.

211140 Co A and Hq's (-) landed at LZ TROUT via YS059473.

211203 motor convoy departed Bearcat enroute to Vung Tau with Co B and Recon

2/18 Inf providing security.

21143 the sealift portion had landed and unloaded at LZ TROUT and the land tail closed RP.

211435 Co C lifted of enroute to Vung Tau.

211700 Co B closed Vung Tau.

211730 Danger 77 visited Operations Base SHARK.

No contact was made during the day. During the night, the rifle companies established a Battalion perimeter with listening posts to the front of each company.

22 May

1/18 published Frag Order Order 3 to OPCODE 11 - 66

220715 Naval Gunfire Team (ANGELICO) arrived Operation Base SHARK.

220720 Three (3) LCM's beached at SHARK.

220915 Gunships fired on sampans in Bn TACR, at YS105560.

221700 VN LCM boats conduct deceptive extraction of Co C.

Co A remained in CP area via YS059473 as the Bn reserve and established ambushes during hours of Darkness. Co B and Bn trains remained at Rear operation base, YS301485. All elements will remain in present locations with A & C Companies conducting night ambush patrols in respective areas.

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222300 Bn monitored call from Artichoke 37 for Dustoff. Bn answered call and a Navy PCS landed at Op Base SHARK YSO59473, one (1) man was off loaded and 4 others given medication.

222355 Medevac of casualty from Navy PCS completed.

H & I fires by Co A, 65 element and Naval Gunfire during the night.

23 May

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 4 to OPRD 11 - 66.

230650 8 clicks arrived at Op Base SHARK.

230700 first lift of Alpha airborne.

230724 aircraft received SA fire from vic YS131512, fire team notified.

230745 airlift of Alpha completed into Op area JAGUAR.

230836 Co C closed Op Base SHARK from PANTHER.

230910 fire team destroyed a sampan with no one aboard at YS109729.

230923 aerial observer received SA fire from YS112498. Arty fired into area with unknown results.

231030 Fire team received fire from vic YS109529.

231030 Co B departed PORPOISE for Op Base SHARK.

231310 LCU closed Op Base SHARK with Co B.

231400 Co C departed Op Base SHARK for Op Base PORPOISE.

231458 Psy War. Ship over Op Base SHARK.

231620 1st Div CG arrived Op Base SHARK.

231710 Co C closed Vung Tau.

232010 Co B's L element vic 026597 received A/W fire. During the day Bn continued operations in TACR w/neg enemy contact. FF II Commander visited Battalion. Co B established two (2) night ambush sites. Bn continues operation in TACR "B" and prepares for TACR "A".

24 May

1/18 published Frag Order 5 to OPRD 11 - 66.

240225 Co B's M-2 ambush position fired on two sampans moving west to east.

240305 Arty fired, results unknown.

240630 Co B's L element received auto weapons fire from YS024571.

240730 Co B departed Op SHARK for LION by LCM.

240910 Co B closed LION.

241007 Co B found damaged sampan with letters and misc papers in it.

241010 Naval advisor reported a mine at YS019618 and a boat hit by a mine at YS028606. Also contact with VC at YS019610, 4 VC KIA, captured one (1) 57RR, one (1) MG and two (2) carbines, located 6 or 7 bunkers, one (1) hut.

241020 Co C departed PORPOISE for SHARK by LCU.

241213 Co, helilift extraction completed from JAGUAR.

241300 Co C closed Op Base SHARK

241400 requested mosquito spray for civic action program but request denied.

242020 ambush patrol of Co C sank one sampan, killed 2 VC (BC) at YS014568.

1/18 Inf continues Operation LEXINGTON III. Co A at Op Base PORPOISE, Co B operation in LION (7), Co C as Bn perimeter defense. No contact during the day.

25 May

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 6 to OPRD 11 - 66.

250625 Co C ambush patrol confirms 3 VC KIA. Found papers.

250730 remainder of Co C departed Op Base SHARK to PUMA.

250845 airstrike delivered on YS003565 suspected mines.

250910 Co C landed at PUMA.

250955 Co C located a base camp at YS030565 which had not been used for some time, destroyed one (1) hut.

261010 Co B extracted from LION by LCM boats

251100 Co B closed Op Base SHARK.

251100 Co A arrived Op Base Shark by LCU.

251205 Co B departed Op Base SHARK for Op Base PORPOISE by LCU.

1/18 Inf continues operations. Co A at Op Base SHARK, Co B at Op Base PORPOISE Co C in area PUMA. No contact during the day.

26 May

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 7 to OPRD 11 - 66.

260600 ambush patrol from Co C killed 5 VC (BC) vic YS014567 in a sampan travelling W to E, captured two (2) wpns and two (2) packs which sank along with the sampan.

260810 Co A Eagle Flight airlift began.

260812 Co A Eagle Flight completed.

260940 Co B departed Op Base PORPOISE.

261045 Co A located platoon size base camp at YS100492, had auto wpns positions and building material.

261140 first element Co A returned from Eagle flight.

261155 Co B arrived Op Base SHARK by LCU.

261230 Co C departed area PUMA for Op Base.

261305 Co C returned to Op Base PORPOISE at 261305.
 261305 element from Co A landed by hoilift at LZ PINK Y8085563.
 261045 all elements of Co A were extracted back to Op Base SHARK.
 261945 ambush patrol from Co A sank one sampan at Y8032524, also received one round of sniper fire from same location.
 262040 four (4) mortar rounds landed in DONG HOA. Crater analysis and tail fins indicated they were 81mm mortars from Duchess unit. Casualties were 7 dead civilians, 24 wounded civilians, and 6 wounded P.F. soldiers.
 262240 casualties were evacuated from DONG HOA to the 1st ROK MASH and the 36th Hospital at VUNG LAU, also some to the 93d Evac.
 Co A and Co B remained in perimeter security for the night. Co C remained at Op Base PORPOISE. Co C had 5 VC KIA (BC), captured two weapons, sank one sampan. Co A destroyed one sampans.
 27 May
 1/18 Inf published Frag Order 8 to OPORD 11 - 66.
 270725 Co B departed Op Base SHARK by LCM boats for Operational area CCELOT.
 270830 Co B closed CCELOT.
 270835 two (2) ralliers turned themselves in to 1/18 Inf in village N.E. of 1/18 Inf CP.
 271007 Co C departed Op Base PORPOISE for Op Base SHARK.
 271145 1/18 began civic action program to repair damage from mortar rounds. Construction material and food sent to DONG HOA.
 271400 Co C closed Op Base SHARK.
 271514 Co A departed Op Base SHARK by LCU for Op Base PORPOISE.
 271712 Chinook arrived with supplies for DONG HOA.
 Negative contact during the day, Co A at PORPOISE, Co B conducting S & D operations with saturation ambushes at night in CCELOT. Co C in perimeter defense. Civic action will continue in DONG HOA.
 28 May
 1/18 Inf published Frag Order 9 to OPORD 11 - 66.
 280650 Co B made contact with two (2) sampans, 11 VC at Y8087492, resulted in nine (9) VC KIA (BC), destroyed 5 carbines.
 280700 Co C began airlift to BARRACUDA
 280730 Co C closed BARRACUDA.
 280828 extraction of Co B by LCM's began.
 280900 Co A commenced airlift from Op Base PORPOISE to BARRACUDA.
 281036 Co A closed BARRACUDA.
 281037 Co B closed Op Base SHARK and aided in civic action in DONG HOA.
 281045 A 1/7 Arty began airlift.
 281555 A 1/7 Arty closed Op Base BARRACUDA.
 281640 Co B began extraction by LCU from Op Base SHARK.
 281945 Co B closed Op Base PORPOISE.
 Contact during the day resulted in nine (9) VC KIA, five (5) carbines destroyed and two sampans sunk. Co A and Co C in perimeter security of Op Base BARRACUDA.
 29 May
 1/18 published Frag Order 10 to OPORD 11 - 66.
 290330 Hq (-) received one suspected 57mm RR, resulting in one (1) minor WIA.
 290720 Co A departed BARRACUDA.
 290748 Co entered area LEOPARD.
 291405 contact was made with an unknown number of VC armed with one .30 cal MG via X8944626.
 291550 contact was broken, resulting in two (2) friendly WIA, one later died. Estimated company size base camp at this location was destroyed and the following equipment was captured: 1,540 rd SA ammo, one bag of documents and six sampans destroyed.
 Co B remains in area PORPOISE, Co C remained at BARRACUDA. Co A conducted saturation ambushes in its area of responsibility.
 30 May
 Co A continued to patrol area LEOPARD.
 301215 an unoccupied base camp was destroyed via X8933613.
 301330 Co A at X8958616 found a weapons cache consisting of 7 rifles (6-8mm & 1-303) and 70 rd ammo.
 3014 15 Co A found an inboard motor sampan at X8954613 and destroyed it.
 Co B remained at PORPOISE and Co C at BARRACUDA.
 31 May
 1/18 Inf published Frag Order 11 to OPORD 11 - 66.
 The operation for Co C was cancelled due to pending operations of Vietnamese forces in the area, as a result Co A continued patrolling in area LEOPARD.
 310900 Co A received SA fire from X8955605. Arty and mortar fire was fired into the area with negative results.

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310935 Co A located a small hospital with 15-20 huts via YS954609, huts destroyed by burning.

311025 a patrol from Co C made contact with a VC squad at YS959577, resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and two weapons captured.

311910 Co A made a foot march back to BARRACUDA and closed at 311710.

Co C patrol conducted saturation ambushes in their area. Co A departed BARRACUDA by LCU at 311930 for PORPOISE. Co B perimeter security along with Co C (-)

1 June

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 12 to OPORD 11 - 66.

010700 Co C (-) departed BARRACUDA for PUMA.

010820 Co C (-) found one (1) weapon (US bolt action) at YS014568.

At YS014568 Co C (-) received SA fire from estimated 6 VC via YS013560, fire was returned with unknown results.

010933 Co C (-) located squad size base camp that had not been used recently via YS962585.

011120 Co C located a larger base camp at YS068578, 1 VC KIA (BC) and one US car. 1/5 SIG, a second base camp was located via YS010570 with negative results.

Co A remained in PORPOISE, Co B remained as perimeter security for BARRACUDA.

2 June

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 13 to OPORD 11 - 66.

1/18 continues Operation LEXINGTON III with Co B conducting search and destroy operations in Target 19.

020732 Co C is ready for extraction.

020840 airstrike with M-54 Depth Charges was begun to clear channel for Co B.

020940 all Co B elements landed via YS032605, YS034605, YS040607.

021200 Co A and Recon Plt arrived at BARRACUDA.

021345 Co B located small base camp of two huts via YS029613, night ambushes were conducted in area.

3 June

Operation LEXINGTON III continues with Co B conducting S & D operations to the northwest of the area via YS032615.

031030 Recon Plt located 1 hut w/storage bin empty, capacity 2-3 tons. YS948595

031345 Co B found a fortified VC position via YS023618, platoon size, also found several cal 106, 57 or 90mm shell cases.

031450 Recon attacked one sampan killed 4 VC (BC) captured one M1 carbine at YS965588.

032140 Co B ambushed a sampan resulting in 3 VC KIA, one (1) Russian carbine and one (1) grease gun captured via YS015614.

Co B continues saturation ambushes. Co A at BARRACUDA and Co C at PORPOISE.

4 June

040615 Co A departed Op Base BARRACUDA by LCM.

040900 C & C received SA fire from via YS007521.

041025 Co B requested Arty fire YS013614 on a suspected enemy position.

041125 Co A found 10 tons of rice via YS993536.

041330 Co B was airlifted from AO 19.

041415 Co B closed BARRACUDA.

041520 C & C ship located 2 huts & 2 sampans via YS015607.

041545 C & C ship spotted sampan at YS994587, FAC checked out w/unk results.

During the morning Bn utilized Air Force Air armed with 1000 lb GP with Daisy Outer Fusos to clear future LZ.

5 June

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 14 to OPORD 11 - 66.

Co A continued to patrol in assigned area.

050925 Recon closed BARRACUDA and brought in a M1 carbine and documents.

051155 Co A located an abandoned base camp consisting of 20 huts via YS966840.

051810 resupply of water to Co A was completed by the C & C ship.

Co A conducted saturation ambushes during the night. Co B remained in area PORPOISE, Co C in area BARRACUDA.

6 June

1/18 published Frag Order 15 to OPORD 11 - 66.

060700 Co C departed BARRACUDA for area of operation

060800 Co C landed via YS937687 conducted extensive patrol the south, south east and south west.

061145 Co A extracted by LCM from via YS028597 and moved to BARRACUDA.

061225 Co B moved from PORPOISE to BARRACUDA by LCU.

061330 Co A departed BARRACUDA for PORPOISE.

061405 Co C engaged a sampan via YS947625 resulting in two (2) VC KIA (BC) and one sampan destroyed.

Co C conducted saturation ambushes during the night. Co B located at BARRACUDA.

7 June

Co C continued extensive patrolling with negative contact.

071220 Co C spotted a sampan moving south at YS948678. Sampan turned around and a fire team was called out to search area with negative results.

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Co C conducted saturation search during the night. Co B remained in area BARRACUDA, Co A remained at PORPOISE.

8 June

Operation LEXINGTON III continued with Co B conducting a sealift by LCM's at 080000.

081020 a base camp was located via YS995520 with one bunker, one (1) VC was sighted in the area of base camp who fled in a SE direction from YS010520. Upon pursuing the VC, two (2) booby trapped grenades and a trail with punji stakes was located at YS005515.

081250 contact was made with unknown number of VC at YS014532 resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC) and one (1) 7.62 rifle captured.

081342 heavy small arms fire was received from vic of YS003516 resulting in one (1) US WIA and one (1) US injured.

081415 contact was made with 3 VC at YS998538 resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC) and one (1) Japanese 7.62 weapon captured, VC broke contact and fled into swamp.

080930 Co C was sealifted out of their AO and brought to BARRACUDA.

081240 Co C departed BARRACUDA by LCU for PORPOISE.

080800 Co A departed PORPOISE.

081200 Co A arrived at BARRACUDA, assumed perimeter security for battalion.

9 June

1/18 published Frag Order 16 to OPORD 11 - 66.

091200 Operation LEXINGTON III terminated.

091415 Co B and Recon airlifted out of AO, both elements had negative contact.

091130 128 Air Mob element killed two (2) VC (BC) and sank (1) sampson, YS970626.

091800 Co B and Recon and Co C closed Bearcat.

091830 Co A, Battery 1/7 Arty and elements of Bn Headquarters moved by LCU from BARRACUDA.

Elements moving by sealift will remain over night aboard LCM and LCU in Saigon Harbor. Rear area at PORPOISE was sealifted by LCU to Saigon Navy Yards on 10 June and 11 June.

8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: A 1/7 Arty (105 How) was direct support of 1/18 Inf during the entire operation. By occupying the same operations base as the 1/18 Inf the fires were timely and accurate.

b. Air Force:

(1) TAC AIR was employed on pre planned strikes. Bn S-3 Air coordinated air request with ALO and submitted all requests to Bde.

(2) Two missions were flown utilizing 1000 lbs Frag with Daisy Cutter Fuses. These were used to clear future LZ's for helicopter assault. The first mission had two duds in two areas. Other than for the duds, the missions were very successful. One mission was flown with M-54 depth charges to clear suspected water mines. Results unknown.

c. Army Aviation: Army Aviation was used every day of the operation. Numerous moves of company and platoon size were made. Fire teams were on station or on call at the operation base (on a daily basis) and the C & C ship was used seven to ten hours daily. Due to the inaccessibility of the R332* the 1/18 Inf depended greatly on the Army aviation support which was exemplary. Support was provided by the 162d and 128th Aviation companies of the 11th Aviation Bn. The aircraft were used to their maximum capability on numerous occasions in the evacuation of wounded and in the resupply and extraction of platoon size elements. The success of LEXINGTON III was directly proportional to the outstanding effort and accomplishments of Army Aviation.

9. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses: KIA - (1), WIA - (4).

b. Enemy Losses:

VC KIA (BC): 37 (3 by Army Air)

WEAPONS AND AMMO

Small arms - 30

Frag grenades - 51

SA ammo - 2172 rds

Grenade fuses - 750

Comp "C" explosive - 100 lbs

Sub-machine gun mag - 8

Grain propellant - 7 tubes

INSTALLATIONS

Base Camp - 14

Ammo facilities - 2

Hospital - 1

Fortified positions - 4

Bunkers - 10

Huts - 14

Landing dock - 1

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WEAPONS AND AMMO (cont)

Saltpeter - 100 lbs
Knives - 2
Slingshot - 1

MATERIALS

Combat packs - 2
Sampans - 37
Fuel oil - 1002 gal
Emory cloth - 300 sheets (12" x 12")
Water jugs - 30 (20 and 50 gal cap)
Rice - 20,100 lbs
Cement - 200 lbs
Salt - 5 lbs
Gronade press/mold - 1
Eating dishware and utensils - 25 sets
Mirror - 1
8" boat propeller - 1
2 1/2 T-T hydraulic jack - 1
75 lb anvil - 1
3" woodcutting saws - 3
Portable loudspeaker - 1
10 gal cans - 8
Kerosene - 1 gal
Soldering rods - 20
Pistol belts - 3
Rice threshing machine - 1
Misc clothes - for 40 pers
Misc tools - wrenches, files, spades, picks, shovels, rivets, nuts and bolts, planes, wedges.
Fishing tackle gear w/100 pieces of lead
Misc med supplies (vitamins, penicillin, saline solution ampules, gauge, etc)
Green parrot
Dong Hoa village government rubber stamp

DOCUMENTS

Propaganda books
Medical training books
Receipt from LY NHON Finance Agent
Roster of party members (poss LY NHON village)
Sketch of unknown hamlet
VC instructions on use of claymore mines
6 envelopes sent to C702 unit from various other units w/code numbers
VC receipt pad for ammo (no unit shown)

c. Installation Locations:

BASE CAMPS

YS016555
YS019555
YS030565
YS944626
XS947614
XS962582
XS018578
XS029613
XS964588
XS87541
YS008563
YS002545
YS006545
YS014533

HUTS

YS030565
XS958616
XS945609
XS946604
YS018578
YS012610
YS029613
XS948595
YS030587
XS986540
YS987541
YS030587
YS006545
YS077544

AMMO FACILITY

XS956628
XS958616

HOSPITAL

XS954609

FORTIFIED POSITIONS

YS023618
XS995521
YS008568
YS100492

10. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE:

a. Personnel:

21 May 66

8 June 66

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FWD
HEB: 122
A 136

REAR
214
77

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117
148

REAR
201
35

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a. Personnel (cont)

	FWD	REAR	FWD	REAR
C	132	62	135	58
Total	556	377	535	332

b. Administrative Plans: Flow of personnel, mail, etc was best handled by using the C & G helicopter on a scheduled run daily between base camp and the FWD CP.

11. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Several rice caches discovered in the Rung Sat Special Zone were destroyed by dumping it into the salt water which is found throughout the area. The base camp installations were well constructed and beyond the destructive capability of the companies operating in the AO. Engineer demolition team was on call at the operation base and also conducted instruction on demolition techniques to the companies when in reserve in the same area. Due to the many rivers and streams in the AO it was necessary to carry river crossing equipment on many operations. Nylon ropes and air mattresses were adequate. Sampans captured were also difficult to destroy. The most successful and fastest method used was a claymore on the bottom of the sampan.

b. The salt water predominant in the RSSZ caused medical problems when operation lasted more than 48 hours. Immersion foot, infection of any insect bites or small cuts were serious enough to place these individuals on light duty and out down the combat strength of the unit.

12. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: LEXINGTON III was termed a highly successful operation by COMUSMACV and COMNAVFORV. The high kill ratio and the damage to Viet Cong base camps and to their equipment and food stocks were not only effective in reducing the VC disruption of friendly shipping through the RSSZ, but they were major factors in maintaining the high morale and aggressiveness of the US troops involved. The conduct of Phase III operations improved the operation in two respects. First of all, TACR Alpha was by far the most lucrative area for operations. Secondly, by lengthening the time a unit spent in the swamp to 48 hours its effectiveness was increased while the favorable by-products of increasing the units time at Vung Tau and at the FWD operational base were also significant. When the 1/18 Inf returns to the RSSZ Phase III - type operations should be duplicated in whatever target areas are selected.

As an overall improvement in US Army Military operations in the RSSZ it would be a definite advantage for the US Army unit commander to have complete tactical freedom in his TACR, not only for his ability to respond immediately to the latest intelligence, but perhaps equally as important, to provide him an opportunity to plan ahead with some assurance that the plan will be executed. This is necessary when such requirements as LHM's, LCVP's, Monitors, Commandments, salvage ships, Mark 54 Depth Charges, Air Force or Navy air strikes, and others must be fulfilled. Coordination lead time involved is at least two days, preferably four or five days if LZ preparation using Daisy Outters is required.

13. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions:

(1) When operating in the RSSZ, operations should not exceed 48 hours without an opportunity for troops to "dry out". Two to four days of remaining dry and treatment of sores and infections were adequate to allow units to go on another operation.

(2) A great deal of coordination is necessary with the VNN to conduct timely sealift operations. The COMNAVFORV LNO's presence in the 1/18 Inf TOC proved invaluable in accomplishing this coordination. By accompanying the Bn Co in the Command and Control helicopter during sealifts his direct radio contact with the R&B Boat Company's Naval Advisor provided the necessary link in this difficult coordination.

(3) Army Aviation (HUIB and HUIB aircraft) is an absolute necessity in operation in the RSSZ.

(4) More freedom of action by the Battalion operating in a TACR is necessary to take advantage of the most recent intelligence and activities of the VC. The time required to clear areas at time was too long to take advantage of the operation.

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(5) With the exception of targets not being accurate as reported, the intelligence base for the operation was largely valid in that the VC forces:

(a) Did have unopposed freedom of movement.

(b) Used the waterways as a primary route of travel as evidenced by the several successful ambushes thereon.

(c) Had the majority of their facilities within a short distance from the waterways, thereby facilitating movement and the transporting of supplies and personnel to and from these facilities.

(6) That few booby traps were encountered probably resulted from the fact that the area was considered safe by the VC because of difficult terrain, excellent concealment from air and ground in the mangrove forest areas, and that few operations had penetrated the area previously.

(7) VC personnel and material losses will probably have an adverse effect on VC future plans and operations. They have probably suffered a loss of prestige in the RSSZ because of US casualties as compared to their losses. Some of the friendly indigenous personnel that inhabit the RSSZ will now have reason to doubt the VC propaganda of "ownership" and infallibility in this area as a result of unrestricted US movements and VC losses.

(8) Although no contact was made with the VC 225th Engr Bn or its elements, it still cannot be confirmed whether or not a unit does exist with this identity.

(9) The fact that locations of bases found are now known, as well as the fact that the VC were forced to evacuate and disperse, will cause them to have to relocate, reconstruct, or repair these facilities. Because of the terrain, VC efforts in this regard will be hampered for sometime, and the capability to support travel of VC units through the area is reduced.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) New arrivals have a tendency to fire prior to identifying the enemy or insuring that moving objects are not friendly troops. Green Troops must be indoctrinated to let the enemy close, with the idea of a first round kill.

(2) Insect bites and open sores became infected quickly in the dirty salt water found throughout the RSSZ. Operations in this area should not exceed 48 hours, troops should be given adequate time for personal hygiene and treatment of infected insect bites.

(3) When the audio terminals of the PRC-25 radio get wet the radio becomes inoperable. Corrective action of using a cigarette lighter or matches can dry these terminals. A wet handset also makes transmission impossible and by covering the handset with aluminum foil from the accessory pack of C-Rations or with a plastic bag this problem is greatly reduced.

(4) Extreme caution must be exercised in selecting landing sites during sealift operations due to tidal changes and the inconsistency of the soil composition in the RSSZ. Tide data can be obtained from S-2, which is a helping factor in selecting time and place. Detailed reconnaissance insures the best possible landing sites.

(5) LZ's and PZ's are few and far between in the RSSZ; however by clearing some of the B-52 bomb craters, extraction could be performed by one HUID going in at a time. Daisy Cutters can be employed to clear areas for LZ's. Three LZ's were cleared for operations in an area inaccessible by any means except air-lift.

(6) When the short or jungle antennas are inadequate the erection of a field expedient antenna will increase the transmission range to where good communication are established. RTO's should be indoctrinated on the use of field expedient antennas.

(7) Communications between individuals in the RSSZ can be accomplished by hand clapping as this is a prevalent background noise in the mangrove swamp.

(8) River crossing equipment to include a 100-150 ft rope and air mattresses should be carried by each platoon for river crossing operations.

(9) The pace count changes considerably in the mangrove swamps and each unit should check its pace for 100 meters. Approx 280 steps were used to measure 100 meters.

(10) The 1:25,000 Photo-Maps of the RSSZ are considerably better than the standard 1:50,000 maps. These maps should be made of all Vietnam and issued through normal channels. The few that the battalion used were given by the COMNAVFORV LHO.

(11) The few aerial photo maps available proved to be invaluable and units going into this area of operations should request air photos of their entire TACR prior to the commencement of the operation.

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(12) Two more M-60 MG's for the wpns plt of each rifle company added considerably to the fire power of the platoon and company. Whenever the weapons platoon of a rifle company is used as a fourth rifle platoon the M-60 MG's should be made available.

(13) Each platoon should have 4 PRC-25's due to the number of squad size ambushes each platoon is required to place out at times.

(14) The platoon column is the only practical formation in the RSSZ because of the dense undergrowth.

(15) Individuals morale and alertness decreased after about 48 hours in the swamp. Rotating troops approx every 48 hours and giving them a 2 - 4 day break solves this problem.

(16) The VC in the RSSZ did not appear to be well trained or aggressive.

(17) The ambush was the most successful maneuver throughout LEXINGTON III. Maximum ambushes should be established on this type of operation. The use of RH and SLAR reports assists in picking ambush locations.

(18) In open areas such as rice paddies, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton mounted radar is very effective.

(19) The use of sectionalized paper plates proved most satisfactory in serving A-Rations in the FWD area. S-4 should assure that an adequate amount of paper plates is kept on hand. By using paper plates man-hours and cargo wt. are saved.

(20) The COMNAVFORV LNO located right in the En TOC proved most valuable in coordination requirements with VNN and US Navy. When-ever possible a LNO should be attached or some arrangements for coordination should be established daily.

John C. Bard


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
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TAOR "A"



INCLOSURE NR ____

K8



INCL 1